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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most dramatic examples of increasing interaction 
across national boundaries in recent years has been the burgeoning 
volume of transnational transactions in corporate equities.1 Most 
developed capitalist countries impose affirmative obligations on is- 
suers of corporate equity to disclose certain information about 
themselves. While these obligations are imposed on issuers, they 
are triggered by transactions. The growth in transnational transac- 
tions is thus increasingly raising difficult issues concerning the reach 
of differing national regimes.2 Given the magnitude of legal re- 
sources devoted to compliance with such disclosure regulations,3 
they promise to feature prominently in the larger discussion of 
1. Foreign share transactions on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993 had a total value 
of $1.2 trillion. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1994, at 89 
(1995) [hereinafter 1994 FACT BOOK]. The total value of share transactions on the New York 
Stock Exchange in 1993 was approximately $2.28 trillion, a figure that must be doubled to 
compare with the $1.2 trillion figure because it counts a purchase and sale as a single transac- 
tion. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1993, at 7 (1994). 
Compare an estimate of the 1986 value of transnational securities on the New York Stock 
Exchange of $378 billion, see 1994 FACT BOOK, supra, at 89, with a Salomon Brothers esti- 
mate of the total value of international equity trading during the same time period of $750 
billion. See Steve Lohr, Investors Retreating from Foreign Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
1987, at Al. 
2. See infra Part V. For a description of securities regulation regimes in other countries, 
see Javier Lizardi Calderon & Samuel Wolff, Mexico, in 10C INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MAR- 
KETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, at 4A-1 (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff eds., 
1982 & Supp. July 1991); Jeff G. Cowan & Richard J. Lachcik, Canada, in 10B INTERNA- 
TIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 4-1 (Supp. Apr. 1992); 
Georgette Miller, France, in 10C INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REG- 
ULATION, supra, at 7-1; G.K. Morse, United Kingdom, in 10C INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 6-1; Eberhard H. Rohm, Germany, in 
10D INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 8C-1 
(Supp. Dec. 1996); Misao Tatsuta, Japan, in 10D INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND 
SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 11-1. 
3. One estimate concludes that aggregate expenses for a normal common stock offering 
range between 1.5 and 2% of the proceeds of the underwriting. See LouIs Loss & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 339 (3d ed. 1989) (citing William J. Grant, Jr., Over- 
view of the Underwriting Process, in SECURmES UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE 
25, 32-33 (Kenneth J. Bialkin & William J. Grant, Jr. eds., 1985)). Thus, in 1995 alone, ap- 
proximately $1.6 billion (2% of $81.7 billion) was devoted to compliance with the U.S. securi- 
ties regime. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1995, at 9 
(1996). 
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the role of national legal regimes in a world of growing 
interdependence.4 
A securities transaction has several dimensions of nationality: 
the nationality of the issuer, the place of execution, the residence of 
the buyer and, if it is a secondary transaction, the residence of the 
seller. A transaction is transnational if at least one of these dimen- 
sions involves a country different from the country of the other 
dimensions. Each of the countries associated with a transnational 
transaction can make a claim for imposing its regime on the issuer 
whose security is involved. This article addresses the question of 
which of these countries should have the authority to regulate the 
issuer's disclosures. 
The answer to this complex question is of growing importance 
for the proper functioning of the global economy. Strong argu- 
ments can be made that appropriate disclosure regulation corrects 
market failures that otherwise would lead to misallocations of capi- 
tal and management inefficiencies. Disclosure regulations can also 
increase investor utility under certain circumstances. Compliance 
with these regulations, however, is costly, and the mere prospect of 
their application can deter potential transactions that would be ben- 
eficial to the parties involved. Complicating the matter further, the 
proper balance between these considerations of benefit and cost is 
not the same for all issuers around the world under all circum- 
stances. Also, for any issuer of a given country and set of circum- 
stances, knowledge about what the appropriate balance is will not 
be evenly spread around the world, nor will there be a consensus 
about it, even among the persons who are the best informed. 
4. The transnational reach of domestic regulation is an essential part of the modem ap- 
proach to the subject area traditionally labeled as "international law." Most of the cases and 
commentary until now have involved just a few areas of substantive regulation, most conspic- 
uously criminal law, welfare legislation for seamen, antitrust regulation, export controls, and 
the antifraud provisions of securities laws. See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON & BART S. FISHER, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 813-53 
(1986); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEM- 
PORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY 1295-392 (1981); 
COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
135-91 (1995); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 885-983 (4th 
ed. 1994); ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 515-704 (1991). 
Recently the issue of the transnational impact of domestic regulation has come up in a 
more indirect fashion in the areas of environmental regulation and labor standards. This 
involves the situation where country A imposes more stringent environmental or labor regu- 
lations on producers operating within its territory than does country B on producers operat- 
ing within its territory. A, in order to prevent B's producers from having a cost advantage 
over A's producers, prohibits imports of products from B unless the producers conform with 
A's more stringent standards. For an overview of such issues, see JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 559-95 (3d ed. 1995). 
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Proper apportionment of the authority to regulate involves con- 
sideration of which country's officials are likely to be most knowl- 
edgeable about the benefits and costs of disclosure for a given 
issuer and circumstance. Also, given the remaining uncertainty as 
to the proper trade-off, the proper apportionment of authority re- 
quires consideration of on which authorities the benefits of a good 
decision and the harms of a bad one will be concentrated. The issue 
ultimately requires hoeing the narrow row between permitting the 
needless evasion of valuable rules that correct market failures and 
the unnecessary expense and frustration of hindering beneficial 
transactions. The global aggregate of economic activity impacted 
by this apportionment of authority is enormous. The gains from 
getting the balance right are potentially very large. Yet, to date, the 
question has not been a subject of much sustained, serious aca- 
demic inquiry.5 
This article approaches the question of which countries should 
regulate which issuers with the goal of determining what apportion- 
ment of regulatory authority would most enhance global economic 
welfare.6 While this goal of maximizing economic welfare drives 
the analysis, the recommended apportionment is clearly within the 
range that would be permitted under international law. The analy- 
sis also suggests that an international agreement on a single regime 
for all issuers around the world would not, for the medium-term 
future anyway, enhance global welfare as much as properly appor- 
tioned regulation by national regimes. 
5. There are some notable exceptions. For two less theoretical articles backing tradi- 
tional investor protection, see James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communica- 
tion: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. INTL. L. & 
Bus. 119 (1996); J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors Under U.S. Securities 
Laws: The Impact of International Regulatory Competition, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 431 
(1994). For a less theoretical article taking a position closer to the issuer-nationality ap- 
proach that I advocate here, see Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. 
Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413 (1995). For 
other, more theoretical works in this area, see Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The 
Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INTL. L. & BUS. 207 
(1996); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regula- 
tion in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (1997). Choi and Guzman agree 
with me that foreign issuers whose shares are sold to U.S. residents or are traded in the 
United States should not necessarily be subjected to the U.S. regime. They come to signifi- 
cantly different conclusions, however, in that they favor giving issuers the freedom to choose 
the jurisdiction governing their disclosure. For reasons discussed infra in sections IV.B.3 and 
V.B.2, I believe that such freedom would lead to an undesirable "race to the bottom" in the 
content of national disclosure regimes. 
6. Distributional issues, in the sense of redistribution from rich persons to poor persons 
or vice versa, are not at the heart of this question. As will be developed further, see infra 
notes 71, 103 and accompanying text, whatever approach to regulating disclosure is adopted, it will not likely have any systematic wealth redistribution effect. 
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The market for a security is "fully global" if it matters little to 
the probability of a transaction taking place whether the issuer, the 
parties, and the place of execution are of the same country or differ- 
ent ones. Part I examines the extent of globalization today and the 
process by which it is occurring. It considers trends in the factors 
favoring globalization and in the counterfactors resisting it. Part I 
concludes that while the market today is by no means fully global, it 
will, over the next decade or so, move substantially in that direction 
for all issuers of any significance, absent obstruction by nationally 
based disclosure regulation. 
Parts II, III and IV address the question of which country or 
countries should regulate which issuers. Part II considers what are 
as a general matter the benefits and costs of an issuer disclosing 
more about itself. Part III examines how these benefits and costs 
are divided up among the countries related to any transnational 
transaction involving an issuer's shares. It considers three dimen- 
sions of nationality: the residence of the buyer,7 the place of the 
transaction, and the nationality of the issuer.8 The issuer's disclo- 
sure behavior affects each of these countries. The analysis of how 
each is affected reveals the distribution of the disclosure behavior's 
benefits and costs, and hence of the benefits and costs of the regula- 
tions that govern it. 
Given this, Part IV considers what apportionment of regulatory 
authority among these countries would lead the issuer to disclose at 
a level closest to that which would maximize global economic wel- 
fare. It concludes that each country should be the exclusive regula- 
tor of all issuers of its nationality, regardless of where in the world 
the shares of that country's issuers are offered and traded, to whom 
they are offered, and among whom they are traded. 
7. In a primary transaction, the issuer is the seller. The nationality of the issuer and seller 
thus do not constitute separate dimensions of nationality. In a secondary transaction, the 
seller is someone different than the issuer. This additional fourth dimension of nationality 
will not be considered in this analysis, however, because the secondary transaction seller's 
direct stake in issuer disclosure - being protected from making a damaging securities portfo- 
lio adjustment as a result of being poorly informed - is essentially the same as the buyer's 
stake. The only difference is formalistic. The portfolio adjustment the seller is choosing is 
whether or not to sell, and the portfolio adjustment the buyer is choosing is whether or not to 
buy. The policy issues raised by the buyer dimension and seller dimension of nationality are 
thus identical and do not merit the additional complexity that separate treatment would 
involve. 
8. The nationality of an issuer would be determined by where the issuer as a firm has its 
center of gravity. Factors important to this determination include the location of the entre- 
preneurs who formed the enterprise, the location of the current headquarters, and the loca- 
tion where the bulk of its operations are conducted. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. 
The issuer's jurisdiction of incorporation would not be a factor in this determination, nor 
would the residency of its shareholders. 
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Part V is a preliminary application of these findings to U.S. pol- 
icy. In the U.S. selection of which issuers onto which to impose its 
regime, the traditional focus has been on the national residence of 
the buyer. The articulated rationale for this selection has been "in- 
vestor protection": the protection of U.S. investors from making 
damaging securities choices as a result of being poorly informed. 
This rationale leads directly to the principle that the only transac- 
tions that should trigger U.S. disclosure regulation are those involv- 
ing U.S. investors, but that they should do so even in cases where 
the issuer involved already is complying with some other country's 
disclosure regime. 
Recently, however, the SEC has proposed a different, "capital 
market protection" approach. This approach maintains the goal of 
protecting certain investors from being poorly informed but refor- 
mulates the class of persons protected to consist of all purchasers in 
the U.S. market, wherever their residence, but not U.S. purchasers 
in foreign markets. Thus, the SEC is proposing a shift in focus to 
the place of the transaction. 
The analysis that this article employs, however, shows that 
neither the traditional investor protection approach nor the pro- 
posed market protection approach is in the enlightened self-interest 
of the United States. In contrast, I conclude that the United States 
should apply its regime only to issuers of U.S. nationality, but do so 
regardless of the location of transactions in the issuer's shares and 
regardless of who the buyers are. This set of issuers, of course, is 
exactly the same set of issuers the United States would regulate 
under the optimal apportionment authority at the international 
level recommended here. 
Globalization is an occasion for a fundamental reassessment of 
the proper function of mandatory disclosure, a reassessment that 
can benefit from our greatly increased sophistication about finan- 
cial economics since the passage of the securities acts in the 1930s. 
As Part II demonstrates, the traditional investor protection ration- 
ale misidentifies the most important stake that a country can have 
in the disclosure practices of an issuer: the efficiency gains in its 
real economy that can be derived from better capital allocation and 
more effective disciplining of managers to act in the best interests of 
shareholders. This misidentification was relatively harmless in an 
era of primarily domestic transactions, because investor protection 
and efficiency considerations each led to applying the rules to the 
same set of issuers. Now that the United States must make deci- 
sions concerning the reach of the U.S. regime to issuers whose 
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shares are involved in transnational transactions, however, the error 
can be much more costly. 
The gains and costs of applying a particular set of disclosure 
rules to a given issuer are, as shown in Part III, primarily concen- 
trated within the country with which the issuer is most closely asso- 
ciated - that is, the country of which it is a "national." Despite the 
rise of "multinational" corporations, the bulk of the world's eco- 
nomic activity is still undertaken by enterprises (including many 
that are labeled "multinational") for which one country is the resi- 
dence of the entrepreneurs that took the enterprise public, the 
place of its headquarters, and the location of the largest portion of 
its operations.9 With the increasing globalization of financial infor- 
mation and ease of effecting transactions abroad, the mobility of 
investment funds is increasing dramatically. For at least the next 
few decades this is likely to make investors' portfolios more inter- 
national than the issuers in which they invest. This increasing inter- 
nationalization of portfolios should not obscure the fact that, as the 
analysis of national stakes shows, it is still in the best interests of the 
United States and of the global economy as a whole for disclosure 
regulation to be undertaken at the national level and for the United 
States to apply its regime only to those issuers that have their eco- 
nomic center of gravity in the United States. 
I. THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION 
An essential first step to analyzing which countries should regu- 
late which issuers is understanding why transnational securities 
transactions take place and what their impact is. By definition, the 
existence of transnational transactions in corporate equities means 
that the market for the securities involved reaches beyond the 
boundaries of the country of the issuer. Such transactions have to 
reach a certain level of intensity, however, before their impact is 
sufficient for us to say that the whole world forms "one market" in 
the same way that a country has traditionally formed one market 
for the equities of its nationally known issuers. 
The extent of the impact of transnational transactions in form- 
ing a one-world market can be measured along two dimensions: 
9. In 1990, profits from foreign operations of U.S. corporations amounted to only about 
one-sixth of all corporate profits. See SURV. CURRENT Bus., Dec. 1992, at 14 tbl.6.16C. In 
1989, overseas assets of U.S. corporations designated as "multinational" were only about 
one-fifth of their total assets. See Jeffrey H. Lowe & Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad: 1989 Benchmark Survey Results, SURV. CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1991, at 29 
tbl.1. 
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price and pattern of investor holdings. The price dimension con- 
cerns the extent to which such transnational transactions assure that 
the "law of one price" applies - that is, that a security promising 
its holder a given future cash flow will have the same price 
whatever the nationality of its issuer or of the exchange on which it 
is principally traded.10 The price dimension is often referred to by 
financial economists as "integration."" 
The pattern of holdings dimension concerns the extent to which 
transnational transactions result in the typical investor around the 
world holding an equity portfolio containing shares of issuers of dif- 
ferent countries roughly in proportion to the countries' respective 
total market capitalizations, as opposed to a portfolio primarily 
containing shares of issuers of her own country.12 Putting it another 
way, the market for a security is "fully global" along this dimension 
if it matters little to the probability of a transaction taking place 
whether the issuer, the parties, and the place of execution are of the 
same country or different ones. 
The extent to which the market for corporate equities is fully 
global along both the price and holdings dimensions depends on 
two contending sets of factors considered below. Factors favoring a 
global market in large part reflect two constant pressures inherent 
in the economics of investing: the desire by investors to earn high 
10. More precisely, the law of one price is said to apply where a security with a future 
cash flow determined by a given probability distribution - conditional on the publicly avail- 
able information known by the best informed investors - has the same price whatever the 
nationality of the issuer or exchange on which it is traded. 
11. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. 
12. I use the word "roughly" because, as we shall see, differences among investors of 
different national residences may call for deviations from these proportions even in a market 
for securities in which distance otherwise means nothing. Relevant differences among inves- 
tors include their tax situation, their consumption of nontraded goods in a world of unpre- 
dictable inflation and deviations of currency exchange changes from purchasing power 
equity, and their need to hedge against risks associated with human capital. See infra section 
I.D. 
For the market for securities to be fully global along the holdings dimension, the average 
U.S. and Japanese investors would both have to have roughly 40% of their share portfolio in 
U.S. stocks and 28% in Japanese stocks. This estimate is derived from figures showing that in 
1995, the total capitalization of all the world's publicly traded issuers was estimated at $17 
trillion, the total capitalization of U.S. issuers was about $7 trillion, and the total capitaliza- 
tion of Japanese publicly traded issuers was about $4.7 trillion. See JAMES L. COCHRANE T 
AL., FOREIGN EQUITIES AND U.S. INVESTORS: BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS SEPARAT- 
ING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1 (New York Stock Exch. Working Paper 95-04, 1995); Big Board 
Capitalization Hits a Record $5 Trillion, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1995, at C17. In fact, however, 
investors display an extreme home bias. For example, at least as recently as 1989, U.S. inves- 
tors on average held 93.8% of their portfolios in U.S.-issuer stocks and only 1.3% in 
Japanese-issuer stocks, and Japanese investors on average held only 0.3% of their portfolios 
in U.S.-issuer stocks and 98.1% in Japanese-issuer stocks. See Kenneth R. French & James 
M. Poterba, Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets, AM. ECON. REV., May 
1991, at 222 & tbl.1. 
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expected returns and the desire to reduce risk through diversifica- 
tion. The counterfactors to a global market are barriers to these 
pressures that traditionally have been sufficiently high to result in 
the market for most equities being largely segmented along na- 
tional lines. A weakening of these counterfactors in recent decades 
has led to the market for corporate equities becoming more 
globalized. 
Part I addresses the current status of market globalization and 
its potential in the next few decades. The extent of market global- 
ization along the price dimension is unclear; some financial econo- 
mists argue that it is already fully global, and others argue that it is 
not.13 As for the pattern of holdings dimension, however, the mar- 
ket is clearly far from fully global. Full globalization would involve 
a manifold increase in transnational share transactions. Rather 
than being a small fraction of purely domestic transactions, transna- 
tional transactions would come to dominate them. Such a develop- 
ment would profoundly impact national regulation of issuer 
disclosure. It is a development that ultimately will have to be faced, 
quite possibly in the next decade or so, because the counterfactors 
favoring segmented national markets will continue to weaken while 
factors favoring a global one will continue inherently strong. 
A. Factors Favoring a Global Market 
1. Returns to Reallocation of Savings 
The existence of differences among nations in domestic savings 
relative to the quality of available opportunities for domestic real 
investment works in favor of a global securities market.14 Real in- 
vestment opportunities in each nation display diminishing marginal 
returns. The proposed projects that constitute any given nation's 
set of domestic real investment opportunities are bound to have dif- 
fering earnings prospects. If projects are implemented in rank or- 
der of their prospects, the more of a nation's projects that are 
implemented - that is, the greater the amount of total domestic 
real investment - the lower the return on the marginal project. 
The amount of available domestic savings and the sets of pro- 
posed domestic investment projects are unlikely to be distributed 
13. See infra section I.C. 
14. Real (as opposed to financial) investment involves the use of resources such as skilled 
labor, machinery, bricks, and mortar to create new capacity to produce a particular good or 
service. Financial investment involves the acquisition of rights to receive cash returns - for 
example, the purchase of a share or bond, the lending of money, or the deposit of money in 
an interest-bearing savings account. 
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among nations such that, if there were no transnational investment 
and each nation invested all its domestic savings in just its projects, 
the expected return on the marginal project of each nation would 
be exactly the same. If country A's marginal project would have, in 
the absence of transnational investment, a lower expected rate of 
return than would country B's marginal project, country A has 
more savings relative to the quality of its investment opportunities 
than country B.15 A reallocation of savings for investment from A 
to B reduces the number of projects implemented in A and in- 
creases the number of projects implemented in B. This enhances 
global economic efficiency because the projects that go unimple- 
mented in A have a lower expected return than the resulting addi- 
tional ones that are implemented in B. As long as a shift of funds 
from A to B will have this result, there will exist incentives for per- 
sons with savings in A to invest them in B. 
The market purchase of the securities of the issuer of one nation 
by an investor in another nation is one of the ways that transna- 
tional reallocations of savings occur. There are other institutions 
through which reallocations occur as well, such as internal financial 
flows of multinational corporations engaging in direct investment, 
bank lending, private block purchases of securities, and even the 
purchase of government debt. But publicly traded securities in an 
international market, just like those in a domestic market, have the 
advantages that they are liquid and facilitate investor 
diversification. 
2. Greater Diversification 
The future return on most securities is probabilistic, not certain, 
and so each has a certain riskiness associated with it. Global invest- 
ing offers investors a way of reducing the negative impact of this 
riskiness to their welfare more than is possible with exclusively do- 
mestic investing. To understand why requires a brief diversion into 
15. A related phenomenon has been the continuing U.S. trade deficit, which creates dol- 
lars abroad in need of investment. In essence, the United States, with its chronic federal 
budget deficit and low private savings rate, has a low amount of domestically generated sav- 
ings relative to its investment opportunities, which means that there are incentives for foreign 
investors to invest in U.S. securities. In 1994, for example, the dollar volume of shares 
purchased by foreigners from U.S. residents on the New York Stock Exchange exceeded the 
dollar volume of shares purchased on the Exchange by U.S. residents from foreigners by an 
estimated $7.7 billion. See 1994 FACT BOOK, supra note 1, at 89 (basing its estimation on an 
annualized projection of the figure for the first nine months). This represented 16% of the 
total capital inflow into the United States in 1994. See Russell B. Scholl, The International 
Investment Position of the United States in 1994, SURV. CURRENT BUS., June 1995, at 52, 56-57 
& tbl.J. 
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the theory of portfolio choice, a pillar of the modern approach to 
finance. 
Portfolio choice theory teaches the investor to focus on what the 
acquisition of a given security does to his whole portfolio of securi- 
ties rather than on the security's characteristics in isolation.16 The 
critical lesson of portfolio choice theory is that holding a diversified 
set of risky securities results in lower risk for any given level of 
expected return.17 The expected return of a portfolio is the aggre- 
gate of the expected returns of its individual securities. The vari- 
ance of a portfolio is not, however, the aggregate of the variances of 
its individual securities, because the actual returns of some of the 
securities will likely exceed their expected returns and the actual 
returns of others will likely fall short of their expected returns. 
Consequently, the deviations of the securities that perform better 
than expected and the securities that perform worse than expected 
will, to one extent or another, cancel each other out. By diversify- 
ing in accordance with the dictates of portfolio theory, the investor 
maximizes, for any given level of portfolio expected return, the ex- 
tent to which this type of canceling out is likely to occur. 
There are limits, however, to the effectiveness of diversification 
for reducing risk. This is most easily seen in terms of a simplified 
model of portfolio choice theory that focuses on the correlation be- 
tween return on each individual risky security and the return on the 
market of securities as a whole.18 
16. Theories of individual investment behavior assume that the purpose of saving and 
investment is to consume the results of the investments at the end of the investment period. 
Because funds are fungible, whatever the combination of gains and losses on the investments 
in individual securities, all that counts is the total. Portfolio choice theory tells the investor 
how to compose a portfolio at the beginning of the investment period that will maximize the 
expected utility he will derive from the end-of-period value of this invested wealth (the 
means of his consumption at that time). If we assume that an investor is a rational maximizer 
of his expected utility, we can also use the theory to predict his behavior. 
17. Investors are typically assumed to be "risk averse" - that is, they like expected re- 
turn and dislike risk. Thus, for any given level of expected return, the lower a portfolio's risk 
the better. The assumption of risk aversion is in turn derived from an assumption that the 
investor will derive declining marginal utility from consuming end-of-period wealth - that is, 
each successive dollar of increasing wealth adds less to his total utility. Risk aversion occurs 
because - compared to the expected utility from a given level of end-of-period wealth 
known with certainty - the chance of a return of one dollar over the expected level does not 
compensate for an equal chance of a return of one dollar under the expected level. Thus, in a 
choice between two portfolios with differing risk, the investor will choose the riskier one only 
if it has a sufficiently higher expected return to compensate him for the disutility he associ- 
ates with the greater risk. 
18. This model was originally developed by Sharpe. See William F. Sharpe, A Simplified 
Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 MGMT. SCI. 277 (1963). For a nontechnical exposition of this 
model, see JAMES H. LORIE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 108-31 
(2d ed. 1985). 
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Each security has two kinds of riskiness associated with it: un- 
systematic or "alpha" risk, the portion of the security's variance 
that has a zero correlation with the market, and systematic or 
"beta" risk, the portion of its variance that is perfectly correlated 
with the market. Unsystematic risk results from factors specific in 
their effects to the issuer or its industry - for example, uncertainty 
concerning the quality of an issuer's management. Systematic risk 
results from factors affecting all issuers whose securities are traded 
in the market - for example, uncertainty concerning future inter- 
est rates. Sufficient diversification can essentially eliminate the 
contribution of the unsystematic risk of individual securities to a 
portfolio's overall risk, because the deviations of the individual se- 
curities are due to factors unrelated to each other and will cancel 
each other out. Diversification cannot eliminate the systematic risk 
of the individual securities, however, because, to the extent that in- 
dividual securities deviate from their expected returns due to fac- 
tors causing systematic risk, generally all securities deviate in the 
same direction. 
Global investing offers investors an opportunity to construct a 
portfolio with lower risk for any given level of expected return. The 
less each issuer in a market shares in common with the others, the 
smaller the proportion of systematic risk and the higher the propor- 
tion of unsystematic risk. Issuers worldwide share less in common 
with each other than issuers of a given nation share in common with 
each other. Thus, if the relevant securities market is global rather 
than merely national, a larger proportion of each issuer's variance 
will constitute unsystematic risk, and diversification will further re- 
duce portfolio risk. 
The concern with diversification highlights that capital markets 
not only decide which proposed real investment projects should be 
implemented, but also who will bear the risk resulting from uncer- 
tainty concerning the investments' future returns. Two modifica- 
tions of the simple model that views transnational investment 
simply as reallocation of savings flow from this observation. First, 
the desirability of a given project now depends not only on its ex- 
pected return but also on its risk characteristics. Second, investors' 
beliefs concerning the probability distributions of the returns on 
available securities and investors' needs for diversification, not the 
amount of savings reallocated transnationally, determine the level 
of transnational transactions as a proportion of all transactions. If 
one nation consistently has more savings relative to its real invest- 
ment opportunities than another, its investors will accumulate a 
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larger absolute share of the joint pool of securities of the two na- 
tions. However, the proportions of the securities of the two nations 
that the investors of each would hold in their portfolios will depend 
on their respective beliefs.19 Transnational transactions, through 
their capacity to reallocate risk in this fashion, have the potential to 
add significantly to global economic growth as the increase in the 
possibilities for diversification leads persons to shift to higher 
expected return investments despite their higher individual 
variances. 
B. Factors Favoring National Markets 
1. Specialized Information Concentrated Nationally 
Finance theorists often assume that all investors share identical 
beliefs concerning the probability distribution of the future returns 
of the available securities. This assumption is useful for under- 
standing certain aspects of investor behavior. It permits the con- 
struction of testable models relating securities prices to systematic 
risk.20 It also permits the demonstration that a totally passive inves- 
tor, who has no specific information concerning the future pros- 
pects of available securities, can minimize risk for any given 
expected return simply by randomly choosing a sufficiently large 
number of different securities from all the securities available in the 
market.21 
In reality, however, investors in different countries still possess 
significantly different bodies of information, despite the trend to- 
ward information globalization. The assumption of identical beliefs 
in the face of this reality obscures our view of two other aspects of 
investor behavior that have significantly hindered complete global- 
ization of the market for equities, at least along the pattern of hold- 
ings dimension.22 First, for the totally passive investor to be willing 
19. If, as most finance models commonly assume, investors' beliefs were all identical, the 
proportions would be identical. The larger absolute amount of transnational investment by 
the investors of the nation with relatively greater savings will be counterbalanced by the 
smaller absolute amount of such investment by investors in the other nation. 
20. See infra section I.C.1. 
21. See infra section I.A.2. 
22. Investors in all the larger developed capitalist countries still hold the bulk of their 
equity portfolios in home country issuers. See infra section I.D. Prominent financial econo- 
mists have suggested for some time that this "home country bias" is related to differences 
between the information investors possess concerning home country issuers and that con- 
cerning foreign issuers. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, Domestic Savings and 
International Capital Flows, 90 ECON. J. 314, 316, 321 (1980) (finding a high correlation be- 
tween marginal increases in domestic savings and in domestic investment and attributing 
these in part to investors' greater uncertainty concerning foreign issuers due to less informa- 
tion); Martin Feldstein, Domestic Saving and International Capital Movements in the Long 
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to undertake the strategy of randomly choosing securities, she 
needs basic faith in the market pricing of the securities from which 
she makes her selection. This faith arises from a level of familiarity 
that, for many of today's investors, is still attained only for the do- 
mestic market. Second, some investors ("speculators") choose their 
portfolios on the basis of their own beliefs, not randomly. These 
beliefs, in turn, are based on specialized information not possessed 
by all participants.23 Speculators are likely to do better concentrat- 
Run and the Short Run, 21 EUR. ECON. REV. 129, 130-31 & 148 n.27 (1983) (finding substan- 
tial imperfections in the international capital market and attributing them in part to investors 
having a higher subjective variance on foreign returns due to less information); Robert E. 
Lucas, Jr., Interest Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-Country World, 10 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 335, 357 (1983) (explaining home bias as the result of the local nature of information 
but noting the lack of models that even begin to explain the relationship). 
More recently, scholars have begun to study this relationship between local information 
and home bias in more formal ways, constructing theoretical models and investigating it em- 
pirically. Cooper and Kaplanis, for example, undertake an empirical study that rejects, as a 
sufficient explanation of home bias, inflation hedging and observable proportionate dead- 
weight costs, such as withholding taxes on dividends and the extra management fees that 
funds charge for investing abroad. By process of elimination, they cite information asymme- 
tries as the most likely alternative explanation. See Ian Cooper & Evi Kaplanis, Home Bias 
in Equity Portfolios, Inflation Hedging, and International Capital Market Equilibrium, 7 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 45 (1994). 
Kang and Stulz, in a recent paper, construct three models, each based on a different factor 
that could generate home bias: (i) an up front lump sum cost to an investor, such as basic 
knowledge acquisition costs about a foreign country, before she is willing to begin investing 
in shares of its issuers; (ii) observable deadweight costs that are proportionate to the amount 
invested, such as dividend withholding taxes or extra management fees; and (iii) information 
asymmetries. Using Japan, which has particularly easily available data about the foreign 
ownership of the shares of Japanese issuers, Kang and Stulz show that non-Japanese investors 
have a stronger home bias against small Japanese issuers than against large ones. They also 
show that non-Japanese investor portfolios of Japanese stocks underperformed the Japanese 
market as a whole. These results, they conclude, are consistent with a combination of the up- 
front lump sum cost of knowledge acquisition model and a simple extension of the informa- 
tion asymmetry model, which posits that because less is known by foreigners about the 
smaller issuers, the asymmetry with respect to them is greater. Kang and Stulz conclude that 
their results are inconsistent with the proportional deadweight loss model. See Jung-Koo 
Kang & Rene M. Stulz, Why Is There Home Bias? An Analysis of Foreign Portfolio Equity 
Ownership in Japan (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
French and Poterba suggest that information asymmetry-related "behavioral finance" the- 
ories can shed light on the home bias phenomenon. For one such explanation of home bias, 
they cite work by Robert Shiller showing that investors in Japan and the United States were 
each relatively more optimistic in their forecasts of the returns from their home country 
issuers than of the returns from the issuers of the other country. French and Poterba suggest 
that such biases, whatever their origins, can persist for a long time, even if risk-adjusted 
expected returns (presumably involving expectations conditional on all knowledge available 
somewhere in the world) are equal in the two countries. This persistence is due to the inef- 
fectiveness of feedback in correcting the biases. The problem is that the use of historical 
actual returns to estimate historical expected returns is plagued by large statistical uncertain- 
ties. As a second behavioral explanation of home bias, French and Poterba suggest that 
investors, due to a lack of knowledge about foreign markets, institutions, and firms, regard 
investments in foreign stocks as "unfamiliar gambles" and impute to them a special kind of 
extra, apparently undiversifiable, "risk" even when they assign identical probability distribu- 
tions to foreign and domestic stock. See French & Poterba, supra note 12, at 225. 
23. This use of the term speculator covers both (i) persons who buy or sell for the short 
run on the basis of information, or evidence of the existence of information, that they believe 
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ing their buying and selling in equities of issuers about which they 
and their advisers start with natural information advantages.24 
These are likely to be domestic issuers because the futures of most 
issuers are determined more by "inside" forces - those occurring 
within the borders of their an issuer's own nation - than by forces 
occurring outside. 
For several reasons residents of a given nation have advantages 
over foreigners in gaining specialized information about their na- 
tion's inside forces and are more familiar with the institutions in- 
volved in the process of price formation for their own nation's 
issuers. One reason is that the costs of acquiring bits of local infor- 
mation are lower for a resident. Residents are more likely to be 
able to read the language in which materials containing such infor- 
mation are published and to receive such materials promptly and 
cheaply. Also, the costs of such information-gathering tasks as tele- 
phone conversations, face-to-face conversations, and site visits are 
lower for residents. Thus it is far easier for a resident to gather 
more bits of local information at a reasonable expenditure. 
More important, these same economies permit a resident who 
receives a large number of bits of such information to develop re- 
fined rules for evaluating them: to choose which bits to analyze 
seriously and by which to be influenced.25 This evaluation must be 
will soon become more widely known and (ii) investors who purchase for the longer run on 
the basis of what they believe to be their superior analysis of the "fundamentals" - i.e., 
information concerning the underlying business of the issuer and its prospects. 
24. This statement is not necessarily inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH), which is another pillar of the modern approach to finance. The EMH, most broadly 
stated, holds that the market price of a security fully reflects all information available at the 
time in question. The seminal article reviewing the work to its date that formed the basis for 
the hypothesis is Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empir- 
ical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). While one of the implications of the EMH is that the ordi- 
nary investor is wasting his time trying to pick "winners" on the basis of information he 
gleans from public sources, a subset of all investors encompasses persons who initially obtain 
new information and whose trades cause the price to reflect such new information. See Ron- 
ald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 569-70 (1984). This subset may be responsible for a substantial percentage of all transac- 
tions. It should also be noted that the EMH is controversial and is less accepted with respect 
to "soft" information about issuers than it is with respect to hard data such as the announce- 
ment of a dividend increase. See Merritt B. Fox, The Role of the Market Model in Corporate 
Law Analysis: A Comment on Weiss and White, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1015, 1044 (1988); Gilson & 
Kraakman, supra, at 561-62. 
25. The questions addressed here really apply to the processing of information by a whole 
network of persons - the participants in the finance process - whose decisions ultimately 
determine which real investment projects are implemented. The role played by these differ- 
ent participants - project proponents, firm managers, financial intermediaries, investment 
advisers, and individual investors - and the nature of the rules by which these participants 
process information are considered in more detail in MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUS- 
TRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 92-232 
(1987). 
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based both on the source of the information as well as on its con- 
tent. The concern with source goes to the accuracy of the informa- 
tion. It asks how trustworthy the source is and, assuming the 
information has an interpretative element, how competent the 
source is. The concern with content asks how much the bit, assum- 
ing the information is accurate, tells the recipient about whether a 
particular security is underpriced or overpriced. 
The resident recipient, through his education and his continuous 
absorption of general information concerning his nation, starts with 
a much richer context in which to make these evaluations. He can 
also obtain cheaply much more information concerning both the 
structure of the source's motivations and the reputation of the 
source. Because acquiring information from the source is generally 
less expensive for residents than nonresidents, the resident recipi- 
ent is also more likely to have had prior personal experience with 
the source and hence has more feedback on the quality of informa- 
tion the source provides.26 The resident recipient is, for the same 
reasons, more likely to have had prior experience by which to assess 
the usefulness of information with any particular content when the 
information involved relates to local forces. 
2. Currency Exchange Risks 
If a resident of the United States purchases a security of an is- 
suer of France, the investor must consider the possibility that when 
he converts the return back into dollars, the rate of exchange may 
be different than at the time of the purchase. Thus, to the U.S. 
investor, the French security has an additional element of risk - an 
additional source of variability of return - that would not be pres- 
ent with an otherwise identical U.S. security.27 Moreover, the size 
of many exchange rate fluctuations in recent years has been suffi- 
26. For an example in the legal literature of the use of this kind of "reputation theory," 
see, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: 
The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 578-79 (1989). 
27. Financial economists often assume away foreign currency exchange risk entirely, 
under the theory that it can be easily eliminated through hedging. See, e.g., Kang & Stulz, 
supra note 22, at 9. This is probably true for large institutional investors that, at a low cost 
per dollar invested in foreign shares, can engage in privately negotiated forward contracts 
and other hedging devices extending out over many years. It is not true, however, of the 
typical individual investor, who can only hedge by dealing in the currency futures market, 
where the maximum duration of available hedges is much shorter and transactions costs are 
significant. Even if individual investors have the alternative of investing in mutual funds 
specializing in foreign stocks that can hedge cheaply and over the long term due to their size 
and sophistication, the limitations on the hedging ability of individual investors can be a 
factor favoring segmented national markets, because some of them would rather invest on 
their own. 
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cient to swamp the other factors that make the return on a security 
variable.28 The extent, however, to which the possibility of ex- 
change rate fluctuations deters transnational security transactions 
depends on the effect of the fluctuations on the riskiness of the in- 
vestor's whole portfolio, not on individual securities, and on the im- 
pact of portfolio riskiness on the individual's utility. 
If, in our example of a U.S. investor, the rates of exchange of 
the dollar for the currency of each other nation vary independently 
of each other, the added riskiness of the individual foreign securi- 
ties need not add anything to the riskiness of the investor's portfo- 
lio as a whole. With holdings of foreign securities from a diversified 
set of nations, the variations in return of individual securities 
caused by exchange rate fluctuations would tend to cancel each 
other out. For a U.S. investor, such exchange rate independence 
would be approximated in a situation where the exchange rate per- 
formance of the dollar, compared to other nations, was in some 
sense average - that is, the dollar's value was stable relative to a 
basket made up of the currencies of the other nations of the world. 
Where foreign currencies move systematically vis-a-vis the in- 
vestor's national currency, as has been the case with the dollar over 
the last fifteen years, exchange rate fluctuations do not cancel out 
each other in this fashion. Other factors, however, may neverthe- 
less limit the effect of the resulting variation in portfolio return on 
the investor's utility.29 First, changes over time in currency ex- 
change rates between two countries are heavily influenced by dif- 
ferences in the countries' relative rates of inflation. The direction 
of the influence tends to compensate for the effects of the respec- 
tive rates of national inflation on the issuer's return measured in the 
issuer's national currency and on the investor's cost of consumption 
measured in his national currency. 
With a U.S. investor and a French issuer, for example, a higher 
inflation rate in the United States than in France would mean that, 
ceteris paribus, the dollar cost of consumption in the United States 
would increase more as a result of inflation than would the French 
security's return as measured in francs. But the effect of the higher 
inflation in the United States on the dollar/franc exchange rate 
would be to weaken the dollar so that the investor would receive 
28. For example, between January and June of 1995, the dollar dropped 15.3% against 
the yen. See Strong Yen Steadily Contributing to Lower Domestic Prices, JAPAN ECON. NEW- 
SWIRE PLUS, Dec. 25, 1995, available in Westlaw, Dialog, Japanecon database. 
29. The investor is assumed to choose the portfolio that will provide the investor with the 
highest expected utility from the consumption of the end-of-period invested wealth. See 
supra note 16. 
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more dollars per franc. Consequently, his return on the security 
measured in dollars might well, as a result, keep up with the U.S. 
rate of inflation. Thus, in terms of the ultimate goal of investment 
- future consumption - exchange rate fluctuations may have a 
stabilizing rather than destabilizing effect.30 
Another factor limiting the effect of variation in portfolio return 
caused by fluctuations in exchange rates on the investor's utility is 
the probability that part of what the investor is likely to consume is 
imported from abroad: in domestic currency terms, exchange rate 
fluctuation will affect the return on foreign securities and the cost of 
imported goods in the same direction. Since one is income and the 
other expenditure, the effects tend to compensate for each other. 
Finally, to the extent that domestic issuers themselves make di- 
rect investments abroad, their returns too are affected by foreign 
exchange rate risk. As a consequence, there is less incentive to 
avoid securities of foreign issuers just to avoid foreign exchange 
risk.31 
3. Government Impediments to Transnational Investments 
In the case of a potential transaction involving an issuer or sec- 
ondary seller of one nation and an investor of another, the govern- 
ment of either nation may have tax or currency exchange 
regulations that create sufficient disincentives that the transaction 
does not take place.32 The government of the investor, for exam- 
30. The risk of inflation at home in goods and services that are available only from do- 
mestic (i.e., nontraded) sources may still be a residual source of home bias. Compared to 
investing in foreign equities, investing in domestic equities may be a better hedge against this 
risk, because the nominal returns on domestic equities may well correlate more closely with 
changes in the nominal prices of nontraded goods and services than do nominal returns on 
foreign equities, even after adjustment for changes in the exchange rate. This is because 
factors other than domestic inflation rates can substantially influence exchange rates and 
cause large deviations from the rates that would achieve purchasing power parity - i.e., rates 
where the same representative bundle of consumption goods costs the same in dollars - or 
any other currency - in every country. See Michael Adler & Bernard Dumas, International 
Portfolio Choice and Corporation Finance: A Synthesis, 38 J. FIN. 925 (1983); Cooper & 
Kaplanis, supra note 22, at 46-47. Cooper and Kaplanis, however, test empirically the propo- 
sition that this is an explanation of home bias and reject the hypothesis. See Cooper & Ka- 
planis, supra note 22, at 50-52. 
31. The existence of domestic issuers with direct foreign investment also weakens the 
incentive to diversify by investing in foreign securities. One empirical study, however, sug- 
gests that a diversified portfolio of U.S. multinational corporations does not achieve nearly as 
much risk reduction as does a portfolio of internationally diversified issuers. See Bertrand 
Jacquillat & Bruno Solnik, Multinationals Are Poor Tools for Diversification, J. PORTFOLIO 
MGMT., Winter 1978, at 8. 
32. These factors, if they do not render the transaction impossible, at the very least re- 
duce the investor's expected return from undertaking the investment. Absent these factors, 
an investor in country A would be able to enjoy the same rate of return from an investment 
in the stock of an issuer from country B that investors in B would enjoy. The investor from A 
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pie, may make it difficult or impossible to obtain the foreign cur- 
rency with which to purchase the security, may tax the returns on 
foreign securities at a higher rate than it taxes the returns on do- 
mestic securities,33 or may refuse to grant the domestic holder of a 
foreign security a tax credit for taxes withheld from the returns by 
the government of the issuer. The government of the issuer may 
make it difficult or impossible for a foreign investor to turn returns 
paid in the local currency into the investor's domestic currency or 
impose a withholding tax on the returns that, for a number of possi- 
ble reasons, may not reduce the investor's home tax obligations by 
a commensurate amount.34 Transnational transactions can be dis- 
couraged not only by currently existing regulations of these sorts 
but also by the fear that they might be imposed at some time in the 
future during the investor's period of ownership. 
4. Transaction Costs of Trading in Foreign Securities 
A final factor favoring national securities markets is the extra 
costs to the purchaser and to the issuer or secondary seller of enter- 
ing into transactions occurring across national lines. These include 
the additional costs associated with international communications, 
currency exchange, and clearance and settlement - the physical 
would therefore find attractive, for diversification reasons, an investment in the stock of a B 
issuer that is priced to produce an expected return for investors in B comparable to the 
expected return the investor in A could earn on investments in the stocks of his own coun- 
try's issuers. With these factors lowering the expected return available to the A investor, 
however, diversification considerations may be insufficient o attract him to invest at all and 
will certainly induce him not to invest as much. 
33. The United States Interest Equalization Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 841 
(1964) (formerly codified at scattered sections of the I.R.C.; repealed 1974), which was in 
effect between 1963 and 1974, was an example of a tax provision intended to discourage 
investment in foreign securities by U.S. residents. The Act imposed a 15% tax on the 
purchase of such securities. The idea behind this tax-induced segmentation of the world's 
financial markets was to permit the United States to pursue a monetary policy of interest 
rates lower than those prevailing abroad without aggravating its balance of payments 
problems. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND UR- 
BAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNA- 
TIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKET III-14 to -15 & n.21 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 
SEC INTERNATIONALIZATION REPORT]; Robert L. Maines, Note, The Interest Equalization 
Tax, 17 STAN. L. REV. 710 (1965). 
34. Cooper and Kaplanis give as an example a U.K. pension fund, the income of which is 
tax exempt under U.K. tax law, but the U.S. income of which would be subject to a 15% U.S. 
withholding tax. Thus, for a dividend yield of 7%, there would be a reduction in the return 
on investment down to approximately 6% when the fund chooses U.S. rather than U.K. 
equities. Cooper and Kaplanis question the relative importance of this factor, however. 
They argue that even after taking account of the extra expenses of foreign investing, it would 
take levels of risk aversion well above what is commonly believed to be that of the average 
investor for this to explain most of why U.K. investors invest such a small portion of their 
portfolios in foreign stocks. See Cooper & Kaplanis, supra note 22, at 55-57; see also Kang & 
Stulz, supra note 22, at 7-8. 
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delivery of the security in exchange for the payment of the purchase 
price.35 Some of these costs are not present where a foreign issuer 
is listed on a domestic exchange, but in that event the issuer faces 
extra costs.36 
C. The Current Extent of Globalization - The Price Dimension 
Economic forces exist that by themselves would lead to a truly 
global securities market. But as we have seen, these forces face 
counterforces favoring segmented national markets. Do these 
counterforces reduce the level of transnational transactions to the 
point where the price of an equity, whose future cash flows are de- 
termined by a given probability distribution, would vary based on 
the nationality of its issuer or of the exchange on which it is princi- 
pally traded? In other words, are these counterforces still suffi- 
ciently strong to keep the "law of one price" from applying globally, 
or have they weakened to the point that we can say the market for 
securities is globally integrated? 
1. International Capital Asset Pricing Model Studies 
One way to test this question is to construct a plausible model 
for the pricing of risk in a global market for securities, patterned 
after the domestic capital asset pricing model (CAPM).37 The 
35. Cooper and Kaplanis try to give a feel for the scale of this factor by noting a study 
that found the expense ratio for U.S. mutual funds specializing in foreign issuers was 0.68% 
per annum higher than for funds investing primarily in U.S. issuers. As noted above, this 
factor, combined with the impact of withholding taxes, is unlikely to explain most of the 
home bias of U.S. investors. See Cooper & Kaplanis, supra note 22, at 56. For institutional 
investors, the 0.68% per annum figure probably overstates the extra transaction costs associ- 
ated with investing in foreign equities, as it also would include the presumably larger research 
expenses associated with foreign investment. For individual investors who trade with any 
frequency, however, it probably considerably understates the impact of the extra transaction 
costs, as they do not enjoy the volume discounts available to institutional investors. 
36. These extra issuer costs include a listing fee on the domestic exchange, maintenance 
of a transfer agent, and the costs of compliance with any applicable local securities laws. 
37. The CAPM is a widely used model of the pricing in a domestic market of capital 
assets such as securities. The CAPM assumes, among other things, that (i) the "market port- 
folio" - a portfolio containing all available capital assets in the same proportions to each 
other as they are found in the market - is efficient; that is, it has the lowest variance of any 
available portfolio with its expected return; and (ii) all investors have identical beliefs con- 
cerning the probability distribution of future returns on the available assets. This second 
assumption can be used to prove the first. Because the market portfolio is efficient, it con- 
tains no diversifiable (unsystematic) risk, only systematic risk. Thus the systematic risk of 
any given asset can be measured by its covariance with the market portfolio. Because any 
portion of the risk of such asset that does not covary with the market portfolio can be diversi- 
fied away, the only portion of the risk that investors will pay a premium to avoid is the 
portion that does covary. From this, it can be shown that each asset will be priced so that its 
expected return is a function of (i) the covariance between the asset's return and the return 
on the market portfolio, (ii) the rate of return on a "safe" asset, and (iii) the expected return 
on the market portfolio. See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
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model can then be tested empirically to see how well it explains the 
pricing of securities around the world. If the model has strong em- 
pirical support, that would suggest that the law of one price does 
apply in the market for corporate equities, with the shares of all 
issuers, whatever their nationality, being priced, after adjustment 
for risk, to yield the same expected return.38 While some early 
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964). A particularly accessible de- 
scription of the model is found in LORIE T AL., supra note 18, at 132-43. 
The CAPM cannot be tested directly because expected returns are subjective, unobserv- 
able judgments of investors. It can be made empirically testable, however, by assuming that 
the market is a "fair game" - i.e., on average the actual return on an asset equals its ex- 
pected return. If this is the case, data on past actual returns can provide information about 
past expected returns. Returns on the market portfolio are measured by a market index that 
is composed of a set of securities that is assumed to be a representative proxy for the market 
portfolio. The existing empirical tests of the CAPM have, however, been subjected to some 
important criticisms. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Ex- 
pected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427 (1992); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Korhauser, Effi- 
cient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 775-86 
(1985); Richard Roll, A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests - Part I: On Past and 
Potential Testability of the Theory, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 129 (1977). Nonetheless, the wide use of 
the CAPM by finance economists suggests that a large portion of them view the tests as 
showing that it has significant power to explain securities pricing. See RONALD J. GILSON & 
BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 101 (2d ed. 
1995). 
38. The basic approach is to construct a model of what securities pricing in an integrated 
global market would look like and then to test the model to see if the experience in the real 
world conforms. The seminal work in this area was performed by Solnik, on the international 
asset pricing model (IAPM), which resembles the CAPM but is modified to take account of 
the possibility of international diversification and the effect that it might have on the pricing 
of assets. See B.H. Solnik, The International Pricing of Risk: An Empirical Investigation of 
the World Capital Market Structure, 29 J. FIN. 365 (1974). The CAPM cannot be applied 
without such modification because the returns of different securities are denominated in dif- 
ferent currencies. This creates exchange risk for each investor when she invests in any secur- 
ity other than risky securities of her own nation or its "safe" asset - that is, an asset with a 
payoff known for certain, denominated in his nation's currency. The solution is to separate 
the risk of each security as denominated in its local currency and the exchange rate risk it 
poses for foreign investors by assuming that each investor behaves as if she purchases a world 
market portfolio when: (i) she hedges each purchase of a foreign security by borrowing in 
the local currency or purchasing an exchange rate future and (ii) she invests as well in a pure 
exchange risk portfolio consisting of a weighted average of the safe assets of each country in 
proportion to its net foreign investment position. From this, it can be shown that each secur- 
ity of a given nation will be priced so that its expected return is a function of (i) the covari- 
ance between the security's return and the return on the world market portfolio, (ii) the 
expected return on the world market portfolio, (iii) the rate of return on that nation's safe 
asset, and (iv) the weighted average of the rates on the returns of the safe assets of all na- 
tions. See id. at 368-69. 
Solnik's tests of the IAPM purport to show that a security's covariance with his index for 
the world market portfolio - his measure of the security's international risk - has signifi- 
cant power explaining the prices of each nation's securities. See id. at 372-73 & tbl.3; see also 
Bruno H. Solnik, An International Market Model of Security Price Behavior, 9 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 537, 552 (1974) [hereinafter Solnik, International Market Model]. 
From this, he concludes that the "international capital market seems to be sufficiently inte- 
grated and efficient to induce an international pricing of risk for common stocks." Id. at 553. 
Adler and Dumas concluded in a later survey article that the tests of the IAPM, including 
Solnik's, have been "inconclusive ... from a statistical standpoint." Adler & Dumas, supra 
note 30, at 954. Stehle focuses more directly on the segmentation versus integration issue by 
testing the hypothesis that the U.S. market is totally segmented against the null hypothesis 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 14:20:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
August 1997] Securities Regulation 2521 
studies appeared to provide empirical support for such models,39 
more recent work suggests that this support is at best weak.40 
What inferences concerning global integration can be drawn 
from this? One explanation for the low level of empirical support is 
that the market is, in fact, not globally integrated. Another is that 
the market is globally integrated, but that the tested models do not 
correctly describe the pricing of risk and so apparent differences 
among countries in terms of the risk-adjusted expected returns of 
their issuers' equities are simply the result of errors in the risk ad- 
justments. Alternatively, the market, while integrated, may not be 
efficient. Equities of particular countries may be systematically 
traded at prices deviating from their fundamental values because of 
"noise traders" influenced by "fads" or "fashions" concerning these 
countries.41 
that it is completely integrated with the rest of the world and by testing the reverse set of 
hypotheses. See Richard Stehle, An Empirical Test of the Alternative Hypotheses of National 
and International Pricing of Risky Assets, 32 J. FIN. 493 (1977). He was unable, however, to 
reject either theory in favor of the other. See id. at 501. Expressing various methodological 
concerns, Solnik himself joined this more skeptical view in a later article. See Bruno H. 
Solnik, Testing International Asset Pricing: Some Pessimistic Views, 32 J. FIN. 503 (1977). 
The IAPM has been subject as well to more basic theoretical criticisms that are relevant 
to its utility as a method of determining the degree of segmentation in the market for securi- 
ties. The most important problem is that the price of consuming a given good or service in 
one country differs from the price, translated at existing exchange rates, of consuming the 
same good or service in another country. Because the criteria by which an investor chooses 
her portfolio is the maximization of her expected utility from future consumption, an investor 
in one country will use a different yardstick to measure the real return to her of a security 
than will an investor in another country. Hence a different portfolio will be optimal for each, 
and there is no single optimal world market portfolio for all investors. This problem is com- 
pounded by the fact that consumption preferences vary among investors of different coun- 
tries so that they want to consume different bundles of goods. These kinds of problems led 
Adler and Dumas to conclude that "there is as yet no definitive empirical method for deter- 
mining whether and to what extent the international capital market is segmented." Adler & 
Dumas, supra note 30, at 967; see also Rend M. Stulz, Pricing Capital Assets in an Interna- 
tional Setting: An Introduction, J. INTL. Bus. STUD., Winter 1984, at 55. 
39. See supra note 38. 
40. In a recent survey of the literature, Jeffrey Frankel states: "We have seen that the 
tests, even those that make full allowance for the range of international assets to be held and 
the range of countries where investors live, seem consistently to reject the international 
CAPM hypothesis." Jeffrey A. Frankel, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EQ- 
UITT MARKETS 1, 12 (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1994). Similarly, Froot and Dabora state: 
"There is a large literature that finds evidence of international segmentation. Risk return 
tradeoffs, as measured by a pricing model such as the international CAPM, appear to differ 
in some countries." Kenneth A. Froot & Emil Dabora, How Are Stock Prices Affected by 
the Location of Trade? 2 (Dec. 8, 1995) (unpublished paper, presented at NYSE Palm Beach 
Conference); see also Vihang Errunza & Etienne Losque, International Asset Pricing Under 
Mild Segmentation: Theory and Test, 40 J. FIN. 105, 121 (1985); Campbell R. Harvey, The 
World Price of Covariance Risk, 46 J. FIN. 111, 147 (1991). 
41. See infra note 76. The first and third explanations may amount largely to the same 
thing, because each implies that a project's cost of capital would differ depending on the 
primary trading place for the shares of the issuer considering the project. 
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2. Studies of Securities Sharing the Same Underlying Cash Flows 
Another approach to determining whether the market is glob- 
ally integrated is to find securities trading in different markets that 
share the same underlying cash flows and test whether they are 
priced to produce the same expected return. This avoids the tricky 
problem of modeling the price of risk that is necessary when cash 
flows with different risk characteristics are compared. 
One example of securities sharing the same underlying cash 
flows involves closed-end country funds. These are investment 
companies whose shares are traded on a major developed country 
exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange and whose assets 
consist solely of shares of issuers of some other country. Thus two 
sets of securities - a share of a country fund and a bundle of indi- 
vidual shares identical to what the fund holds as assets - share the 
same underlying future cash flow. Studies show, however, that the 
typical fund's share price deviates, often substantially, from the 
price of the bundle of individual shares that make up its assets. The 
direction and extent of this deviation is significantly influenced by 
what is happening in the market on which the fund shares are 
traded.42 
Another example is "Siamese twin" stocks, which are stocks of 
companies whose charters fix proportionally the division of a com- 
mon pool of current and future equity cash flows, with both twins 
traded on the same two developed country markets but with one 
traded more actively on one market and the other more actively on 
the other. In an efficient integrated market, we would expect their 
prices to move in lockstep, particularly because both securities are 
traded in both markets so that the transaction costs of arbitrage 
between them are low. Such pricing studies, however, also find 
large deviations that are "highly correlated with the relative stock- 
market indexes of the country where each stock is traded most 
actively."43 
The price deviation in each example suggests either a lack of 
global integration or lack of market efficiency based on fads and 
fashions related to local markets. But in each example the devia- 
42. See James N. Bodurtha, Jr., et al., Closed-End Country Funds and U.S. Market Senti- 
ment, 8 REV. FIN. STUD. 879 (1995); GIKAS A. HARDOUVELIS ET AL., WHAT MOVES THE 
DISCOUNT ON COUNTRY EQUITY FUNDS? (National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper No. 4571, 1993). 
43. Froot & Dabora, supra note 40, at 3; see also Leonard Rosenthal & Colin Young, The 
Seemingly Anomalous Price Behavior of Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever N.V./PLC, 26 J. FIN. 
ECON. 123 (1990) (finding large deviations in the pricing of the twin companies' stocks). 
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tion is open to an alternative explanation that is consistent with a 
globally integrated, efficient market for equities. For the closed- 
end country funds, the market for the underlying stocks may be 
sufficiently nonliquid and inaccessible as to create very large arbi- 
trage costs.44 For the Siamese twin stocks, there may be tax- 
induced differences in the composition of each firm's shareholder 
group, with the kind of investors interested in each having different 
reservation prices for the stock.45 
3. Conclusion 
Empirical work to date has provided no clear assessment of the 
extent to which today's equities market is globally integrated. 
Some sense of the predominant opinion among financial econo- 
mists, however, can be gleaned from the standard texts in the field. 
These suggest that some sets of countries already have relatively 
highly integrated markets for securities - for example, the United 
States and Canada, or the Benelux countries. Most others are less 
integrated but are moving in that direction.46 We will see that my 
conclusions concerning the appropriate apportionment of regula- 
tory authority will hold whether the market for corporate equities is 
fully integrated along the price dimension or not, but the reasoning 
used to get there differs at some points in the argument. 
D. The Current Extent of Globalization 
The Pattern of Holdings Dimension 
The counterforces favoring segmentation clearly continue to 
have a strong negative effect on globalization as measured along 
the investor holdings dimension. Absent the continued existence of 
these factors, transnational transactions would be of much greater 
44. See Froot & Dabora, supra note 40, at 2. 
45. See id. at 15-17 (asserting that the Siamese twin stock deviations results are best ex- 
plained by the market for equities being segmented and inefficient but that tax-induced in- 
vestor heterogeneity is the most likely alternative explanation). 
46. See EDWIN J. ELTON & MARTIN J. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND IN- 
VESTMENT ANALYSIS 272-74 (5th ed. 1995). Another commentator states that "[t]he evi- 
dence suggests that world security markets are [at least partially] integrated ... [and t]o the 
extent there is some segmentation the corporation may be able to do something for its stock- 
holders that they cannot do for themselves, namely, reduce risk through direct foreign invest- 
ments." JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 715 (10th ed. 1995). 
Still another commentator reviews one study as having "found some evidence that markets 
are integrated" and another as having "also found weak evidence in support of integration." 
THOMAS E. COPELAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 
811 (3d ed. 1988) (citing F.L.A. Grauer et al., Sharing Rules and Equilibrium in an Interna- 
tional Capital Market Under Uncertainty, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 233 (1976); Solnik, International 
Market Model, supra note 38). 
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importance than they are. The correlations between indices repre- 
senting the equity markets of different countries are remarkably 
low and generally well below the average correlation coefficient be- 
tween a pair of United States securities.47 This suggests that a large 
amount of risk reduction is possible from international diversifica- 
tion beyond what can be accomplished by diversification among the 
issuers of a single nationality. For example, Solnik showed that the 
average variability - including the exchange risk to a U.S. investor 
- of return for a set of portfolios, each of which consisted of equal 
investments in fifty securities chosen randomly from a list of Euro- 
pean and U.S. securities, was less than half of the average variabil- 
ity of a set of portfolios composed on the same basis but from a list 
restricted to U.S. issuers.48 Turning the risk/return tradeoff around 
the other way, French and Poterba show, for example, that to justify 
as rational current patterns of holdings, given their foregone diver- 
sification opportunities, U.S. investors must believe that U.S. issu- 
ers have expected returns 2.5% higher than Japanese issuers have 
and Japanese investors must believe that U.S. issuers have expected 
returns 3.5% lower than Japanese issuers have.49 One set of inves- 
tors has to be wrong; quite possibly both are. If it is one set, they 
are missing out on transnational investments that would both signif- 
icantly add to portfolio expected return and significantly reduce 
portfolio risk; if it is both, they are missing out on transnational 
investments that could significantly reduce risk while maintaining 
expected return. 
These data suggest that if U.S. investors believe that the average 
rate of return on U.S. and non-U.S. equities is the same, they 
should, in the absence of factors favoring national markets, hold 
U.S. and non-U.S. equities in approximately the same proportions 
to each other as the proportions of U.S. and non-U.S. equities in 
the total market value of all equities available in the world. The 
same suggestion would apply to non-U.S. investors.50 
47. See ELTON & GRUBER, supra note 46, at 274. 
48. See Bruno H. Solnik, Why Not Diversify Internationally Rather Than Domestically?, 
FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1974, at 48, 51 fig.11. The gains in risk reduction from interna- 
tional diversification presumably would have been even greater if Japanese and Latin Ameri- 
can securities had been included. See id. at 52. 
49. See French & Poterba, supra note 12, at 223. 
50. Putting aside for a moment differential pricing depending on the tendencies of securi- 
ties of different countries to contribute to the riskiness of a diversified portfolio (as predicted 
by the CAPM and IAPM), one would expect that if investors worldwide share identical ex- 
pectations, equities would be priced so that they all have the same expected return and inves- 
tors of any one nation would have no reason to choose domestic over foreign securities. 
There is, of course, the possibility that the market is not well described by the assumption 
that investors in different countries share the same beliefs concerning the future returns of 
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The extent of international diversification by both U.S. investors 
and non-U.S. investors falls far short of this crude prediction of 
what would prevail without counterfactors favoring national mar- 
kets. For example, in 1993, the U.S. and non-U.S. markets repre- 
sented, respectively, 37% and 63% of the total market value of all 
publicly traded equities available in the world. However, U.S. in- 
vestors on average held only 5.7% of their equity portfolios in non- 
U.S. issuer stock, the remaining 94.3% being devoted to U.S. issu- 
ers. The portfolio imbalance was similarly reflected in non-U.S. in- 
vestor holdings, which consisted of 97% non-U.S. issuer stocks and 
3% U.S. issuer stocks.51 
These data show that the counterfactors favoring national mar- 
kets continue to restrain the level of transnational transactions suf- 
ficiently that the market for corporate equities still falls far short of 
being "truly global" in terms of the pattern of holdings dimension. 
But they also show the potential for a vast increase in the volume of 
such transactions. If, as predicted in the next Section, these 
counterfactors weaken significantly, transnational transactions will 
in the future constitute a much larger portion of all transactions, 
perhaps five or ten times greater than today. 
any given security, which, as developed below, may help explain why transnational transac- 
tions are not more prevalent. To the extent that pricing does depend on systematic risk, the 
conclusion in the text still holds, because in such a market any investor that does not fully 
diversify will be taking on uncompensated risk. 
51. All percentages are derived from the following data for calendar year 1993: 
U.S. issuer equity Non-U.S. issuer equity Total 
equity market $5.2 trillion (37%) $8.9 trillion (63%) 14.1 trillion 
capitalization 
holdings by $4.9 trillion (94%) $ .3 trillion (6%) 5.2 trillion 
U.S. investors 
holdings by non- $ .3 trillion (3%) $8.6 trillion (97%) 8.9 trillion 
U.S. investors 
Figures in the above table come from the following sources: U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., 
1994 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (1994) (reporting that U.S. equity market capitalization in 1993 
equalled $5.2 trillion and reporting that worldwide equity market capitalization in 1993 was $14.1 trillion, allowing a calculation of non-U.S. equity market capitalization as $14.1 trillion 
minus $5.2 trillion); Russell B. Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United States in 1994, SURV. CURRENT Bus., June 1995, at 52, 56 (reporting holdings by non-U.S. investors of U.S. equity securities in 1993 of $340.0 billion); id. at 54 (reporting holdings by U.S. investors of non-U.S. equity securities in 1993 of $297.7 billion). Thus, based on the 
foregoing figures, holdings by U.S. investors of U.S. equity securities in 1993 equalled $5.2 trillion minus $340 billion, or $4.9 trillion; holdings by non-U.S. investors of non-U.S. equity 
securities equalled $8.9 trillion minus $297.7 billion, or $8.6 trillion. 
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E. The Future of the Factors Favoring National Markets 
1. Information 
Until recently, U.S. investors, including sophisticated institu- 
tional investors, held very few foreign equities in their portfolios.52 
Because this would be hard to explain solely as the result of the 
other counterfactors favoring national markets, the information ad- 
vantages that investors of a given nation have concerning the pros- 
pects of that nation's issuers must have played a substantial role in 
explaining why international diversification has historically been so 
limited.53 Conventional theories of investment behavior for both 
speculators and passive investors would not, however, have pre- 
dicted this reluctance to invest in foreign securities. 
In conventional theory, the speculator in the domestic market 
designs his portfolio on the basis of his own beliefs, formed by the 
information in his possession, concerning the probability distribu- 
tions of the future returns of the available securities. The fact that 
52. See ELTON & GRUBER, supra note 47, at 262. Although these authors do not mention 
them, casual empiricism and the SEC rules both suggest that Canadian securities have been 
an exception to the historical tendency of U.S. investors to shun foreign equities. This fact 
tends to support the information explanation for home bias, because U.S. investors know 
more about Canadian issuers than any others, but Canadian securities are the least desirable 
foreign security from the diversification point of view. Canadian share prices are far more 
highly correlated with United States share prices than the share prices of any other nation. 
See ELTON & GRUBER, supra note 46, at 267 tbl.12.3. 
As recently as 1979, only eight percent of the 1600 largest U.S. pension funds, despite 
their sophistication, invested any money at all in foreign stocks. See Marcia Berss, Tomorrow 
the World, FORBES, July 2, 1984, at 104, 107. In 1983, pension funds invested only $8.7 billion 
in foreign securities, see id., a tiny portion of the $981.1 billion then entrusted to them, see 
Steven Greenhouse, Just Whose Money Is in an Employee Pension Plan?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
1987, ? 4, at 7. By 1991 the top 200 pension funds alone invested $68 billion in foreign mar- 
kets. See Margaret Price, International Assets See Healthy Increase, CRAIN'S PENSIONS & 
INV., Jan. 20, 1992, at 17. Also by then, over 400 mutual funds, with assets of about $80 
billion, invested almost exclusively in foreign securities. See Remarks of Richard Breeden, 
Chairman of the SEC, to the Investment Company Institute General Membership Meeting, 
Wash., D.C. (May 21, 1992), available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew file. 
53. An extensive literature relating to home bias discussed in prior notes supports this 
conclusion. See supra notes 22, 27, 32, 35 and accompanying text. The point is also well 
illustrated by an example developed by Lessard. He calculated, assuming the expected re- 
turn on United States equities is 15%, the minimum expected return of a security from each 
of a variety of foreign countries that could still, because of its capacity to reduce portfolio 
risk, justify inclusion in the portfolio of a U.S. investor. For a substantial majority, the ex- 
pected return can be less than 10% and still justify inclusion. These figures were based on 
the covariance between each nation's securities and a world index (a statistical measure of 
the extent to which the two moved together), all translated to dollars so that exchange risk is 
already considered. See Donald Lessard, World, Country, and Industry Relationships in eq- 
uity Returns: Implications for Risk Reduction Through International Diversification, 32 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 32 (1976); see also ELTON & GRUBER, supra note 46, at 277 tbl.12.10. It is 
highly unlikely that, for every one of these major developed nations, the existence, or fear of, 
differential taxes and exchange controls and the extra transaction costs of transnational trans- 
actions together would be sufficient to constitute the equivalent of a burden of more than 
five percent in rate-of-return terms. 
2526 [Vol. 95:2498 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 14:20:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Securities Regulation 
he is not fully informed about a given security causes him to assign 
a variance to his prediction of the future return, and the less he 
thinks he knows, the larger the variance. He assumes, however, 
that his prediction is unbiased - i.e., on average neither high nor 
low. A greater variance does not lead him to keep the security out 
of his portfolio. 
The passive investor in the domestic market is unconcerned with 
his ignorance and buys securities because it is a way to store his 
savings that historically has produced, on average, a positive rate of 
return. He chooses a random selection of available securities as- 
suming that the market price is the best estimate of the future re- 
turn of each of the securities selected and that the portfolio's 
diversity will give him the maximum possible protection from risk. 
The historical, near-total unwillingness of U.S. investors of both 
types to buy foreign equities suggests that their sense of greater ig- 
norance about these issuers compared to domestic issuers has had a 
radical effect. The speculator must have felt that he did not know 
enough to make sensible evaluations of the probability distributions 
of their future returns.54 The passive investor must have felt that he 
did not know enough to trust the process by which foreign equities 
were priced.55 
The recent increase in ownership of foreign equities by U.S. in- 
vestors suggests that this barrier - the unwillingness by most inves- 
54. Ruth Mack, who has developed a general model of decisionmaking under uncer- 
tainty, suggests that human beings have an intolerance, which ex post appears irrational, for 
actions involving "ambiguity" - i.e., actions the riskiness of which is hard to evaluate. See 
RUTH P. MACK, PLANNING ON UNCERTAINTY 55-58 (1971). The process by which investors 
evaluate the risks associated with investment in domestic equities is well established. See 
supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. In comparison, a general lack of experience in 
evaluating the risks associated with foreign equities may lead to ambiguity-caused intoler- 
ance. Similarly, Heath and Tversky ran an experiment in which they found that subjects, 
faced with two gambles to which they assigned identical probability distributions, behaved as 
though the less familiar gamble was riskier. See Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference 
and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCER- 
TAINTY 5 (1991). French & Poterba cite this study and suggest that home bias may be ex- 
plained in part by investors treating foreign stocks in the same way. See French & Poterba, 
supra note 12, at 225 n.4. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice 
and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986). 
55. Going back further in history, there is precedent within the borders of the United 
States for this same kind of reluctance to invest outside a local market. Lance Davis con- 
cluded that until about 1914 a national capital market, even in large bank deposits, did not 
exist. Prior to that date, he found major differences in the interest rates offered by the major 
city banks in different regions of the country. These rate differences exceeded what could be 
accounted for in the default risk differences. This suggests that savers in low interest rate 
regions felt sufficiently ignorant about the banks in the high interest rate regions so as not to 
trust their savings to them and that there did not exist well-informed intermediaries with 
sufficient trustworthiness to obtain the amount of capital necessary to arbitrage the differ- 
ence away. See Lance E. Davis, The Investment Market, 1870-1914: The Evolution of a Na- 
tional Market, 25 J. ECON. HIST. 355 (1965). 
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tors even to consider their purchase - has been broken. Yet, the 
information advantages possessed by such investors with respect to 
domestic issuers probably still explains much of why investors are 
not nearly as diversified internationally as they would be if the mar- 
ket were truly global as measured by the pattern of holdings dimen- 
sion. The asset pricing models, from which this projection of high 
diversification arises, create an image of a market entirely popu- 
lated by passive investors who select random portfolios. The specu- 
lators - the participants responsible for the process by which 
prices are set and adjusted as new information reaches the market 
- are not considered. Yet speculators appear to hold a substantial 
portion of all outstanding equities. For example, institutional inves- 
tors, most of which engage in at least some management of their 
portfolios, hold almost fifty percent of such securities.56 A large 
portion of individual investors, the holders of the remaining fifty 
percent, do not have well-diversified portfolios,57 suggesting that at 
least some are "playing the market," whether it makes sense for 
them to do so or not. Speculators, as noted earlier, are likely to do 
better concentrating their buying and selling in equities of issuers 
about which they start with a natural information advantage. In 
large measure, this is still domestic issuers. 
In the future, however, technological change is likely to narrow 
substantially the differences in the respective costs of timely acqui- 
sition of information from foreign and domestic sources by tele- 
phone calls, links to computerized databases, electronic document 
transmission, and travel to engage in face-to-face meetings and on- 
site inspections. This is true both of information directly relevant to 
predicting the prospects of issuers and information about the moti- 
vations and reputation of the sources of the directly relevant infor- 
mation. These same technological changes, through their effect on 
mass media, marketing, education, scholarly research, and direct 
personal interaction, are working toward creating a more uniform 
social and economic culture among the developed nations of the 
world. This greater uniformity will assist the investor in evaluating 
the information he receives. Moreover, the rules by which investors 
and their advisers evaluate information have a "learning by doing" 
56. See Financial Assets and Equity Holdings, BRANCANTO REP., Jan. 1995, at 42 tbl.11. 
57. See MARSHALL E. BLUME & IRWIN FRIEND, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE INDIVID- 
UAL INVESTOR 46-50, 117-20 (1978); Marshall E. Blume & Irwin Friend, The Asset Structure 
of Individual Portfolios and Some Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J. FIN. 585 (1975). 
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aspect and improve with experience,58 so that even the decline in 
information costs to date has not yet had its full impact. 
In addition, the technological changes that have already signifi- 
cantly narrowed information cost differences have been accompa- 
nied by the emergence of truly international securities houses 
backed by large amounts of capital.59 This development permits a 
very efficient transfer of information across national lines. Because 
the sender and the receiver of information are members of the 
same organization, the receiver has an unusually high degree of 
trust in, and experience with, the sender. They can employ well- 
recognized symbols that incorporate a great deal of information. 
Again, the learning-by-doing aspect of this form of communication 
means that the full impact of this development has probably not yet 
been felt. 
2. Exchange Rates 
The recent increase in the importance of transnational transac- 
tions has occurred despite the likely inhibiting concurrent increase 
in the instability of exchange rates over the past twenty years, par- 
ticularly the sharp increase followed by the sharp decrease in the 
value of the dollar against other major currencies in the 1980s.60 In 
recent years, however, fluctuations among the major currencies 
seem to have decreased,61 perhaps due to increased efforts by the 
world's monetary authorities to coordinate their actions so as to re- 
duce instability.62 If these efforts are perceived as succeeding and 
investors feel less inhibited by exchange rate concerns, transna- 
tional transactions will be encouraged. The inhibiting effects of ex- 
change rate concerns will be further softened if there is a continued 
58. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
59. For example, in mid-1995 Merrill Lynch acquired London's largest stockbroker, 
Smith New Court, for $842 million in cash. The merger created the largest securities firm in 
the world. See Helen Dunne, Merrill in f530m Cash Offer for Smith Deal With US Broker 
Creates World's Largest Securities Organisation, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 22, 1995, 
City, at 1; Peter Truell, Merrill Lynch Buying Big British Securities Firm, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
1995, at 33; Deal Would Form Biggest Brokerage, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1995, at D2. 
60. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, at 400, tbl.B-106 (1996). 
61. Recently there has been a renewed interest and emphasis by the G7 countries in 
reducing currency fluctuations. See Forex, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1996 (1996 Guide to Switzer- 
land Supp.), available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File; G7 Optimistic on World Economy 
Despite Slowdown, REUTERS FIN. SERVICE, June 16,1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Non-US File; Santer Calls for Move to Stabilise Dollar, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 15, 
1995, Financial Pages, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File. 
62. See C. Randall Henning, Europe's Monetary Union and the United States, FOREIGN 
POLY., Spring 1996, at 83; Leonard Silk, World System Seeks Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
1987, at D2; cf. Leonard Silk, Is 'Conventional Wisdom' Wise?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1989, at 
D2 (noting that floating exchange rates have not provided predicted stability). 
2529 August 1997] 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 14:20:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Michigan Law Review 
increase in foreign trade.63 As we have seen, the effects of ex- 
change rate fluctuations on the cost of consuming imported goods 
and on the returns on foreign investment tend to compensate for 
each other. 
3. Government Impediments 
The period between World War II and the early 1970s witnessed 
a variety of currency control and tax measures that tended to rein- 
force segmentation of markets along national lines.64 These meas- 
ures have been largely dismantled in the last 15 years.65 While a 
return of such measures is conceivable, it is unlikely. The interna- 
tional finance genie is too much "out of the bottle." National econ- 
omies have become structured on the expectation of a continued 
flow of international finance. Nations compete with one another to 
provide environments congenial to the financial services industry, 
which regards such taxes and regulations as an anathema.66 The 
further back in history tax and currency control measures become 
with the passage of time, the less will be the fear of their reimposi- 
tion and the inhibiting effect of that fear on transnational 
investment. 
4. Transaction Costs 
The same technological changes that narrow the cost differential 
of obtaining information from foreign and from domestic sources 
63. Total U.S. exports and imports of goods in 1965 equalled 9.4% of Gross National 
Product (GNP), while the comparable total in 1994 equalled 22.2% of GNP. See ECONOMIC 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 60, at 280-81 tbl.B-1. 
64. At the end of World War II, the U.S. dollar was the only major currency that was 
freely convertible. It was not until 1958 that the major European currencies achieved full 
convertibility. See Richard Myrus, From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of the 
Exchange-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and the European Commu- 
nity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2095, 2098 n.24 (1994). 
65. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 489 
(1993) (arguing that the elimination of currency exchange controls has been a dominant force 
behind the creation of a global securities market). 
66. The Interest Equalization Tax imposed by the United States between 1963 and 1974, 
see supra note 33, is an example of the kind of damage that such taxes and regulations can do 
to a nation's financial services industry. The tax is generally believed to be a major cause of 
the development abroad of the Eurobond market and of the rebirth, at the expense of New 
York City, of London as an international financial center. See Hugh Stephenson, Shadow 
Over Banks in London: American Phaseout of Curbs May Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1973, 
? 3, at 6. In contrast, deregulation of restrictions on foreign ownership of securities firms 
participating in the Tokyo and London stock markets contributed to the large growth of 
these markets in the years immediately following deregulation. See Martin French & Peter 
Lee, World Equity Flows into London, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1987, at 54; Big Bang Brief, ECON- 
OMIST, Aug. 2, 1986, at 60; Japanese Give Foreign Brokers More Than They Bargained For, 
ECONOMIST, May 17, 1986, at 85. 
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will greatly reduce differences in real costs between executing a 
purchase or sale on a foreign exchange versus on a domestic ex- 
change, as it becomes practical for the major exchanges around the 
world to compete for listings and orders. In the event that comput- 
erized electronic trading of securities worldwide replaces trading on 
organized stock exchanges, differences in the cost of executing 
transactions in the shares of domestic and foreign issuers would to- 
tally disappear.67 
F. Conclusion 
The foregoing survey suggests that, at least if we put aside any 
possible segmenting effects of national securities laws, there are 
strong underlying forces at work that, over the next decade or two, 
will greatly increase the percentage of foreign ownership of most 
sizable corporations around the world and create a severalfold in- 
crease in the relative importance of transnational securities transac- 
tions. The prospect of this fundamental change underlies all of the 
discussion that follows. 
67. Whether this current exchange-based structure of secondary trading will continue 
into the foreseeable future or there will be a move to electronic trading is a matter of debate. 
Exchange trading and computer trading are each institutions that centralize order flow. 
Computer trading has a number of advantages: easy investor access from anywhere through 
computers with real-time displays of bids, offers, and volume; low cost of operation; and ease 
of transaction reconstruction leading to more reliable clearance and settlement and more 
effective enforcement of regulations. A number of observers predict that computer trading 
will probably, or at least possibly, replace exchange trading. See JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD'S SECURITIES MARKETS: ECONOMIC CAUSES AND 
REGULATORY CONSEQUENCES - OR - BEWARE THE UBER-REGULATOR 19-20 (John M. 
Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 68, Aug. 1990); 
MORRIS MENDELSON & JUNIUS W. PEAKE, ELECTRONIC EXECUTION SYSTEMS: MYTH vs. 
REALITY (U. Penn. Law and Economics Discussion Paper, Apr. 1990); Therese H. Maynard, 
What Is an '"xchange?" - Proprietary Electronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statu- 
tory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 833, 862 (1992). 
The key question is whether a computer trading system can provide liquidity comparable 
to that provided by a system based on specialists operating on an exchange floor. See Wil- 
liam C. Freund, Electronic Trading and Linkages in International Equity Markets, FIN. ANA- 
LYSTS J., May-June 1989, at 10, 12; Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of 
Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications 
for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL . REV. 299, 318-19 (1991). There are real questions as to 
whether specialists in fact provide such liquidity, however, as their obligation to do so is 
vague and the capital at their disposal is small compared to the largest traders. See Jonathan 
Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes 
for the New York and Tokyo Exchanges, 75 CORNELL . REV. 1007, 1026-34 (1990). Macey 
and Kanda point out that the Tokyo Stock Exchange essentially works without specialists 
who attempt to provide liquidity as the saitori firms, the ones that most resemble specialists, 
act as pure conduits that match buy orders and sell orders and are not allowed to trade on 
their own account in the stocks assigned to them. See id. at 1043-44. Macey and Kanda 
speculate that the functions that the saitori firms do provide could be done largely by com- 
puter. See id. at 1046. 
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The large increase in transnational transactions, with their po- 
tential for triggering imposition of the disclosure regimes of multi- 
ple countries on a single issuer, will make the question of the 
apportionment of regulatory authority more critical. Increased 
globalization will also be seen as the key factor undermining the 
long-run viability both of the existing traditional U.S. approach to 
the reach of its disclosure scheme, with its emphasis on "investor 
protection," and of the recent SEC proposal to shift that emphasis 
to "market protection." These problems are likely to force a funda- 
mental reassessment of the proper function of mandatory 
disclosure. 
II. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GREATER DISCLOSURE 
The central purpose of this article is to determine which country 
or countries associated with a transnational share transaction 
should have the authority to require the issuer to reveal more about 
itself than it would voluntarily. In order to make this determina- 
tion, we need to consider why anyone would care about the issuer's 
disclosure practices: What as a general matter are the benefits and 
costs of the issuer revealing more about itself? We then need to 
know how are these benefits and costs of issuer disclosure distrib- 
uted among the multiple countries associated with the transaction. 
These are critical questions, because we cannot determine which 
country or countries can best weigh these costs and benefits without 
knowing the stakes of those doing the weighing. 
This Part starts the analysis by looking at a single closed econ- 
omy and considering the overall benefits and costs of greater issuer 
disclosure. This single closed economy can be thought of as the 
national economy of the past, when corporations invested primarily 
in their home country and there were relatively few transnational 
securities transactions - the kind of economy with which national 
regulations were originally designed to deal. It can alternatively be 
thought of as the likely global economy of the long-term future 
when there will be a single highly integrated market for securities, 
in which issuers responsible for a large portion of the world's pro- 
duction will have their operations dispersed around the world, 
showing no national pattern of concentration, and decisions con- 
cerning mandatory disclosure will be made by a single global 
authority. 
We will assume throughout this article that all issuers are subject 
to a basic antifraud rule that prohibits the making of materially 
false statements and of omissions that make the statements made 
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misleading. There is a great deal of information, however, that issu- 
ers subject only to an antifraud rule would choose not to make pub- 
lic. That, of course, is why systems of mandatory disclosure 
regulation developed in the first place. 
A. Benefits of Greater Disclosure 
Three kinds of rationales can be put forward for forcing issuers 
to disclose any given kind of information, suggesting three possible 
benefits from greater disclosure: (1) the market will be a fairer 
place in which to invest; (2) the market will be a less risky place to 
invest; and (3) resources will be allocated more efficiently.68 
The following discussion uses the learning of modern financial 
economics to analyze each of these possible benefits. It finds the 
first - greater fairness - the least compelling and the third 
efficient allocation - the most.69 The approach looks at a hypo- 
thetical issuer X and a hypothetical piece of information that is rel- 
evant to predicting the future cash flows produced by X's shares. It 
is information that the public does not know and that management 
either does know or could more easily ascertain than could outsid- 
ers. The question is how, if at all, public disclosure of the informa- 
tion can improve anyone's position. 
1. Fairness 
A securities market is fair if the "actual value"70 of the shares 
that investors buy is on average at least as great as the price they 
68. An auxiliary rationale would be to assist a ban on insider trading. When more is 
disclosed, there is less material nonpublic information on which insiders can trade. I have 
argued elsewhere that the reach of insider trading regulation should also be based on issuer 
nationality. See Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regu- 
late What?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1992, at 263. 
69. The efficiency-enhancing features of mandatory securities disclosure have been em- 
phasized elsewhere. See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Under- 
writer Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1015-25 (1984); Marcel 
Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 
(1992). For other perspectives on the efficiency-enhancing features of securities disclosure, 
see Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 
763 (1995) (arguing that while regulators chase the goal of price accuracy enhancement, the 
laws enacted under this banner actually work to reduce the flow of information relevant to 
accurate pricing of securities); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to 
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995) (arguing that the goal of disclosure should 
be focused on, and limited to, helping investors uncover breaches of contractual or fiduciary 
obligations); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of 
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988) (disputing the premise 
that a market with accurate share prices is able to monitor or structure efficiently the alloca- 
tion of scarce resources in the economy). 
70. The "actual value" of a share is the future stream of income - composed of divi- 
dends and other distributions - accruing to its holders, discounted to present value. For an 
2533 August 1997] 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 14:20:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Michigan Law Review 
pay. More, rather than less, public knowledge about X is not a nec- 
essary condition for a market to display this kind of pricing. Fair- 
ness is thus not a compelling rationale for mandatory disclosure.71 
To see why this startling conclusion is correct requires a consid- 
eration of the process by which securities are priced. Securities are 
priced by the actions of speculators.72 Each speculator, in making 
her assessment of the probability distribution of future returns from 
holding a share of an issuer such as X, will include the fact that the 
issuer has not addressed certain matters. There is no reason to be- 
lieve that the inferences that the speculator draws from the issuers' 
absences of comment will bias her assessments of their future re- 
turns - that is, result in her consistently over- or underestimating 
these returns.73 As a consequence, there is no reason to expect that 
elaboration of this concept of actual value and its relationship to market price, see Fox, supra 
note 69, at 1010-14. 
71. I refer here to the fairness of an issuer practice of providing less, rather than more, 
information. Although nothing in the law is more debated than concepts of fairness and their 
applicability to particular situations, the concept and application put forward here is highly 
defensible. It is true that any particular individual who enters into any particular transaction 
may end up in a worse position than if there had been greater disclosure. This would hold in 
the case of a purchase if (i) the price was higher than what turned out to be the shares 
actual's value and (ii) the price would have been lower with more disclosure. It is of course 
possible to argue that in this case the practice of less disclosure has led to an "unfair" result. 
This kind of ex post evaluation of fairness, however, seems an inappropriate way of assessing 
the interaction of issuers and investors in a financial market. Assume that the market dis- 
plays the kind of pricing termed fair in the text. At the level of the overall economy, a 
practice of less disclosure will not work any overall transfer of wealth to sellers (including 
issuers) from buyers. At the individual level, it is true that the investor, when she decides to 
buy, is engaging in a larger gamble if there is less disclosure. But the odds are fair, and she 
knows before she acts that she is taking the gamble. The question, considered below, re- 
mains as to whether decreasing this risk by increasing disclosure is desirable, but that issue is 
distinct from fairness. It should also be noted that an individual purchaser is likely to engage 
in many different share purchases in her lifetime, and the purchases that turn out to have 
been overpriced are likely to be canceled out by underpriced purchases. For further elabora- 
tion of this concept of fairness, see Fox, supra note 68, at 272-74; Fox, supra note 69. 
72. The term speculator is defined in Part I to mean any investor who chooses her portfo- 
lio on the basis of her beliefs concerning the future returns of available securities rather than 
randomly or on the basis of the security's historical Beta. These beliefs are based on the 
information possessed by the investor. See supra note 23. 
73. This is because the speculator makes an inference from the fact that the issuer, when 
not required to say something one way or the other about a certain matter, chooses not to 
disclose. Making an inference of this sort is the same kind of behavior that investors are 
assumed to exhibit in signaling theory. See, e.g., Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in 
Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES 
IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979). The claim here concerning 
the consequences of investors making such inferences is much more modest, however. Un- 
like in signaling theory, there is no suggestion here that as a result of the competitive interac- 
tion among issuers in the financial market and the motivations of management, a pattern of 
disclosure will develop whereby, between affirmative statements by some issuers and investor 
inferences from the silence of others, the exact state of affairs at each firm can be ascertained. 
To see how the more modest proposition made here works, consider the following exam- 
ple. Suppose that country A's mandatory disclosure scheme requires an issuer to describe 
whether its business is distributed relatively evenly over many customers or is concentrated 
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the market prices of such issuers' shares will be biased - that is, on 
average different from their actual values - just because the issuers 
are not required to address matters that a mandatory regime might 
require them to address.74 The finding of unbiased pricing in the 
with one or a few customers. Country B's scheme does not require such disclosure. Assume 
that it is generally considered better in issuer X's industry to have a broad customer base. 
Country A's scheme does not apply to issuer X, and X chooses not to say anything about its 
customer distribution. The speculator is likely to view X's future earnings less favorably than 
if X had made an affirmative statement that it had a broad customer base. She will not, 
however, necessarily view X's future earnings as unfavorably as she would have if X had 
affirmatively stated that its business was concentrated with just one or a few customers. This 
is because there may be a variety of reasons, besides in fact having a concentrated customer 
base, why X might choose not to address the matter if it were not forced to, such as the 
usefulness of this information to competitors and customers. See infra section II.B.2. The 
speculator takes all the information available to her, including, if she is well informed, what 
she knows about the character of management in terms of volunteering bad news, the past 
experience with issuers generally as to what silence has turned out to mean, the existence of 
circumstances that would make the disclosure of good news costly for the firm, and any 
information available from other sources concerning X's customer base. She then makes her 
best guess, on the basis of all the information that is available to her, as to the probability of 
one state of affairs versus the other and makes her assessment of X's future earnings 
accordingly. 
In a situation such as this example, where an issuer has not commented on a matter, the 
speculator on average guesses correctly. The idea behind this proposition is that each specu- 
lator's expectations concerning a share's future returns are based on the particular informa- 
tion within her possession. There is nothing structural in the process that determines the 
information received by the speculator that would lead her to underestimate or overestimate 
the value of a share's future returns, and so there is no reason to believe ex ante that the flow 
of information that goes to each speculator is going to bias that individual's expectations 
concerning future returns. The actual bits received may lead to an underestimate or overesti- 
mate of value in any particular assessment but, just like in sampling, the direction in which 
the estimate errs is purely a matter of chance. For an elaboration of this view of how inves- 
tors form their subjective probability distributions concerning the future returns of securities, 
see Fox, supra note 25, at 76. 
74. This statement relies on the premise that a lack of bias in speculators' assessments of 
future returns translates into a lack of bias in prices. This premise is true under a variety of 
theories of price formation in markets where investors have heterogeneous views concerning 
the probability distribution of the future value of the available securities. See, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding 
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1981) (theorizing that any investor possess- 
ing new information will trade to his profit on it until the price moves to the point when there 
are no more profits to be made because the information is fully reflected in price); Sanford 
Grossman, Further Results on the Informational Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets, 18 
J. ECON. THEORY 81 (1978) (theorizing that final equilibrium market prices reflect the most 
accurate possible prediction of future value given all information possessed by any one or 
more investors as a result of each investor "reading" the information possessed by the others 
through observation of the movement of market prices toward equilibrium); Sanford Gross- 
man, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades Have Diverse Informa- 
tion, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976); John Lintner, The Aggregation of Investor's Diverse Judgments and 
Preferences in Purely Competitive Securities Markets, 4 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
347 (1969) (theorizing that prices reflect a weighted average of the views of all investors); 
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 
n.10 (1965); Robert E. Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market 
Information Efficiency, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 874 (1980) (theorizing that prices average the 
views of investors in such a way that they are more nearly accurate than the forecasts of any 
individual investor); Robert E. Verrecchia, On the Theory of Market Information Efficiency, 
1 J. Accr. & ECON. 77 (1979). These theories vary in terms of the relative roles of different 
investors in determining price. Whatever theory one embraces, however, if the view of each 
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empirical literature testing the efficient market hypothesis,75 
although it concerns the ability of the market to process a different 
kind of information and tests immediate price reaction against 
longer-term prices rather than against actual value, is consistent 
with the proposition that the market reaction to the absences of 
comment by issuers that is discussed here would also be unbiased.76 
individual investor is unbiased in the sense that the term is used here, then the price will be 
similarly unbiased. 
75. See supra note 24. 
76. There is a large body of financial economics literature evaluating the market reaction 
to the affirmative public announcement of various kinds of events affecting particular issuers. 
For a classic review, see KENNETH GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 249-59 (1982). An event 
study involves a large number of issuers, each of which has experienced the announcement of 
a particular kind of event - for example, a stock split. The typical study shows that the 
shares of the affected firms, as a group, experience statistically significant abnormal returns at 
the time of the announcement and, starting almost immediately thereafter, normal returns 
for the duration of the study, which is sometimes as long as several years. Thus, while some 
issuers' share prices go up in the periods following the announcement - compared to the 
market as a whole - and others go down, the average change is near zero. Assuming that 
longer-term prices are themselves an unbiased measure of actual value, the results of the 
studies are thus consistent with the concept that the market's evaluation of the significance of 
the event for the actual value of each issuer's shares, while sometimes too high and some- 
times too low, was unbiased. 
Some financial economists, known as noise theorists, have attacked the EMH. They sug- 
gest that naive speculative traders, activated by fads, fashions, or irrational psychological 
predispositions toward things like chasing trends, add cumulative noise to share prices so that 
for significant periods of time share prices end up deviating from their fundamental value - 
the efficient market price that would prevail if the market consisted entirely of rational inves- 
tors who possessed all available information. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 
(1986). This can happen, in their view, even if there are also smart speculators who trade 
with knowledge of a stock's fundamental value. The smart speculators are limited in their 
ability to arbitrage away the difference. Unless they have an infinite time horizon, the uncer- 
tainty created by the possibility of continued noise trading makes taking such a position in- 
herently risky, even if they knew for certain a stock's actual value. They know at the time 
they are contemplating a purchase, for example, that because of noise, price may still deviate 
from actual value at the time they plan to sell. See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader 
Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990). Furthermore, smart speculators in 
fact do not know a stock's actual value with certainty; they only have a more accurate guess, 
and this adds to the risk of arbitrage. See Fox, supra note 25, at 36-43, 55-59; Andrei Shleifer 
& Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 
1990, at 19. An excellent survey in the legal literature of the work of the noise theorists, 
together with an analysis of its legal implications, is found in Donald C. Langevoort, Theo- 
ries, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
851 (1992). 
There is considerable empirical work supporting the noise theorists' position. Robert 
Schiller, in a pioneering study, looked at stock prices and dividends over the last 100 years 
and found that stock price volatility "appear[s] to be far too high ... to be attributed to new 
information about future real dividends if uncertainty about future dividends is measured by 
the sample standard deviations of real dividends around their long-run exponential growth 
path." Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent 
Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 433-34 (1981). Consistent with the idea that 
the market overreacts to news, a number of studies suggest that share prices tend to revert 
toward the mean - i.e., price upswings tend to be followed by downswings and vice versa. 
See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: A Mean-Reverting Walk 
Down Wall Street, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1989, at 189; James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. 
Summers, Mean Reversion in Stock Prices: Evidence and Implications, 22 J. FIN. ECON. 27, 53 
(1988). 
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Empirical work showing that purchasers of new issues occurring af- 
ter imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements under the Se- 
curities Act of 1933 did no better in their investments than 
purchasers of new issues in the time before mandatory disclosure is 
also consistent with the proposition that less information does not 
bias prices against the interests of purchasers.77 Other empirical 
Noise theory is controversial within the financial economics community. See, e.g., Eugene 
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991); Terry A. Marsh & Robert C. 
Merton, Dividend Variability and Variance Bounds Tests for the Rationality of Stock Market 
Prices, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 483 (1986) (critiquing Shiller's dividend study). Even if noise 
theory were to become fully accepted, however, it does not undermine the argument in the 
text that prices in the market will be fair - i.e., the actual values of the shares that investors 
buy are on average at least as great as the price they pay - whether there is much disclosure 
or only a little. The fads, fashions, and irrational psychological tendencies that drive the 
naive speculators are as likely to be negative as positive. Uninformed investors who choose a 
diversified portfolio on a random basis - the practice that EMH theorists recommend to 
them - thus will gain as often as they lose as a result of the deviations from fundamental 
value, which in turn is distributed randomly around actual value. 
Noise theory does predict a worse outcome than does the EMH for uninformed or irra- 
tional investors who choose to speculate - the naive speculators. They will have a tendency 
to buy when prices are too high and sell when prices are too low, in the process providing 
profits for the smart speculators. It is highly questionable whether the concept of fairness 
should be expanded to condemn this wealth transfer, however, given the availability to unin- 
formed investors of a strategy - a randomly chosen diversified portfolio - that permits 
participation in the benefits of equity investing without risking such losses. It would seem 
inconsistent for society to permit people to bet at horse races and in state-run lotteries, de- 
spite the fact that the odds are against them, but to condemn as unfair the result of unin- 
formed or irrational speculation in the equity markets. See Shleifer & Summers, supra, at 30- 
31. 
Even if we were to expand the concept of fairness to condemn the wealth transfer from 
naive speculators to smart ones, however, it is difficult to predict whether, in a noise-theory 
world, more disclosure would decrease or increase the size of the transfer. On the one hand, 
by reducing the uncertainty associated with the smart speculators' assessments of actual 
value, more disclosure reduces the risk of engaging in the arbitrage activity that moves 
money from naive speculators to smart ones. On the other hand, the higher level of such 
activity will narrow the spread between price and actual value and hence the amount of 
damage that a naive speculator suffers each time he buys when the price is too high or sells 
when it is too low. Thus, even if we wished to reduce the size of the transfer, it is unclear 
whether more disclosure would mitigate or exacerbate the problem. Public education against 
engaging in naive speculation might, for example, be more effective, as might stricter rules 
regulating the advice given by brokers. 
77. Stigler, taking two groups of new share issues, one from the period 1923-28 (prior to 
the passage of the Securities Act of 1933) and the other from the period 1949-55 (after the 
Act's passage), compared their respective five-year post-issue growth in prices as a ratio of 
the growth in prices in the market as a whole. The post-Act group did not do better than the 
pre-Act group, see George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 
117, 122-24 (1964) [hereinafter Stigler, Public Regulation], suggesting that mandatory disclo- 
sure did not eliminate any unfairness that was present in the initial selling price of pre-Act 
new issues. 
Stigler's study has been criticized for computational errors that understate the perform- 
ance of the post-Act group. See Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964). After recalculating, however, Stigler still found that the 
after-issue price growth for a majority of the five years - including, most importantly, the fifth year - was still either not as good as the pre-Act group or not sufficiently better than 
the pre-Act group to be considered statistically significant. See George J. Stigler, Comment, 37 J. Bus. 414, 418-19 (1964) [hereinafter Stigler, Comment]. 
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work concerning the pricing of new issues is also consistent with the 
proposition.78 
Stigler's study also has been criticized on methodological grounds because of a failure to 
account for dividends and for differences among stocks in systematic risk, but research 
reveals no adequately conducted study that does take account of such factors and comes up 
with a different result from Stigler's, at least with respect to seasoned issuers. Jarrell con- 
ducted a study making the same comparison as Stigler but without Stigler's methodological 
shortcomings and came to the same conclusion as Stigler. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The Eco- 
nomic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 
613 (1981). Jarrell's study, however, has itself been criticized. See Joel Seligman, The Histori- 
cal Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 11 n.37 (1983); Rod- 
ney T. Smith, Comments on Jarrell, 24 J.L. & ECON. 677 (1981). Simon, in another study 
using the techniques of modem financial economics to consider the Stigler comparison, also 
agrees with Stigler's conclusions with respect to seasoned issuers and initial public issues of 
shares to be traded on the New York Stock Exchange, but finds that the pre-Act issues of 
shares to be traded on regional exchanges were significantly overpriced and the post-1933 
issues were not, suggesting a category of issues in which the mandated information did elimi- 
nate a price bias that had been leading to unfairness. See Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 
1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. 
ECON. REV. 295, 304-08, 313 (1989). 
78. There is a prominent related literature that also concerns the performance of new 
share issues. This literature investigates whether the shares in these offerings are inefficiently 
priced at one point or another during the first several years after the initial offering. This 
literature does not include consideration of the effects of the level of mandated disclosure, 
and thus does not have clear, direct implications for the proposition in the text that fairness is 
unrelated to the amount of disclosure. It touches on issues sufficiently close to this question, 
however, to deserve comment. 
A large number of studies show that initial public offerings (IPOs) are offered at a "dis- 
count" in the sense that there is, on average, a significant jump from the offering price to the 
price at which they trade in the initial days or weeks after the offering. See James R. Booth & 
Lena Chua, Ownership Dispersion, Costly Information, and IPO Underpricing, 41 J. FIN. 
ECON. 291, 306-08 (1996) (surveying empirical studies establishing the discount and testing 
possible explanations); Roger G. Ibbotson & Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings, in 
NORTH-HOLLAND HANDBOOKS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: 
FINANCE (R.A. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic & W.T. Ziemba eds., 1992) (showing underpricing in 
other countries); Roger G. Ibbotson et al., Initial Public Offerings, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
37 (1988) (surveying empirical studies establishing the discount and testing possible explana- 
tions). A number of explanations have been put forward, but the most recognition has been 
given to ones involving information asymmetry. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit 
Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 66- 
72 (1993); Booth & Chua, supra, at 292-93; Ibbotson et al., supra, at 42-43. Particular atten- 
tion has been paid in the literature to a model developed by Kevin Rock in which there are 
three kinds of actors - issuers (and their underwriters), uninformed investors, and informed 
investors - with the informed investors better able to determine the actual value of newly 
offered shares than the other two. New shares are allocated in a process in which orders are 
placed by investors for a given number of shares at the offering price. If the offering is 
oversubscribed, each investor gets a pro rata portion of the offering based on the size of his 
order. The uninformed investors suffer from adverse selection because they cannot separate 
the good deals from the bad ones and thus order equal amounts of each. They get a larger 
portion of the offerings for the bad deals because the informed investors do not place orders 
for them. In order to attract capital from the uninformed investors, IPOs need to be under- 
priced so that despite the adverse selection, these investors will earn a market rate of return 
on average. See Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1986). 
This model, and variants of it working on similar themes, have received considerable empiri- 
cal support. See Booth & Chua, supra, at 306-07; Jay R. Ritter, The "Hot Issue" Market of 
1980, 57 J. Bus. 215 (1984). 
There is one study, by Tinic, that compares the size of the offering-price discount relative 
to initial trading prices for a sample of IPOs in the period 1923-30, prior to the passage of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and its new issue disclosure provisions, with a sample of IPOs in the 
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period 1966-71, after the Act's passage. See Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offer- 
ings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988). Contrary to what would have been predicted by 
the information asymmetry theory, Tinic found that the discount was larger with the 1966-71 
sample than the 1923-30 sample. See id. at 804-05 & tbl.3. His explanation is that the Act 
created the potential for the issuer and the investment banker to incur considerable litigation 
costs and that the larger discount reduces both the probability of litigation and, if it occurs, its 
cost. The discount therefore constitutes a form of litigation insurance. See id. at 797-803. 
According to this explanation, the additional disclosure required by the Act either does not 
have the effect predicted by the information asymmetry theory or its effect is swamped by the 
litigation insurance factor. There are obviously severe problems in attributing the increase in 
the discount to this one change between the two sample periods when so many other factors 
have changed as well. Most of the other tests that Tinic runs concerning the size of the 
discount produce results that are consistent with both his theory and the information asym- 
metry theory. There are also errors in Tinic's description of the potential litigation costs 
created by the Act that diminish the force of this as an explanation of the discount. See 
Alexander, supra, at 26 n.28. 
The fact that, on average, IPO offering prices are discounted relative to the prices at 
which the shares initially trade does not necessarily mean that they are discounted relative to 
their actual value. The studies are more mixed on this latter question. Ibbotson, in perhaps 
the most frequently cited study establishing the existence of the discount relative to the initial 
trading price, looked as well at trading prices thereafter for various periods up to five years 
and found returns on a risk-adjusted basis were normal, thereby suggesting that the initial 
trading price was efficient and that the offering price was discounted relative to actual value. 
See Roger G. Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 235, 
at 250-58, 265; see also Tinic, supra, at 815. Loughran and Ritter recently came to a different 
conclusion. In a study that matched a large number of firms doing IPOs with comparable 
firms that were already publicly traded and had made no offering in several years, they found 
that it would, on average, require approximately a 44% larger investment in the IPO at its 
initial trading price to end up with the same wealth five years later as with an investment in 
the nonoffering matching firm. See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 
J. FIN. 23, 32 (1995). This inferior return swamped the initial discount of the offering price 
relative to the initial trading price, so that one would still have to make a 30% larger invest- 
ment in the IPO at the offering price to end up with as much wealth in five years. See id. at 
32 n.7. The Loughran and Ritter study thus suggests that relative to actual value, IPOs are 
not offered at a discount but at a large premium. See also Stigler, Comment, supra note 77, at 
421 tbl.A1 (comparing, for new issues offered in the periods 1923-1927, before the Securities 
Act, and 1949-1955, after the Act, the average ratio of the price of the new issue shares five 
years after offering to market prices generally, finding the ratio for the second period is not 
better than the first on a statistically significant basis - which result he uses to argue that the 
Act led to no improvements - but also finding, without comment or a test for statistical 
significance, that in both periods the new issues, five years out, had underperformed the 
market as a whole); Hans R. Stoll & Anthony J. Curley, Small Business and the New Issues 
Market for Equities, 5 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 309 (1970) (studying issuers regis- 
tering very small offerings under the SEC's Regulation A - at the time $300,000 or less 
and finding that the offering prices are on average discounted relative to initial trading prices 
but that over the longer run investments in these shares at the offering price underperform, 
even without risk adjustment, a portfolio of larger stocks). Loughran and Ritter also find 
that SEOs - new equity offerings of "seasoned" issuers where the issuer already has publicly 
traded shares outstanding at the time of the offering - are similarly bad buys compared to 
IPOs purchased at initial trading prices. See Loughran & Ritter, supra, at 32. 
The fact that, on average, IPO offering prices are discounted relative to the prices at 
which they initially trade is no cause to worry on fairness grounds about the level of disclo- 
sure required for new offerings because that fact, without more, suggests that the initial pur- 
chasers are getting an unusually good deal. The empirical work supporting the information 
asymmetry explanation of the discount shows that issuers about which more is known can 
offer their shares at a lower discount. See, e.g., Ritter, supra, at 215-16, 237. This would 
suggest, as discussed in Part III, that, cost aside at least, issuers have an interest in being 
under a regime that assures a high level of disclosure. But that is an entirely different basis for concern about the level of disclosure than investor fairness. 
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2. Risk 
Just because the amount of information available in the public 
domain about X is unrelated to the fairness of its share price does 
not mean that it is unrelated to the accuracy of its share price. A 
share price can be unbiased - no more likely to be above than 
below the share's actual value - but still have a low expected accu- 
racy in the sense that there is a significant likelihood that it will 
deviate a substantial amount one way or the other from actual 
value.79 
Less information about X will lead to greater uncertainty among 
speculators about X's future. As a consequence, X's shares will 
have lower expected price accuracy.80 Put another way, X's shares 
The possibility, raised by the Loughran and Ritter study, that both IPOs and SEOs are 
offered at prices in excess of actual value does raise fairness concerns, because it suggests the 
existence of a market inefficiency that is systematically working to the advantage of issuers 
and to the disadvantage of investors. Without a better understanding of why such an ineffi- 
ciency has arisen, if in fact it has, and why the market has not realized it and corrected for it, 
we cannot decide whether the level of disclosure affects the extent of the problem and, if so, 
in which direction. Interestingly, Shayne and Soderquist, who recently wrote an article moti- 
vated by the Loughran and Ritter study, do not list increased disclosure among their variety 
of securities law reforms to counteract the reported overpricing. See Jonathan A. Shayne & 
Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REV. 
965, 977-86 (1995). It must also be kept in mind that these are the findings of a lone study. 
Even if replicated by others, they may represent the pricing of an as-yet-unidentified risk 
factor that is less for firms offering new issues than for comparable ones that do not, rather 
than an unfairness-creating market inefficiency. In addition, for the last three years of the 
study (1988-90), the wealth shortfall from investing in new issues disappears. This could be 
consistent with the market having caught onto and corrected for the inefficiency. However, 
the authors feel that given the particular features of these three years, this period is too short 
to make this conclusion. See Loughran & Ritter, supra, at 49. 
79. To put this concept of expected accuracy in statistical terms, consider price to be a 
random variable generated by a distribution function with a mean equal to actual value, 
reflecting the fact that the price is unbiased. A good measure of the price's expected accu- 
racy would then be the variance of the distribution - the expected value of the square of the 
deviation from actual value. The greater the variance, the lower the price's expected 
accuracy. 
80. The relationship between information and price accuracy is well captured by Stigler in 
his often-cited statement that "[p]rice dispersion is a manifestation - and, indeed, it is the 
measure - of ignorance in the market." George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 
69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 214 (1961). 
Results of empirical work, also by Stigler, lend support to the proposition that disclosure 
of the particular kinds of information mandated by the U.S. regime for primary offerings 
does in fact increase price accuracy. These results come from the same study, discussed supra 
in note 77, comparing the post issue growth of prices (relative to the market as a whole) for 
two groups of new share issues, one from the period 1923-28 (prior to the passage of the 
Securities Act of 1933) and the other from the period 1949-55 (after the Act's passage). The 
variance of post issue growth of prices was lower for the second group than the first. See 
Stigler, Public Regulation, supra note 77, at 122, 123 tbl.3. Simon comes to the same conclu- 
sion using the methods of moder finance. She compares various post-Act periods with Stig- 
ler's pre-Act period and finds that the post-1933 groups had consistently lower variances. See 
Simon, supra note 77, at 305-06 & tbl.4. This rules out the "bull market" explanation of 
Stigler's results - i.e., that the greater variance in the pre-Act period was due to the fact that 
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will have greater risk associated with them81 because there is a 
greater likelihood that what an investor receives from holding such 
a share - distributions and price at resale (both discounted to pres- 
ent value) - will deviate substantially from what she pays for it. 
This increased risk means that any investor holding shares of X, 
unless she is fully diversified by also holding shares of a substantial 
number of other issuers, will have a more risky portfolio than would 
have been the case if more information had been available about 
it was a boom period whereas the post-1933 period he used was not. See Simon supra note 
77, at 308-13. 
The best explanation of the post-1933 group's lower variance is that additional informa- 
tion provided to the market from mandated disclosure caused the initial selling prices for the 
new issues to be closer to actual value; less correction was necessary as the future unfolded. 
See Friend & Herman, supra note 77, at 390-91; Simon, supra note 77, at 311-13. The second 
group's lower variance can alternatively be explained as evidence that after passage of the 
Act more risky companies were kept out of the market by SEC regulation, see Stigler, Public 
Regulation, supra note 77, at 122, but this explanation is less persuasive. It is not clear why 
Stigler chose this alternative explanation other than the fact that he is suspicious of regula- 
tion of all sorts. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). He clearly accepts the theoretical proposition that any information that 
is of value to investors for predicting the future with greater accuracy will lead to less share 
price dispersion. See supra note 80. The results showing that the second group in fact had 
less dispersion logically should have led him to the conclusion that the information that the 
1933 Act prompted to be disclosed was in fact of such value, unless he had affirmative evi- 
dence that led him to believe that some other factor was responsible. But in providing his 
alternative explanation, Stigler offers no such affirmative vidence. See Stigler, Public Regu- 
lation, supra note 77, at 122. 
The proposition that disclosure of the information mandated by the U.S. regime for peri- 
odic disclosure - as opposed to the regime for primary offerings - increases price accuracy 
is harder to test. When we are forced to look at the market as a whole, it is more difficult to 
separate out changes in other factors affecting the market between the period before and the 
period after imposition of the regime. Subject to this caveat, however, there is empirical 
evidence that imposition of periodic disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 reduced price dispersion. Benston looked at 483 New York Stock Exchange 
firms for a period starting prior to the imposition of the 1934 Act regime and running to a 
point 90 months after imposition, using the market model to determine the absolute size of 
their month-to-month residuals, a measure of price dispersion. See George J. Benston, Re- 
quired Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973). Of these firms, 290 disclosed sales data before imposi- 
tion of the 1934 Act regime and 193 did not. After imposition, all disclosed sales data. Ben- 
ston focused on whether the riskiness of the 193 nondisclosing firms declined compared to 
that of the disclosing firms and found no statistically significant evidence that it did. This, of 
course, does not prove that it did not: the effect may have simply not have been large enough 
to show up as statistically significant given the statistical powers of the test. Cf. Fox, supra 
note 24, at 1035-38 (discussing limitations of statistical analysis of another set of findings). 
Interestingly, Benston's results are also relevant as to the value of the total package of infor- 
mation required to be disclosed under the 1934 Act regime: they show that the riskiness of 
all 483 firms, as measured by the size of their residuals, was significantly less after imposition 
than before. See Irwin Friend & Randolph Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock 
Market: Comment, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 467 (1975). Other factors being equal, this would 
indicate that the total mandated package did increase price accuracy. 
81. In statistical terms, the probability distribution generating the difference between the 
price of X and its actual value, while still having a zero mean - reflecting a lack of bias - 
will have a larger variance. 
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X.82 A significant portion of all buyers of X's shares will conse- 
quently suffer lower expected utility83 - assuming, as the capital 
asset-pricing model suggests, that X's shares will be priced in such a 
fashion that their expected return is unaffected by the greater risk 
resulting from lack of company-specific information.84 
Two points need to be noted concerning this risk reduction ben- 
efit from greater disclosure. Each will take on particular impor- 
tance when we consider a world with multiple jurisdictions and 
multiple open economies. First, there exists an alternative policy - 
encouraging investors to diversify - that might be at least as effec- 
tive at increasing investor expected utility. Second, even assuming 
no greater diversification, the nature of the lower expected utility 
resulting from less information needs to be carefully defined. It is 
not correct that X's issuance of the securities without disclosure re- 
sults in lower expected utility than if X had not issued its securities 
at all. Whatever the level of disclosure, each additional investment 
opportunity available to investors that a share value maximizing 
firm finds worth selling into a market that has unbiased pricing rep- 
resents an increase in the demand for savings. The issuance there- 
fore marginally raises the overall market expected rate of return 
available to investors.85 Each additional investment opportunity 
82. The lack of information increases the likelihood that the actual value of an individual 
share of X will substantially differ from price - i.e., increases its riskiness. If an investor's 
portfolio of high-risk assets consists entirely of shares of X, such an increase in the risk asso- 
ciated with X obviously commensurately increases the riskiness of the investor's portfolio as 
a whole. However, the impact of such an increase in the riskiness of X on the riskiness of the 
investor's portfolio as a whole diminishes and ultimately effectively disappears as the investor 
holds a larger and larger number of securities different from shares of X. This is because the 
kind of information that would be increased by X disclosing more is specific to X. Risk due 
to lack of company-specific information is unsystematic and can be diversified away. See 
supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra note 17. 
84. See supra note 37. 
85. This can be seen through an example. Consider a simple world in which all proceeds 
from the issuance of securities go for new real investment projects, there is a fixed supply of 
savings, and all projects have the same amount of systematic risk, so that project risk is not a 
factor in the pricing of securities whose returns are related to the projects. Assume also that 
each firm issues a new security only when the security can be sold for more than the cost to it 
of funding a real investment opportunity that will provide an expected cash flow equal to the 
expected distributions to security holders given the terms of the security. The expected re- 
turn on the project is determined by the cost of the project and its expected cash flow. The 
expected return on the security is determined by its price and the expected distributions to its 
holder. 
Issuance of a security is essentially a purchase of an investor's savings. A firm pays for 
these savings by providing terms that result in the security having some given expected rate 
of return. It is advantageous to make such a purchase of savings if the rate of return on the 
project funded with the savings is greater than the rate of return on the securities. The de- 
mand curve for savings, DD in Figure 1, thus will be identical to a curve that takes all projects 
being considered by all firms in rank order of their expected rates of return and depicts on 
the vertical axis the project's expected rate of return and on the horizontal axis the aggregate 
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also has a future return generated by a probability distribution with 
presumably at least slightly different variance-covariance character- 
amount of savings needed to fund both that project and all projects superior to it in expected 
rate of return. As can be seen in Figure 1, if the supply of savings is S*, the market clearing 
rate of return will be r*. If securities are sold into a market with unbiased pricing, projects on 
average will be funded in rank order of their expected returns down the list, up to and includ- 
ing the project that just exhausts the fixed supply of savings. The rate of return on this 
marginal project will be designated r*. 
Expected return D 







Consider what adding firm X and its proposed investment project, with an expected re- 
turn of r', does to the situation. Unless r' > r*, X will not find it advantageous to issue the 
security at all. If r' > r*, the introduction of X to the market will push the demand curve to 
the left for all points at or below r' by an amount equal to what is necessary to fund X's 
project. This will result in an increase in the market-clearing rate of return on securities. The 
intersection of supply and demand will now be at a point above r*. X's project has "crowded 
out" what would have been the marginal project, the one with a return of r*, resulting in a 
new marginal project with a somewhat higher rate of return, r**. Of course, notwithstanding 
the exaggerated manner in which it is presented here for purposes of illustration, in a large 
economy the introduction of a single additional issue with the project would have a de 
minimis effect. This is why the DD is drawn as a smooth curve rather than stepped. But the 
exaggeration shows how the rate of return on securities is affected by the inclusion or exclu- 
sion of a whole class of securities - for example, securities of issuers of country B. 
Relaxation of the assumption that savings are in fixed supply will not change the result: a 
higher market rate of expected return will still be needed. To the extent that a higher market 
rate is not needed to permit the crowding out of the marginal investment project, it is needed 
to coax out additional savings. Similarly, differences in systematic risk among projects re- 
quire compensating adjustments in their expected returns prior to the construction of the 
demand curve for savings. The existence of security issues for purposes other than new real 
investment is more complex. In general, however, anything that is not used for new real 
investment is a refinancing, and the proceeds of such refinancing are returned to the market 
so that the supply of savings is not diminished and the marginal real investment project still 
determines the market rate of return. 
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istics than any existing opportunity. Each additional opportunity 
therefore permits investors to compose portfolios with more 
favorable trade-offs between risk and return than otherwise would 
have been available.86 Any attempt to increase investor expected 
utility through risk reduction thus will be counterproductive if re- 
quiring X to disclose more deters it from offering its shares in the 
first place. 
3. Efficient Allocation of Resources87 
The amount of information available about X - and hence its 
share price accuracy - has a second kind of effect on the economy: 
allocative efficiency. The securities market monitors and structures 
the allocation of scarce resources in the economy. It influences in 
important ways which proposed investment projects are imple- 
mented and how the economy's existing productive capacity is used. 
Most of these choices are made, at least in the first instance, by 
entrepreneurs setting up new corporations and by the managements 
of existing corporations. Security prices and the information used 
to establish them are central to the mechanisms that limit the dis- 
cretion of the entrepreneurs and managers who make these choices. 
The three key mechanisms are: the cost of capital to individual cor- 
porations, the market for corporate control, and share-price-based 
management compensation. 
a. The Cost of Capital and Project Choice: The Role of Dis- 
closure at Time of a New Share Offering. To understand how lack of 
information and resulting share price inaccuracy can affect which 
proposed investment projects are implemented, consider the fol- 
lowing stylized facts. Suppose that X and Y are new firms, yet to be 
capitalized. In each case, the firm is incorporated by proponents of 
a proposed new investment project who hope to attract funds to 
implement it. Each firm is considering a new investment project of 
equal cost and equal risk. Anyone who knew what the respective 
firm proponents know about the details of the projects would con- 
clude that Y's project has a higher expected cash return than X's. 
The proponents of each project investigate the market to determine 
the amount they would receive for their equity. Suppose that X's 
shares will be overpriced. Proponents of X might find that they can 
raise sufficient funds to cover the cost of implementing the project 
86. See supra section I.A.2. 
87. This discussion is substantially based on a more developed discussion concerning 
these same issues in a purely domestic context appearing in Fox, supra note 69, at 1018-22. 
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without having to offer the public all of X's equity. The rest of the 
equity, which will cost the proponents very little, will be retained by 
them. The proponents therefore will be able to enjoy an "en- 
trepreneurial surplus" - value added to these retained shares be- 
cause of their pro rata claim on expected positive cash flow 
generated by the project. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that Y's shares will be underpriced. 
Proponents of Y might find that they cannot raise sufficient funds 
to cover the cost of implementing the project even by offering to 
the public all of Y's equity. Under these circumstances, the X pro- 
ponents, attracted by the entrepreneurial surplus, will decide to go 
ahead, while the Y proponents will decide not to go ahead. Be- 
cause of inaccurate security prices, scarce resources will be used to 
implement X's project, even though Y's project is superior. 
If X and Y are instead ongoing corporations, each considering 
its project as an additional investment, a similar though more com- 
plicated story can be told about the results of inaccurate share 
prices. Share price is likely to be inversely related to management's 
perception of its "cost of capital," the figure that management 
weighs against a given investment project's expected benefits when 
deciding whether to undertake a given investment project. An 
inaccurately high X share price and an inaccurately low Y share 
price can therefore lead to implementation of X's project and not 
Y's project.88 
b. The Market for Corporate Control and Stock Price-based 
Incentives: The Role of Ongoing Disclosure After Shares have been 
Publicly Sold. When the choices made by the managers of existing 
corporations concerning which new projects to implement and how 
to use existing capacity maximize shareholder wealth, they are gen- 
erally presumed also to constitute the most efficient allocation of 
resources.89 There is no assurance, however, that the managers of 
corporations will make the choices that maximize shareholder 
wealth. Management may not be competent, and even if it is, its 
best interests sometimes differ from those of the shareholders. A 
88. The relationship between share price accuracy and project choice by ongoing corpo- 
rations is explored in more detail in id. at 1016-18. 
89. Conventional economic theory holds that in a competitive economy in which antiso- 
cial behavior, such as pollution, is properly regulated, management decisions that are best for 
existing shareholders also allocate the economy's scarce resources most efficiently. See WIL- 
LIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 395-400 (4th ed. 1977); 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WIL- 
LIAM P. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 678 (12th ed. 1985). 
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corporate manager, like anyone, can be expected to value compen- 
sation, perquisites, respect, power, affection, a sense of rectitude, 
and job security. The decisions the manager makes for the firm 
may affect the level of all these rewards. The extent to which a 
manager makes decisions that are in the best interests of sharehold- 
ers depends on the structure of incentives in which she operates. 
As developed below, the amount that is publicly known about a 
corporation can affect these incentives in important ways. 
i. The Market for Corporate Control. One obvious way that 
shareholders might prevent management decisions that are not in 
the best interests of shareholders is for them to replace an unsatis- 
factory management by electing one more to their liking. But many 
large corporations, especially in the United States, are "manage- 
ment controlled." Share ownership is so dispersed that manage- 
ment can perpetuate itself indefinitely by controlling the firm's 
proxy machinery and nominating as directors its own members and 
persons friendly to current management.90 Concerted shareholder 
90. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 241-44 (7th ed. 1995); EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPO- 
RATE POWER 54 (1981). Herman estimates that 78 of the largest 100 industrial corporations 
and 165 of the largest 200 nonfinancial corporations are management controlled. See id. at 
58-61; see also John P. Palmer, The Separation of Ownership From Control in Large US In- 
dustrial Corporations, Q. REV. ECON. & Bus., Autumn 1972, at 55-57 (finding that in 1965, 
101 of the largest 125 firms and 176 of the largest 250 firms were management controlled, and 
in 1969 management controlled 99 and 171, respectively). A sense of the share of the econ- 
omy's allocation decisions that are made by the managements of these management con- 
trolled firms comes from the congressional testimony of Michael Pertschuk, former 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. He estimated that in 1977 the largest 200 manu- 
facturing corporations held 60% of all manufacturing assets and that in 1976, 451 firms con- 
trolled 70% of all manufacturing assets. See Mergers and Industrial Concentration: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong. 
155 (1978) (statement of Michael Pertschuk). 
Some American legal scholars have suggested that the increasing percentage of share 
ownership by institutional investors creates the potential for more concerted shareholder 
action. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 
(1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor 
Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117 (1988); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
863 (1991); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 10 (1991). Reports concerning management changes at a number of the largest U.S. 
corporations in the last several years suggest that institutional investors are in fact beginning 
to play a greater role. See, e.g., Brett D. Fromson, American Express: Anatomy of a Coup, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1993, at Al; Doron P. Levin, Stempel Quits Job as Top G.M. Officer in 
Rift with Board, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1992, at Al; Steve Lohr, Big Business in Turmoil: 
Upheavals at I.B.M., Sears and Elsewhere Underline Fundamental Shifts in Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 28,1993, at Al; Steve Lohr, I.B.M. to Replace Its Top Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
27, 1993, at Al. 
Even if institutional investors are playing a larger role in corporate governance, their 
likely impact is enhanced by greater public disclosure. Institutional investors are hampered 
in obtaining needed information through private contacts with corporate officials by the con- 
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action to vote management of such companies out of office is diffi- 
cult. On the other hand, if an existing shareholder or an outsider 
can purchase enough shares of the corporation to obtain a control- 
ling interest, he can replace incumbent management on his own.91 
The existence of such a market for corporate control results in take- 
overs that terminate incompetent or self-interested management. 
Equally important, the fear of a takeover will motivate incumbent 
management to make decisions more in accord with the best inter- 
ests of shareholders than it might otherwise make. 
The effectiveness of the market for corporate control in restrict- 
ing management discretion depends on the accuracy of the price of 
a firm's shares and the quality of information available to the mar- 
ket concerning the firm's operations, both of which are enhanced 
by greater disclosure. To see the relevance of the accuracy of a 
firm's share price, consider the following example. 
Suppose that the incumbent management of a firm (the target) 
is making decisions that are not in the best interests of its share- 
holders. An outsider is aware of this mismanagement and thinks 
that it could do a better job. Assume for a moment that the out- 
sider is certain of how much the target will be worth in its hands.92 
If the target's share price accurately states the value of the firm 
assuming the continuation of incumbent management, the outsider 
will find a takeover worthwhile. The price it must pay to acquire 
the shares necessary to effect the takeover will be less than what the 
shares will be worth once it is in control. But if the price is inaccu- 
rate and the inaccuracy sufficiently overstates actual value, the 
takeover will not be worthwhile, notwithstanding the poor quality 
of incumbent management's decisions and the outsider's certainty 
as to the greater worth of the target in its hands. The more inaccu- 
rate share prices are generally, the more cases there will be where 
cern that they will end up with material nonpublic information, the possession of which will 
prevent them from legally trading in the issuers' shares. Also, their willingness to incur costs 
to ferret out information is still limited by information's public-good nature: each institu- 
tional investor receives only a small portion of the total shareholder gain when the informa- 
tion obtained leads, through shareholder pressure, to better corporate decisions. See Merritt 
B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance 4-6 (May 16, 1997) (unpublished 
paper, presented at the Symposium on Comparative Governance, Max-Planck-Institut, 
Hamburg, Germany, on file with author). 
91. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965). A brief survey of the work in this area is found in F.M. SCHERER & 
DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 42-43 (3d 
ed. 1990). 
92. This assumption of certainty is unrealistic, and its unrealism makes the market for 
corporate control appear more effective on average than it really is in restricting manage- 
ment discretion. 
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the takeover mechanism will fail because the target's share price is 
too high. 
To see the relevance of the quality of information available to 
the market, consider a variation on the example above. Assume, 
more realistically, that the outsider's assessment of the value of the 
target in its hands, though unbiased, is uncertain. The outsider is 
not perfectly informed about the future. Thus, the outsider knows 
that in any particular case its assessment is equally likely to be too 
high or too low and is unlikely to be exactly right. In this situation, 
even if both the price of the shares and the assessment are correct, 
the outsider cannot be confident of these facts. If risk averse, the 
outsider may not undertake the takeover, despite the expected gain 
from doing so. 
The outsider's fear results from the all-or-nothing aspect of a 
takeover. The outsider must acquire a certain number of shares or 
it will be unable to effect the transfer of control on which its expec- 
tation of gain is based. For a target corporation of any significance, 
this minimum number of shares would constitute a large investment 
relative to the size of the typical outsider's portfolio. Altering the 
portfolio to include these shares would add to its riskiness because 
the unsystematic component of the risk could not be fully diversi- 
fied away. The outsider's expected gain from the transfer of control 
may not be sufficient to compensate for the added risk. When more 
information about a potential target is available to the market, less 
unsystematic risk will be involved in an outsider's assessment of 
what the firm would be worth in its hands, and less expected gain 
will be necessary to motivate the outsider to undertake the 
takeover. 
ii. Share-Price-Based Compensation. The role of share price 
is not confined to the operation of the market for corporate control. 
A number of management compensation devices - stock options, 
stock appreciation rights, warrants, and employee-stock-ownership 
plans - depend on share price to determine the magnitude of the 
reward given the recipient.93 
Everything else being equal, the compensation scheme that 
would most effectively align management interests with those of 
shareholders, and hence the most efficient allocation of resources, 
would be entirely stock price based. In recent years this point has 
been given increasing attention in the discussion of how to improve 
93. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 91, at 45-46. 
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the performance of U.S. corporations.94 It would be the most at- 
tractive package to shareholders and management alike because a 
portion of the gains from more efficient allocation would be avail- 
able to each. At the beginning of the year, management would re- 
ceive a compensation package with a higher expected yield than if 
the package were not stock price based, but not so much higher that 
shareholders would receive none of the benefits from the resulting 
improvement in management decisions.95 
Everything is not equal, however, and the problem again is risk. 
Compensation based on share price might end up well above or 
well below what is expected. For the typical manager, job compen- 
sation is a large part of annual income, so this risk cannot be diver- 
94. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives - It's Not How 
Much You Pay, but How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138. A critical review of the 
literature advocating greater share-price-based compensation for management can be found 
in Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory 
of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2096-106 (1994). The superiority of a stock-price- 
based compensation scheme can be seen in terms of the shortcomings of its alternatives. The 
promise of year-end bonuses and future salary increases based on merit are devices by which 
top management, as a group, can reward those members who have made decisions contribut- 
ing to the group's goals. Incentives awarded by a management group, however, will protect 
shareholders only if there is a way to align the interests of the group with those of the share- 
holders. A profit-sharing arrangement may work to align management and shareholder in- 
terests to some extent. A defect in those plans is that "profit" is an accounting figure that at 
best captures only imprecisely many of the gains and losses experienced by a firm. For exam- 
ple, research and development expenditures generally cannot be capitalized and must be 
treated as a current expense, even though they may enhance the future revenues of the firm 
as much as capital expenditures for bricks and mortar. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN- 
DARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 2: ACCOUNTING 
FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS 6 (1974). Thus, profit-sharing arrangements 
often create incentives to make decisions that emphasize a firm's short-run performance over 
its long-run performance. In contrast, when a manager, in choosing among the alternative 
courses of action, chooses the option that most benefits the firm, that choice will on average have the most positive immediate effect on share price, even if the benefit will not be realized 
until some point in the future. 
There is evidence that a compensation package that emphasizes stock returns results in 
management decisions more in the interests of shareholders. See Robert Tempest Masson, 
Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1278, 
1289 (1971) (finding that firms that tie executive compensation to stock returns perform bet- 
ter than those that do not); Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remu- 
neration, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 7, 25-37 (1985) (showing a similar correlation for salary and bonus even before adding in employee stock options and stock appreciation rights). The fact 
that compensation is structured in a way that creates incentives for increasing shareholder 
wealth does not necessarily mean that it is the incentives that made the better-performing 
managers perform the way they did; correlation does not establish causation. It is possible 
that the typical manager in the study was unaffected by the incentive structure under which 
he worked, but that the board, which at the beginning of the manager's tenure was not sure 
of his abilities, observed firm performance over time and then began paying him what he was 
worth. For an example of this kind of "learning" theory of compensation, see Milton Harris 
& Bengt Holmstrom, A Theory of Wage Dynamics, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 315 (1982). 
95. The concept that it can be in the interests of both shareholders and management to 
develop an incentive structure that limits management discretion derives from agency theory. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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sified away. A manager thus will want at least part of his total 
compensation scheme to include less risky elements, such as 
straight salary. The higher the expected accuracy of a firm's share 
price, however, the less risky stock-price-based compensation and 
the larger the portion of the total package he will be willing to ac- 
cept in this form.96 Greater disclosure, therefore, will enhance the 
efficient allocation of resources in this fashion as well. 
B. Costs of Greater Disclosure 
Disclosure involves costs as well as benefits. The easiest way of 
identifying these costs is first to consider the private costs of the 
individual issuer in making additional disclosure, and then to con- 
sider disclosure's costs in terms of larger groups: issuers as a class 
and the economy at large. 
1. Private Costs of Disclosure to the Individual Issuer 
a. Operational Costs. The most obvious costs of greater disclo- 
sure to an individual issuer are the operational costs. The issuer 
must gather and evaluate the necessary information, and then com- 
pose and disseminate a message to the public. These operational 
costs inevitably involve the time of the issuer's officers and employ- 
ees. They may also involve fees for lawyers, accountants and other 
experts, and for printing, particularly in the case of disclosure that is 
legally mandated and required to be in a particular form. Man- 
dated disclosure is also likely to involve governmental "user" fees 
intended in some fashion to recompense the administering agency 
for its expenses.97 
b. Interfirm Costs. Disclosure is likely to involve nonopera- 
tional costs as well, which I shall refer to as "interfirm" costs. For 
96. There is empirical evidence to support the proposition that a reduction in the riski- 
ness of an issuer's stock will increase the proportion of compensation a manager will be 
willing to take in stock price based form. Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan compare the 
percentage of shares owned by officers and directors in a representative sample of exchange- 
listed U.S. firms in 1935 and one in 1995 and finds that it increased from 13% to 22%. They 
find that the relationship between ownership and performance is very similar in the two 
periods. The most promising explanation of the change is the reduction in stock price volatil- 
ity between the first and second periods. See Clifford G. Holderess et al., Were the Good 
Old Days that Good? Evolution of Corporate Ownership and Governance since the Great 
Depression (Oct. 8, 1996) (unpublished paper presented at the University of Michigan De- 
partment of Economics Economic History Seminar, on file with author). 
97. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission charges initial issuers a filing 
fee of one-fiftieth of 1 percent (0.02%) of the maximum offering price of the securities being 
sold. See Sec. Act Rule 457, 17 C.F.R. ? 230.457 (1996); see also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra 
note 3, at 339. 
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an individual firm, being forced to disclose certain information can, 
looked at in isolation, increase its costs or decrease its revenues be- 
cause of use of the information by competitors, major suppliers, or 
major customers. Competitors can act in ways that reduce the is- 
suer's rents, if they know the issuer's lines of business that are un- 
usually profitable or the kinds of products or activities that the 
issuer's research suggests will be unusually profitable in the future. 
Suppliers and customers who deal with the issuer on a negotiated 
basis can strike bargains more favorable to themselves when armed 
with this kind of information. The information enhances suppliers' 
and customers' bargaining positions because it gives them a better 
idea of the size of the potential surplus created by their deals with 
the issuer. 
2. Costs of Disclosure to Issuers as a Class and to the Economy 
as a Whole 
It would be misleading, however, to stop the analysis at the level 
of the individual firm. A widespread disclosure practice, whether 
prompted by a mandatory regime or other pressures, involves the 
issuer's competitors, suppliers, and customers providing informa- 
tion comparable to what the issuer provides. The information pro- 
vided by these other firms can be useful to the issuer. Depending 
on the particular issuer, these countervailing gains may equal or ex- 
ceed the nonoperational, "interfirm" costs that the issuer incurs as a 
result of the practice. Looking at the question across the whole 
economy, the average issuer will gain as many advantages from 
knowing more about its competitors, suppliers, and customers as 
these firms will gain from knowing about the issuer. Thus, the pri- 
vate, individual firm cost of disclosure, which includes both opera- 
tional costs and interfirm costs, will be greater than the social costs 
of that disclosure, which will approximately equal the operational 
costs alone. As a result, absent regulation, firms can be expected to 
disclose less than is socially optimal.98 
We cannot, however, stop quite here. The effects of greater dis- 
closure on the level and distribution of rents in the economy has 
implications for its static and dynamic efficiency in ways that go 
beyond the ordinary domain of financial economics and of the de- 
bate on the virtues and vices of mandatory disclosure.99 The effect 
98. See sources cited infra note 143. 
99. Static efficiency refers to enhancing economic welfare through reallocation of the ex- 
isting fixed supply of productive resources in a world with a given technology. Static effi- 
ciency is maximized when these resources are allocated in a Pareto-optimal fashion - that is, 
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on static efficiency is positive: increased disclosure will lead to 
more effective competition and hence a reduction in the allocative 
distortions associated with monopoly rents. The effect on dynamic 
efficiency is negative: increased disclosure reduces the rewards for 
developing knowledge that identifies new markets and new prod- 
ucts in any area unprotected by patents or copyrights. It in essence 
reduces the scope of what is considered proprietary information.100 
Thus, a proper calculation of the welfare effects of greater disclo- 
sure must include not only balancing its benefits for the finance 
process against its operational costs but also considering these static 
and dynamic efficiency effects. 
III. THE STAKES OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN THE 
DISCLOSURE OF TRANSNATIONALLY TRADED ISSUERS 
How are the benefits and costs of increased disclosure distrib- 
uted among multiple countries? In the world of the near- and 
medium-term future, transnational transactions will be becoming 
increasingly important, but most issuers will still have clear national 
identities and disclosure regulation will still be undertaken by na- 
tional authorities. In assessing the stakes of each of the countries 
involved, this article confines itself to transactions in which the 
place of the transaction is either the issuer's country or the buyer's 
country of residence and, in the case of secondary transactions, in 
which the buyer and seller are of the same country of residence. 
This greatly simplifies the analysis without significantly reducing 
understanding.101 
when no one's welfare can be further improved by a resource reallocation without some 
other person's welfare being diminished. Perfect competition among profit maximizing 
firms, when combined with the satisfaction of certain other conditions, will result in a Pareto- 
optimal allocation of resources. See JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 255-64 (2d ed. 1971). 
Dynamic efficiency refers to enhancing economic welfare through implementation of 
technological change that permits, from the existing fixed supply of productive resources, 
either a larger output of existing products or the output of new products more valued by 
consumers than what was produced before. The conditions, if any, under which competition 
promotes dynamic efficiency and the ones, if any, under which monopoly encourages it are a 
matter of intense debate among industrial organization economists. I have given a critical 
overview of this debate elsewhere. See Fox, supra note 25, at 199-202. 
100. Edmund Kitch takes note of this rent-reducing feature of disclosure to argue that 
issuers have an interest in not complying with mandatory disclosure rules and to question the 
practicality of the regime. See Kitch, supra note 69, at 846-74. The other way of looking at 
this, of course, is to conclude that this rent-reducing feature of disclosure is exactly why we 
cannot count on disclosure being provided voluntarily, even in circumstances in which its 
social benefits exceed its social costs. This is why we need a mandatory regime. 
101. Given that three dimensions of transnational transaction nationality are being con- 
sidered here, such a transaction can involve as many as three countries. Including three- 
country transactions in the analysis, however, would add considerably to the complexity of 
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So confined, all transnational transactions fall into one of three 
general categories. The first is the "standard" transaction. Here 
the investor buys or sells the securities involved in the securities 
market of his country of residence, but the issuer is of a different 
country. The second category is the "transplant" transaction. The 
investor buying or selling the security and the issuer are of the same 
country, but the transaction is effected in another country. The 
third category is the "issuer country" transaction. Like the stan- 
dard transaction, the buyer is of a different country than the issuer, 
but, unlike the standard transaction, the transaction is effected in 
the issuer's country. 
TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING SHARES OF B ISSUERS 
Buyer's Residence 
A B 
Place of A Standard Transplant 
Transaction 
B Issuer Country Domestic 
The discussion below is organized around these three categories 
of transactions. For each category, it considers the stakes of the 
associated countries in the disclosure practices of the issuers of the 
shares involved. The focus is on two countries, A and B. The 
issuers involved are "nationals" of B, meaning that the residences 
of the entrepreneurs who founded them, the issuers' principal 
places of business, and the largest portions of their operations are in 
country B.102 The discussion of each of the three categories 
assumes that there are no public transactions, including purely 
domestic ones, in the shares of the issuers involved outside of the 
category being considered. Despite being generally at odds with 
reality, this simplifying assumption is helpful because it sets up the 
most extreme set of facts against which to test the propositions 
made. As a result, by the end of the discussions of the three 
the presentation without a significant gain in elucidating the underlying principles. Three- 
country transactions are also probably much less common than two country ones. Where the 
buyer and issuer are of different nationalities, the buyer is likely to buy either in his home 
market, where his transactions costs are lowest, or, if the security is not available there, in the 
home market of the issuer, which would typically be the most developed market for the 
issuer's securities. Thus, typically only two countries will be involved because the place of the 
transaction is either the same country as the issuer or as the buyer. 
102. The following discussions of the three categories are obviously equally applicable to 
the other possible standard, transplant and issuer country transactions involving A and B, 
where the issuer is from A; all that is necessary is a reversal of all the country names. 
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categories, a clear understanding will emerge of how, whatever the 
actual overall mix, the residence of the investor, the nationality of 
the issuer, and the place of any given transaction give rise to distinct 
stakes in the disclosure practices of the issuer involved. 
A. The Standard Transaction: Buyer From A; Transaction 
Occurs in A; Issuer From B 
1. The Stakes for Country A, the Country of the Buyer 
In the "standard" transnational transaction, the investor buys 
the securities involved in the securities market of his country of res- 
idence. The transaction is transnational because the issuer is of a 
different country. Such a transaction is "standard" because, given 
the investor's desire to minimize transaction costs, he would natu- 
rally choose to purchase the security in his home market if it was 
available there. The issuer will naturally promote such availability, 
if the potential volume of transactions in the investor's home coun- 
try were sufficient to support a market for the security and the is- 
suer were not deterred by securities law considerations. As a result 
of these factors, transnational transactions in the standard category 
have occasioned the most frequent legal consideration and are 
therefore the subject of the most developed jurisprudence. 
We will use as our example standard transnational transactions 
in the shares of issuers X and Y, nationals of country B. We will 
thus focus on sales in country A of X and Y shares to residents of A 
and trades in such shares among such residents. Remember that we 
assume that these transactions are not accompanied by any public 
sales to, or trades among, B residents. In essence X and Y are pub- 
lic companies only abroad. We will explore the respective stakes of 
countries A and B in X's and Y's disclosure practices by identifying 
the consequences for each country if X or Y reveals less rather than 
more about itself. 
a. Fairness and Risk. First, observe that country A has no 
stake in the disclosure practices of X and Y based on concerns 
about fairness for its investors. Greater fairness is simply not a ben- 
efit generated by greater disclosure. As we saw in Part II, reducing 
the amount of publicly available information about issuers like X 
and Y may increase the uncertainty that the share price reflects its 
actual value, but it will not bias the share price. Regardless of the 
level of disclosure by X and Y, investors in A will not be buying the 
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shares of these issuers at prices that are, on average, greater than 
their actual values.103 
Risk, as we have seen, is a different matter. If X or Y discloses 
less about itself, its share price will be less accurate. Investors hold- 
ing its shares in less than fully diversified portfolios will face in- 
creased risk and hence lower expected utility. Because all public 
investors in X and Y are residents of country A, A will be the coun- 
try that receives this benefit from any increased disclosure by X or 
Y. As we have also seen, however, this observation is subject to 
two caveats. First, the same benefit may be obtainable, probably at 
less cost, by persuading investors in A to diversify more. Second, 
investors in A are better off having shares in X and Y available to 
them, even with minimal disclosure, than not available to them at 
all. Country A would be hurting, not helping its investors, if a pol- 
icy of extending its mandatory disclosure regime to foreign issuers 
103. This statement needs some elaboration to the extent that the world more closely 
resembles the one described by the noise theorists than the one described the EMH theorists. 
See supra note 76 (discussing, in the context of a closed economy, disclosure's effect on fair- 
ness in a noise-theory world). 
First, consider secondary trading. Under the assumptions of the analysis in the text, all 
public trading of X and Y shares is among investors in A. Whatever the level of B issuer 
disclosure, such trading cannot effect any kind of wealth transfer between country A and 
country B. For investors within A buying B issuer shares, price, as in the closed-economy 
discussion, will be fair in the sense that on average it will equal actual value. This guarantees 
that uninformed A investors who choose a diversified portfolio of B issuers' shares, on a 
random basis, are likely to be unaffected by the disclosure level. Noise theory predicts a 
wealth transfer between the other two groups in A investing in B issuers' shares - the smart 
speculators and the naive speculators - as the former profit in their arbitrage activities at 
the expense of the latter. As in the closed economy discussion, expanding the concept of 
fairness to condemn such a transfer is highly questionable. Even if fairness were so ex- 
panded, it is unclear whether more disclosure would exacerbate or mitigate the problem. 
If we relax the assumption in the text that all public secondary trading of X and Y shares 
is among investors in A, and if the proportion of transactions by smart B speculators versus 
naive B investors differs from the comparable proportion of A investor transactions, noise 
theory predicts a transfer of wealth to the country with the higher proportion of smart specu- 
lator transactions. Again, however, the direction of the effect of greater disclosure on the 
size of this transfer is unclear. 
A primary offering, with or without such a relaxation of the assumption in the text, in- 
volves at least indirect transactions between residents of A, as purchasers, and a resident of 
B, the issuer - usually with an investment banker acting as an intermediary. However, as 
discussed previously, the empirical literature comparing new issues in the United States 
before and after passage of the Securities Act of 1933 does not show that the resulting in- 
crease in disclosure improved the fortunes of the purchasers. See supra notes 77-78. This 
suggests that the level of disclosure had no effect on the fairness of initial-offering prices. So, 
at least as a general matter, country A has no fairness stake in the disclosure level of issuers 
from B engaging in even primary offerings of securities. The possible exception to the con- 
clusion that disclosure has no effect on average offering price relates to initial public offerings 
of shares that were to be traded only on a regional stock exchange rather than on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Simon found that these issues were on average overpriced. See Si- 
mon, supra note 77, at 304-08. Simon's findings suggest that country A might have a stake in 
the disclosure level of those issuers from country B that engage in initial public offerings that 
will not then be traded on one of the world's major exchanges. 
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resulted in X and Y shares not being available to these investors in 
the first place. 
b. Efficient Allocation of Resources and Cost. We saw in Part 
II that less disclosure at the time that new shares are offered to the 
public leads to allocational inefficiencies because of its effect on 
which real investment projects are implemented. Less ongoing dis- 
closure also lessens allocational efficiency because it reduces the ef- 
fectiveness of the market for control and share-price-based 
compensation as devices for limiting managerial discretion. On the 
other hand, less disclosure of either kind also reduces costs. The 
question to be addressed here is the extent, if any, to which resi- 
dents of A experience either of these effects. 
i. A Simplified World of Only Initially Capitalizing Firms. We 
will start with a simplified world in which all the B issuers are firms 
seeking capital just once. Each invests in a single project. Project 
return is determined only by the quality of the project idea, not the 
quality of management. Thus the only time a firm discloses is at the 
time it seeks its capital. The only allocational gain from greater 
disclosure is improved project choice. 
Assume, as in the example in Part II, that firms X and Y are 
each offering shares to fund equally expensive proposed projects. 
Anyone who knew what the respective firm entrepreneurs knew 
about the projects would conclude that Y's project has the higher- 
expected cash return. Remember that less accurate share prices in- 
crease the likelihood that X's project will be implemented and Y's 
project will not be. Less disclosure results in less accurate prices. 
In a market in which there are many X-type and Y-type firms, a 
general practice of less disclosure by such firms will thus mean a 
higher number of such misallocations. 
Three groups share in the returns generated by the activities of 
these firms: the suppliers of the entrepreneurial talent, the public 
suppliers of capital, and the suppliers of the other factors of produc- 
tion. The first and third groups consist entirely of B residents, the 
second entirely of A residents. The losses from misallocation can 
only come from one or more of these three groups. As shown be- 
low, because of capital's mobility the suppliers of capital will not be 
hurt. Nor will suppliers of capital bear any of the costs of whatever 
level of disclosure is provided. Thus country A has no stake, based 
on resource allocation or cost concerns, in the disclosure practices 
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of country B issuers, even those that raise their public capital exclu- 
sively through stock sales to A residents. 
This conclusion is derived as follows. The greater the ignorance 
in the market and, hence, share price inaccuracy, the greater the 
misallocation of capital. For any given amount of capital flowing 
from A to B,104 there will be more instances of inferior projects 
being implemented and superior ones not. This will reduce the im- 
plemented projects' average cash return. Since country A's inves- 
tors can make unbiased, though not fully accurate, evaluations of 
what each project's cash return will be, their awareness of the mar- 
ket's greater ignorance will lead them to discount their expectations 
concerning the project cash returns of all B issuers. They know that 
greater ignorance will lead to more misallocations, but they do not 
know which issuers' projects are inferior. 
Cash return on a firm's initial project is the ultimate source of 
all cash distributions to shareholders.105 Lower project cash return 
will mean lower cash distributions to shareholders. These cash dis- 
tributions are divided between two groups of shareholders: the 
public shareholders in A, who exchange the capital necessary for 
the project for shares representing whatever percentage of the is- 
suer's total equity they demand to provide that amount of funds, 
and the entrepreneurs, who receive whatever equity remains. Re- 
gardless of whether the levels of expected cash returns on the 
projects of country B issuers and their consequent expected total 
cash distributions to these two groups of shareholders are high or 
low, investors in country A will demand the same level of expected 
cash distributions. Investors in A have a large supply of alternative 
investment opportunities.106 Lower total expected shareholder 
104. The analysis that follows shows that, everything being equal - including the amount 
of funds flowing out of A to purchase shares of B issuers such as X and Y - the misalloca- 
tions from lower disclosure will reduce returns to entrepreneurs in B and leave investors in A 
unaffected. The actual amount of capital flowing from A to B in fact will be lower because 
the reduction in entrepreneurial surplus will reduce the number of investment opportunities 
from B supplied to the market. 
105. This is true on a discounted basis whether the project cash return is paid out at the 
time received or is retained and reinvested with the distributions to shareholders coming 
instead from the cash return on the reinvestment. 
106. The proposition in the text treats country B as a producer of investment opportuni- 
ties - rights to receive a return at a given point in the future with given risk characteristics 
and an expected value at the time of payout of one dollar. It assumes that investors in A face 
a market in which each such opportunity, whether from B or elsewhere, will be priced the 
same and that the price will not change materially depending on whether B offers fewer such 
opportunities - that is, B issuers have low expected total cash distributions to shareholders 
- or more - that is, B issuers have higher expected distributions. The proposition thus 
analogizes B to a firm selling a product in a perfectly competitive market in which, according 
to standard microeconomic theory, its level of production will have no material effect on 
price. 
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cash distributions of B issuers will simply result in investors in A 
demanding a right to receive a commensurately larger proportion 
of distributions before they provide the capital necessary to imple- 
ment B issuer projects. In other words, investors in A will receive a 
larger proportion of total equity, and the entrepreneurs in B will get 
a smaller proportion. Between the two groups of shareholders, the 
harm to project choice from lower disclosure thus will fall entirely 
upon entrepreneurs in B. For the same reasons, these entrepre- 
neurs will also bear the costs involved in whatever disclosure is 
provided. 
ii. A World With Ongoing Issuers and Ongoing Disclosure. 
Now enlarge the world to include issuers that have an ongoing 
existence. The managers of these issuers from time to time decide 
to implement new projects. Once a project is implemented, manag- 
ers make decisions on how it is run. In this world, as we saw in Part 
II, disclosure is important to efficient resource allocation in two 
The proposition in the text would clearly hold if (i) the market for corporate equities was 
fully global along the price dimension, see supra Part I, and (ii) and B's economy was not a 
large portion of the total global economy. In this case, there would be one global-risk- 
adjusted expected rate of return that would be unaffected by project return in B. The shares 
of country B issuers such as X and Y would be priced to provide investors with that expected 
rate. The proposition will also hold under less stringent conditions. Consider, for example, a 
lack of perfect global integration due to a general reluctance among investors in A to invest 
in foreign equities. The only condition needed for the proposition to hold would be that the 
value of the shares of country B issuers being offered in A does not form a substantial portion 
of the value of all the foreign equities that investors in A are willing to consider. Even when 
this condition is not met, the likely reasons why it would not be met suggest that A would not 
have the kind of stake that should give it the power to regulate the disclosure practices of 
these B issuers. One possible reason that shares of B issuers could form a substantial portion 
of all the foreign investments that investors in A would be willing to consider would be that 
B's economy constitutes a substantial portion of the whole global economy - for example, if 
B were the United States. Then poorer project choice in B, through its effect on the supply 
of investment opportunities globally, would reduce the rate of return investors in every coun- 
try expect on investments in the shares of foreign issuers. This would not, however, be a 
situation that forms a sound basis for giving A the power to regulate the disclosure of B 
issuers. A residents have no more stake in the disclosure practices of B issuers than have 
investors in all third countries. 
A second possible reason that shares of B issuers could form a substantial portion of all 
the foreign investments that investors in A would be willing to consider would be that inves- 
tors in A feel significantly more comfortable with purchases of B issuer shares than with the 
purchase of most other foreign issuer shares - for example, if A were the United States and 
B were Canada. This situation, however, suggests a situation of sufficiently intense interac- 
tion between these two particular economies that their regulation should, and as a practical 
matter can, best be handled by bilateral agreements between the two countries establishing a 
joint regime, rather than general rules parceling out authority between the two countries as 
to which national regime should govern. The United States and Canada are working toward 
such an arrangement by undertaking a degree of coordination of their two regimes and then 
providing for reciprocal recognition for qualified issuers that register under the other coun- 
try's regime. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registra- 
tion and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 33,6902, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 30,036 (1991). 
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ways. First, just as in the simplified world, in cases in which firms 
finance their projects through the public sale of shares, less accurate 
prices lead to an inferior choice of projects to be implemented. 
Second, once firms have their initial injections of publicly held eq- 
uity, self-interest may lead their managers, when making both pro- 
ject choice and operating decisions, to deviate from what is in the 
existing shareholders' best interests. The market for corporate con- 
trol and share-price-based compensation schemes help to limit devi- 
ations, but, as we saw in Part II, the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms depends on the ongoing level of available information 
and share-price accuracy over the rest of the life of the firm. Re- 
source allocation efficiency thus depends both on the level of dis- 
closure at the time that firms sell shares to the public and on the 
ongoing level of firm disclosure thereafter. 
(a) Initial Public Offering Disclosure. A has no resource allo- 
cation or cost-based stake in the level of B issuer disclosure at the 
time of initial public offering. The analysis here directly parallels 
the analysis in the simplified world. Suppose that B issuers do not 
disclose very much. Less disclosure means less share-price accuracy 
and hence more misallocations and a lower expected cash return. 
Again, this will not affect investors in A. The prices of B-issuer 
shares will be discounted to reflect this lower expected cash return, 
guaranteeing that A investors will get the same expected rate of 
return despite the lower level of disclosure. Entrepreneurs in B 
bear the discount, because a lower offering price will result in 
greater dilution of their holdings,107 and they are the ones who 
would enjoy the cost savings. 
(b) Ongoing Periodic Disclosure. In one sense, the same can 
be said of A's resource allocation and cost-based stakes in the ongo- 
ing periodic disclosure practices of B issuers. At the time that an 
issuer from B offers its shares to investors in A, the investors have 
an expectation concerning the firm's level of ongoing disclosure in 
the future. They thus have an expectation concerning the effective- 
ness with which, over the rest of the issuer's life, the market for 
corporate control and share-price-based compensation schemes will 
107. The empirical literature supporting information asymmetry explanations of the dis- 
count of IPO offering prices relative to their initial trading prices, see supra note 78, suggests 
that the less that is known about an issuer, the greater the discount. See, e.g., Ibbotson et al., 
supra note 78, at 41-42; Ritter, supra note 78, at 222-31, 237. This literature thus also tends to 
support the proposition that entrepreneurs bear the cost of suboptimal levels of disclosure. 
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limit managerial deviations from optimal project choice and operat- 
ing decisions. 
An expectation of less disclosure, for example, will lead to an 
expectation of greater deviations, and a resulting smaller cash flow 
available to shareholders. The offering price of the issuer's shares 
will be discounted to reflect this smaller expected available cash 
flow. The expectation of accompanying cost savings would affect 
the offering price in the opposite direction. Investors in A thus 
again will receive the same expected rate of return, regardless of B 
issuers' expected level of ongoing disclosure over time, and entre- 
preneurs in B will bear the effects of the expected disclosure prac- 
tices of B issuers. 
In a second sense, however, A's allocation efficiency and cost- 
based stakes in the ongoing disclosure practices of B issuers are real 
and quite different from its stakes in initial public issue disclosure. 
From the point of an initial public offering by a B issuer onward, A 
residents hold all of its publicly traded shares. For these A share- 
holders, the optimal level of disclosure is the one whereby the is- 
suer discloses just up to the point where the marginal costs of any 
additional disclosure would start to exceed the resulting further 
marginal reduction in managerial deviations. A shareholders are 
worse off to the extent that disclosure is not at this level.108 The 
ongoing interest of the A shareholders in the issuer adhering to this 
optimal level of disclosure does not perfectly coincide with the 
ongoing interest of the managers, who are residents of B. Even if 
the managers are the issuer's founding entrepreneurs, or are other- 
wise significant shareholders, their gains from the managerial devia- 
tions permitted by a suboptimal level of disclosure may be greater 
than their losses as holders of only part of the issuer's shares. 
(c) Subsequent Public Offering Disclosure. An analysis of A's 
resource allocation and cost-based stakes in the level of disclosure 
at public offerings subsequent to initial offerings requires identify- 
ing the multiple functions played by such disclosure. One function 
for subsequent public-offering disclosure is the same as for initial 
public-offering disclosure: to guide funds to the firms that can 
make the best use of them. A now needs to be concerned about 
two groups with regard to this function: the new investors from A 
who are considering the offering and the issuer's existing A share- 
holders. The level of disclosure required of B issuers does not af- 
108. To the extent that it was expected that the disclosure level was not going to be opti- 
mal, the A investors are, of course, compensated in advance by a discounted purchase price. 
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fect the new investors from A. Again, less disclosure means less 
price accuracy and hence more cases of funds going to firms that 
are not the ones that can make the best use of them. Again, the 
share prices of B issuers engaging in these public offerings will be 
discounted to reflect this fact. So, as with the initial public offering, 
the new investors from A will get the same level of return regard- 
less of the level of disclosure. Now, however, this discount and the 
costs of disclosure are borne by the existing shareholders from A as 
well as the entrepreneurs from B. A lower offering price will result 
in a greater dilution of the holdings of both. This effect of the dis- 
closure level on the existing A shareholders, however, does not 
form the kind of stake in the subsequent public offering disclosure 
practices of B issuers that, by itself, is likely to generate a desire by 
A to regulate those practices. This is because the interests of the A 
investors exactly parallel the interests of entrepreneurs in B. 
The second function served by subsequent public-offering dis- 
closure is the same as that of ongoing disclosure: to assist in the 
functioning of the market for corporate control and share-price- 
based compensation schemes to limit managerial deviations from 
optimal project choice and operating decisions.109 With regard to 
this function, A's stakes are real. The existing A shareholders have 
the same interests in the B issuer's subsequent public offering dis- 
closure as they do in their periodic disclosure practices. As in ongo- 
ing disclosure, these interests do not perfectly coincide with those 
of the issuers' managers who are from B. 
2. The Stakes for B, the Country of the Issuer 
Now let us consider the consequences to country B if firms such 
as X and Y reveal less rather than more about themselves. Investor 
fairness and risk are not concerns, because of our assumption that 
these firms have no B residents among their public shareholders. 
Our concern instead exclusively focuses on country B's stakes in the 
allocation-of-resources effects of issuer disclosure and its costs. 
a. Entrepreneurs. From the discussion immediately above, 
we already know a great deal about the distribution of disclosure's 
resource-allocation benefits and costs. In the simplified world of 
only initially capitalizing firms, we saw that the level of disclosure 
109. The suggestion that subsequent public-offering disclosure regulation can have this 
second, agency-cost-reducing function is not new. See Fox, supra note 25, at 138-39, 339-67; 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 
(1984); Fox, supra note 69, at 1018-22. 
August 1997] 2561 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 14:20:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Michigan Law Review 
determines the proportion of superior to inferior projects chosen to 
be implemented and the consequent expected cash return. Entre- 
preneurs in B fully bear this effect on expected cash return and on 
the costs of disclosure. In the more complex world where issuers 
have an ongoing existence, the level of ongoing disclosure expected 
at the time of an issuer's public offering creates expectations con- 
cerning the level of managerial deviations and disclosure costs - 
and hence the level of cash flow available to shareholders. As the 
market price discounts for this, entrepreneurs fully bear the effects. 
Thereafter, however, if an issuer discloses at less than an optimal 
level, its entrepreneurs only feel part of the effect on the firm's net 
cash flow. They no longer own all the equity; the firm's sharehold- 
ers in A bear the remainder of the effects. If these entrepreneurs 
continue in a managerial capacity, they can enjoy all of the benefits 
from the managerial deviations permitted by the suboptimal 
disclosure. 
b. Labor. We have not yet considered the other group that 
can be affected by the choice as to which investment projects are 
implemented and how they are operated - the suppliers of the 
other factors of production, most importantly, labor. For the 
projects of B issuers, these suppliers will be concentrated in B. The 
analysis below shows that they too are almost certain to be benefi- 
ciaries of the improved allocation of resources that results from 
both greater new public issue disclosure and greater ongoing disclo- 
sure. This is a very important conclusion because it underscores the 
importance of country B's stake in the disclosure practices of its 
issuers, even in the artificially extreme case of issuers whose public 
shares are offered to, and traded by, investors residing in country A 
exclusively. This conclusion will be demonstrated in terms of the 
effects of greater new public issue disclosure on project choice in 
the simplified world of initially capitalizing firms. The reasoning is 
equally applicable, however, to the effect of ongoing disclosure on 
the way that the market for corporate control and share-price- 
based compensation disciplines managers of ongoing firms in their 
project choice and operating decisions.110 
i. Labor's Absolute Share and the Technical Change Analogy. 
Analyzing the effect of the quality of project choice on labor in B is 
a complex task. The analysis requires us to determine what would 
happen to labor's absolute share of B's national product if issuers 
110. See infra note 119. 
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such as X and Y disclosed more. Does labor gain or lose from the 
better allocation of capital that results from improved share-price 
accuracy? 
In a competitive economy, each unit of labor is paid the value of 
the marginal physical product of labor (mppl) - the value of the 
increased output resulting from the addition of the marginal unit of 
labor.11l Labor's absolute share of B's national product conse- 
quently equals the total number of units of labor, L, multiplied by 
mppl. Assuming that L stays constant, the effect of better alloca- 
tion on labor's absolute share of B's national product depends on 
the effect of better allocation on labor's marginal physical product. 
To get a feel of the effect of better allocation on the demand for 
labor, consider first the single reallocation from X's project to Y's 
project, which by itself would be too insignificant within the work- 
ings of B's whole economy to have a perceptible effect on the price 
of labor or its availability to other projects. By definition, Y's 
higher expected cash return means that the spread between the 
value of output and the cost of inputs for Y's project exceeds that 
for X's project. Assuming constant returns to scale, this greater 
spread can only be explained by one or more of the following three 
things being true of Y's and X's production functions:112 (i) Y, us- 
111. In models of an economy of this sort, each unit of labor is typically assumed to be 
interchangeable with each other unit. In other words, there is no recognition that workers 
differ in their skills and effort. In equilibrium, the value of mppl is equal across all industries. 
112. A firm's production function states the maximum output that the firm can obtain for 
each possible combination of capital and labor. The two projects have different production 
functions because the managers possess different technical information about how to trans- 
form the inputs into output or, in this particular model, because the managers, for reasons 
other than profit maximization, constrain themselves from utilizing a method of transforma- 
tion about which they do possess the technical information. Thus, somewhat unusually, the 
issues of competency or skill on the one hand and nonprofit-maximizing managerial behavior 
on the other are, in this part of the discussion, collapsed into the firm's production function. 
With the production function so stated, firms are assumed to seek to maximize profits. 
This treatment of agency costs bears a resemblance to the approach of Jensen and 
Meckling. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 95. One of their cardinal contributions was to 
reintegrate important observations of the managerial theory of the firm into the larger neo- 
classical framework of profit maximization. They saw that there were economic advantages 
to the separation of ownership from control - i.e., having finance and risk bearing provided 
by passive investors and managerial skills provided by professional managers - but that 
there were costs as well - both the costs to shareholders of managerial deviations from 
maximizing shareholder value and the costs of combating this behavior. Maximizing eco- 
nomic welfare means minimizing these total costs rather than the impossible task of eliminat- 
ing managerial deviations entirely. 
To isolate out the effects of disclosure on the quality of project choice, I am in essence 
treating the agency costs of a given issuer as fixed. The same kind of analysis also can show 
that the effects of ongoing disclosure on the disciplining mechanisms of the market for corpo- 
rate control and share-price-based compensation will also very likely lead to an increase in 
labor's absolute share of B's national income. Greater discipline increases the expected cash 
returns of all firms. Again, it can only do so by changing the firms' production functions in 
one or more of the three ways listed in the text. 
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ing the same amount of each input as would X, can produce an 
output that sells for more than that of X; (ii) Y can produce an 
output of the same value as that of X using the same amount of 
labor as would X but less capital; or (iii) Y can produce an output of 
the same value as that of X using the same amount of capital as X 
but less labor. 
Stated this way, one can see a close analogy between better cap- 
ital allocation and technical change. Each describes a phenomenon 
by which an economy produces a more valuable output from a 
given fixed set of inputs. The difference is that the study of techni- 
cal change starts out with all the economy's firms having one set of 
production functions and looks at the effects of a change in those 
production functions as a result of new technical knowledge. It as- 
sumes the occurrence of the appropriate welfare-maximizing input 
reallocations in response to these changes in production functions. 
In contrast, the study of better allocation assumes that a variety of 
firms already exist, each possessing its own production function and 
the change involves one set of firms receiving capital instead of an- 
other. What the phenomena of technical change and better capital 
allocation share in common is that the firms that are receiving capi- 
tal after the change have different production functions than the 
firms receiving capital before the change and economic welfare is 
enhanced as a result. The analogy between technical change and 
reallocation is important because the effect of technical change on 
labor's share of national income has been the subject of considera- 
ble study by economists.113 
To employ this analogy to trace the effect of better capital allo- 
cation on labor's share, we will begin with the assumption, subse- 
quently to be relaxed, that all firms in the economy produce the 
same product. We will also assume that the level of disclosure by B 
issuers does not affect the aggregate amount of capital flowing from 
A to B, just to which firms it goes.114 
113. See, e.g., J.R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 89-135 (1963); K.J. Arrow et al., Capi- 
tal-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency, 43 REV. ECON. & STAT. 225, 244-246 (1961); 
Irving B. Kravis, Relative Income Shares in Fact and Theory, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 917 (1959). 
114. This second assumption helps segment the analysis into tractable parts and, though 
inaccurate, is harmless. It is inaccurate because it ignores the effects of poorer disclosure 
(when not cost justified) on the demand in B for capital from A. As explained above, see 
supra note 104, the expectation of lower project cash return will diminish the returns to 
entrepreneurs and hence diminish the amount of capital being demanded. The assumption is 
harmless because the larger amount of capital flowing from A to B when B's issuers increase 
disclosure will by itself increase the mppl in B and hence simply supplement the increase in 
mppl from better allocation that the analysis in the text suggests is likely. 
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ii. All Firms Produce the Same Product - Neutral Impact on 
Factor Effectiveness. The first explanation of Y's greater expected 
cash return, where both projects would use the same amounts of 
labor and capital but the value of Y's output would be greater than 
X's, can be analogized to factor-neutral process innovation. Using 
the factors in Y is equivalent to using in X a proportionally larger 
number of units of each factor. It is as though their use in Y pro- 
portionally increases the number of "effective" units of each factor. 
Suppose for a moment that the differences in expected cash return 
among all proposed projects seeking foreign capital is due to this 
first cause. What would be the effect of greater disclosure by the B 
issuers seeking capital in A, so that more of the better projects like 
Y and fewer of the worse projects like X are chosen? If the produc- 
tion functions involved conform to standard assumptions, the mar- 
ginal products of labor and of capital will each grow 
proportionally.115 Labor and capital divide in the same proportions 
a larger pie so that labor's absolute share of national product 
increases. 
iii. Same Product - Capital-Saving Impact. The second ex- 
planation of Y's higher expected cash return, that Y has a produc- 
tion function that permits it to produce the same amount of output 
as X using the same amount of labor but less capital, can be analo- 
gized to capital-saving process innovation. Using a given amount of 
capital in Y is equivalent to using a larger number of units of capital 
in X. It is like increasing the number of "effective" units of capital. 
115. X's production function can be stated as Qx = X(L,K), where Q, is X's output and L, 
and Kx are the inputs of labor and capital, respectively. Y's production function can be stated 
as Qy = Y(L,K), with Qy, Ly, and Ky having parallel meanings. According to the description 
of the production functions in the text, Qy = X(kL,kK) (where k is a constant greater than 1). 
Because of the assumption of constant returns to scale, Qy also equals kX(L,K). Thus 
dQy/dL = kdQx/dL and dQy/dK = kdQ,/dK. 
Assume for a moment a "pure case" in which all capital comes from abroad, high issuer 
disclosure means that all Y-type projects and no X-type projects will be implemented, and 
low issuer disclosure means the opposite. The total amount of capital and labor is fixed, and 
thus, if capital goes to the Y projects instead of the X projects, each Y project would receive 
the same amount of each input as the X projects otherwise would have. Thus, with better 
allocation, the mppl and mppk would each be just k times their values with worse allocation. 
It is more realistic to assume that only some of B's firms seek capital from abroad and 
that more disclosure by these firms only results in the implementation of some Y projects 
instead of X ones. As long as the proposed projects seeking foreign capital are representa- 
tive of the economy as a whole in terms of their factor intensities, the mppl will with more 
disclosure still increase in competitive equilibrium, but not by a factor of k. This is because if 
only as much labor was used in the Y projects as would have been used in the X projects, the 
mppl in the Y projects would be greater than the mppl in all the other projects and hence 
greater than the wage rate. Thus, the Y project managers would seek more labor, lowering 
their mppls and raising those of all other projects to a point where the mppls in the Y projects 
and in the others would all be equal. 
August 1997] 2565 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 14:20:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Michigan Law Review 
Now suppose for a moment that the differences in expected cash 
return among all proposed projects seeking foreign capital are due 
to this second cause. What, this time, would be the effect of more 
disclosure by the B issuers seeking capital in A so that more of the 
better projects like Y and fewer of the worse projects like X are 
chosen? If the production functions involved conform to standard 
assumptions, the marginal product of labor would increase.ll6 This 
is because the number of units of labor stays fixed, but the number 
of effective units of capital increases, thereby giving each unit of 
labor more effective capital to work with. Labor's absolute share, 
the total amount of labor times its marginal physical product, would 
thus again increase. 
iv. Same Product - Labor-Saving Impact. The third expla- 
nation of Y's higher expected cash return, Y having a production 
function that would permit it to produce the same amount of output 
as X using the same amount of capital but less labor, can be analo- 
gized to labor-saving process innovation. Using a given amount of 
labor in Y is equivalent to using a larger number of units of labor in 
X; it is as though the number of "effective" units of labor increased. 
Momentarily assume that the differences in expected cash return 
among all proposed projects seeking foreign capital are due to this 
third cause. What now would be the effect of more disclosure by 
B's issuers so that more of the better projects like Y are chosen and 
fewer of the worse projects like X? This time, there is no unambig- 
uous answer to derive from standard assumptions about production 
functions generally. The answer instead depends on their more spe- 
cific characteristics. 
116. X's and Y's production functions can be as stated in supra note 115. According to 
the description of the production functions in the text, Qy = X(L, EkK), where Ek is a constant 
greater than 1. Adopting the common assumption that both production functions are linear 
homogenous - the isoquants all have the same shape and there are constant returns to scale 
- it can be shown that dQx/dLdK will then be positive. That is, for any given amount of 
labor, mmpl increases as K increases. See HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 99, at 79-85. 
Thus dQy/dL will exceed dQx/dL for any given actual amounts of capital and labor allocated 
to a firm utilizing one production function or the other. 
Assume first a "pure case" in which all capital comes from abroad, and assume that high 
issuer disclosure means that all Y-type projects and no X-type projects will be implemented 
and low issuer disclosure means the opposite. Again, with the total amount of capital and 
labor fixed, each Y project would with high disclosure receive the same amount of each input 
as each X project otherwise would have. Under these circumstances, as discussed in the 
paragraph above, the mppl will be greater. 
Now, more realistically, assume that only some of B's firms seek capital from abroad and 
that more disclosure by these firms only results in the implementation of some Y projects 
instead of X ones. For the same reasons as with the explanation analogized to factor-neutral 
technical change, the mppl will still be greater but not by as much as in the "pure case." See 
supra note 115. 
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Two contradictory forces are at work in this case, each a result 
of the fact that one actual unit of labor stands for more than one 
effective unit. On the one hand, for any given total number of ac- 
tual units of labor used in Y, a greater number of effective units are 
being used. Reflecting the law of diminishing returns, the marginal 
product of an additional effective unit thus will be lower. On the 
other hand, one more actual unit of labor used in Y, when added to 
any given number of effective units of labor, will add more to out- 
put than will adding one more effective unit. Given a fixed number 
of actual units of labor, whether the second force dominates the 
first depends on the ease with which labor and capital can be substi- 
tuted for each other in X's production function - that is, the elas- 
ticity of substitution between labor and capital.117 The greater the 
ease of substitution, the less that an increase in the aggregate 
number of effective units of labor drives down the product of the 
marginal effective unit of labor and hence the less important the 
first force. 
Empirical study of the U.S. economy strongly suggests that this 
second force in fact does dominate. As set out in the Appendix, the 
U.S. economy's production functions display an ease of substitution 
such that better allocation would increase the marginal product of 
an actual unit of labor. Hence labor's absolute share of national 
product would increase, even under the highly artificial assumption 
that differences in expected cash return among all proposed 
projects seeking foreign capital are due solely to this third explana- 
tion. The same is likely to be true of other developed countries as 
well. 
v. Same Product - the Likely Balance of Impacts. The 
probability that better allocation would increase B's mppl is even 
greater if differences between the projects that receive capital with 
better allocation and those that receive it with worse allocation are, 
as in the real world, due, to one extent or another, to all three ex- 
planations. The most plausible assumption about the mix of these 
projects is that it will show no overall bias toward capital saving or 
labor saving projects.118 In that event, even if, despite the contrary 
117. See Appendix. 
118. The reason why X-type projects rather than Y-type projects are more likely to be 
chosen with less disclosure is greater ignorance. Assuming that among all the projects pro- 
posed, there is no labor-saving bias in the reasons why the better projects are better, plain 
ignorance should not result in missing more Y projects that were superior to the X ones 
because of their labor-saving potential than Y projects that were superior to X ones because 
of their capital-saving potential. 
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indications of the empirical studies, the elasticity of substitution is 
sufficiently low that labor-saving better allocations alone would 
lower the mppl, their effect would be more than canceled out by the 
equal number of capital-saving better allocations.119 Factor-neutral 
better allocations, which enhance the marginal products of both fac- 
tors, would simply add to the improvement in labor's marginal 
product. 
vi. Firms Produce Different Products - the Likely Balance of 
Impacts. Relaxing the assumption that the economy produces only 
one product should not alter the general conclusion that better cap- 
ital allocation will enhance labor's absolute share of national in- 
come. This is obvious where Y's production function, despite 
involving a different product, bears a linear relationship to that of 
X. For every given combination of labor and capital, the amount of 
Y product that would be produced will be the same multiple of the 
An assumption of no bias seems plausible: each entrepreneur had every incentive to have 
its firm have the most productive production function possible, one that for each possible 
amount of labor requires the least capital for any given output and vice versa. The propo- 
nents of the X-type firms simply have not done as well in pursuing this goal. There is no 
reason why, when they fall short, they are more likely to miss opportunities to save labor 
than capital. 
It is true that innovation is a major spur for proposing new investment projects and that 
economists generally believe that there is a labor-saving bias to innovation. See, e.g., HICKS, 
supra note 113, at 123-24; Kravis, supra note 113, at 941-42. But this does not necessarily 
undermine the plausibility of the neutrality assumption: more of both the X-type and Y-type 
projects might be spurred by labor-saving ideas than capital-saving ideas, but the difference 
between them might reflect a balance of missed opportunities to save inputs. Even if this 
does not hold true, however, it is important to note that a substantial portion of all proposed 
projects, X-type and Y-type, will be spurred by the need to replace existing capacity, to meet 
new demand, or to provide new products, rather than by the potential of new input-saving 
production innovation. 
119. Assuming, as we have, linear homogeneous production functions, the marginal prod- 
ucts depend only on the ratio of the inputs. A better allocation that saves a given proportion 
of the economy's total amount of capital clearly increases the marginal product of an actual 
unit of labor by giving each unit of labor more effective units of capital with which to work. 
A better allocation that saves the same proportion of the economy's total amount of labor 
has two opposing effects on the marginal product of an actual unit of labor. First, it decreases 
the marginal product of labor by the same amount as the capital-saving better allocation 
increases it because the increase in the effective number of units of labor decreases the 
amount of capital available to each effective unit of labor by the same amount that the capi- 
tal-saving better allocation increases the amount of capital available to each unit of labor. 
Second, the labor-saving better allocation raises the marginal product of labor because each 
actual unit now stands for more than one effective unit of labor. If the elasticity of substitu- 
tion is much lower than the empirical studies indicate, the first effect would dominate the 
second and labor-saving better allocations would lower mppl. However, with an equal 
number of Y projects being capital saving and labor saving, an increase in the adoption rate 
of Y projects will still increase mppl: the increase in mppl from the capital-saving projects 
would just cancel out the decrease from the first effect of the labor-saving projects, leaving 
the second effect to raise mppl. 
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amount of X product that would be produced.120 If one combina- 
tion of inputs produces 100 units of X's product and 150 units of Y's 
product and another combination would produce 200 units of X's 
product, that second combination thus would produce 300 units of 
Y's product. What makes Y's project superior is that for each of the 
given combinations of inputs, Y's output sells for more than X's 
output. In this situation, allocation of capital to Y instead of X is 
again analogous to factor-neutral process innovation. Using any 
given combination of inputs in Y is equivalent, in terms of the value 
of the output, to using a proportionally greater number of units of 
each factor in X. Again, in terms of value produced, it is as though 
their use in Y proportionally increases the number of effective units 
of each factor. Analogous to the reasoning above, if the differences 
between the Y-type projects and X-type projects were all of this 
kind and more disclosure by B issuers seeking capital in A would 
lead to more Y projects and fewer X projects, the marginal products 
of labor and of capital will each grow proportionally.121 Obviously, 
in reality the production function of Y will not bear a linear rela- 
tionship to that of X. But the assumption that it does is adequate 
for looking at aggregate consequences of better allocation. 
Relaxing the single-product assumption introduces the issue of 
consumer preference among products. Considering consumer pref- 
erence among products creates the possibility that a Y project will 
be superior to an X one because, at the margin and given the prices 
of inputs reflecting their opportunity costs, Y-project proponents 
are better able to sense consumer preferences. There is no reason 
to believe that the products that the proponents of such Y projects 
choose would on average be more or less labor intensive than the 
products that the proponents of the X projects would choose. Both 
groups of proponents are competing for funds and both are trying 
their best to gauge consumer preferences. The only difference is 
that the Y proponents are more successful at it. 
Like factor-neutral process innovation, the aggregate effect of 
product innovation thus should be to increase labor's marginal 
product and hence its absolute share of national income. 
120. In more technical terms, the production functions of X and Y differ only by a scalar. 
If QX(L,K) is the production function for X, and Qy(L,K) is the production function of Y, 
then Qx(L,K) = kQy(L,K), where k is a constant positive real number. Given our continuing 
assumption that they are homogeneous, all the isoquants of both production functions will be 
the same shape. Thus, while X and Y would produce different products, their respective 
production functions are such that, given the market prices of labor and capital, the managers 
of each will use capital and labor in the same proportions. See HENDERSON & QUANDT, 
supra note 99, at 79-81. 
121. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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3. The Relevance of the Place in Which the Transaction 
Is Executed 
The last dimension of nationality - the place the transaction is 
effected - has not played a role in this analysis of standard transac- 
tions. It is the central focus of the discussion of transplant transac- 
tions that follows where place is the unique factor that makes the 
transactions transnational. The relevance of place to the stakes of 
the two countries in standard-transaction disclosure will be post- 
poned until the discussion of issuer-country transactions, because 
the place of the transaction is the sole factor that distinguishes stan- 
dard transactions from issuer-country transactions. Its relevance 
thus is most easily seen through a comparison of the stakes of the 
two countries in the two kinds of transactions. 
B. The Transplant Transaction: Buyer From B; Issuer From B; 
Transaction Occurs in A 
In the "transplant" transnational transaction, the issuer and the 
investor buying or selling the security are of the same country. It is 
essentially a domestic transaction except for the fact that it is ef- 
fected in the securities market of another country. Transplant 
transactions have historically been rare for a large, developed coun- 
try such as the United States. Investors want to minimize transac- 
tion costs by engaging in transactions in their home countries and 
issuers will tend to promote a market for their securities first do- 
mestically, where there would naturally tend to be the largest inter- 
est in them. Other forces related to differences between countries 
in their mandatory disclosure regimes or the execution efficiency of 
their exchanges, however, may create incentives for such issuers to 
promote transplant transactions. With the cost differential between 
effecting a transaction on a foreign market and on a domestic mar- 
ket declining, transplant transactions are likely to become more im- 
portant in the future. 
Remember again that we are assuming an extreme set of facts in 
which the shares of the issuers on which we focus will only be sold 
and traded in transplant transactions. There are no public sales to 
or trades among residents of A in the shares of these issuers, nor 
are there any sales or trades effected in B. 
1. The Different Nature of the Stakes 
In a transplant transaction, all the benefits and costs from dis- 
closure discussed so far are experienced exclusively by residents of 
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B. They are the investors, the entrepreneurs, and the suppliers of 
the other factors of production. They are the ones who enjoy the 
risk reduction and better allocation resulting from increased disclo- 
sure and who bear its added costs, however these benefits and costs 
are distributed among them. The situation is no different than if the 
initial offering and subsequent trading in the shares were entirely 
domestic. In terms of these interests, B is the only country that has 
a stake in the disclosure practices of its transplant-transaction issu- 
ers. Even though transactions in their shares are being effected in 
A, A has no stake. 
There is another interest that we have not yet considered: the 
volume of securities transactions effected within a country's bor- 
ders. Serving as the location for securities transactions economi- 
cally benefits the residents who provide the services necessary to 
effect these transactions. If the level of disclosure that accompanies 
transplant transactions in A differs from that which accompanies 
domestic transactions in B, the difference can affect the quantity of 
these transplant transactions and hence the total volume of securi- 
ties transactions effected in each country. A has an interest in the 
existence of a difference if the difference is one that would increase 
country B issuer-transplant transactions. Because most transplant 
transactions likely are substitutes for purely domestic transactions, 
B would have a volume-related countervailing interest of similar 
strength in removing any difference - that is, in place being irrele- 
vant to the level of disclosure by B issuers. 
The likely source of any difference between the disclosure that 
accompanies transplant transactions and that which accompanies 
purely domestic ones would be a difference in the rigor of each 
country's mandatory disclosure regime. The stakes of countries A 
and B in the transplant transaction disclosure of B issuers thus 
translate into their respective stakes in whether or not the applica- 
tion of A's regime to such transactions substitutes for the applica- 
tion of B's regime. 
2. Country A's Regime Is the More Rigorous: The Market 
Reputation and Cost Deterrence Effects 
a. The Market-Reputation Effect. Suppose that A's disclosure 
regime, at least when applied to its purely domestic transactions, is 
more rigorous than B's. Thus, A might be the United States, and B 
might be Germany. If A applies the same regime to transplant 
transactions, issuers from B that promote transplant transactions in 
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A will have to disclose more than if they promote purely domestic 
transactions. 
This difference can attract certain transactions to A. Consistent 
application of A's regime creates a reputation that any issuer whose 
shares are sold or traded in A has disclosure practices that meet A's 
higher standard. Given such a reputation, the mere fact that an 
issuer's shares are sold or traded in A economically communicates 
to investors that the issuer, even if it is from B, meets A's standards. 
An issuer would want to make such a communication if it deter- 
mines that the benefits of meeting this higher standard exceed the 
costs. An issuer making such a determination has an incentive to 
promote the public sale or trading of its securities in A. In order to 
establish or preserve the reputation that creates this incentive, A 
has a stake in the issuer actually meeting the standard. 
If A's regime is the more rigorous and market reputation is the 
only factor that draws transplant transactions to A, A has a stake in 
B issuers disclosing more when transactions in their shares occur 
within A's borders than when they occur at home in B. A wants 
location to matter and wants to apply its regime. B has a counter- 
vailing volume-related interest in removing any difference, so that 
location does not matter.122 
b. Other Attractions to A and the Cost-Deterrence Effect. 
Some issuers in B, however, may have reasons other than A's repu- 
tation for high disclosure standards to promote transplant transac- 
tions. For example, A may have a stock market that executes 
transactions more efficiently than do the markets in B. If this is the 
case, it becomes ambiguous whether A has a volume-related stake 
in the existence of a disclosure difference for transplant-transaction 
B issuers. One group of B issuers is, as just described, attracted by 
the difference and without it would not promote transplant transac- 
tions in their shares even given A's superior execution efficiency. 
Another group of B issuers, however, might find A's execution effi- 
ciency, if that were all that was involved, to be a sufficient induce- 
ment to promote transplant transactions of their shares in A, but 
might find that the costs of complying with A's regime exceed the 
122. Of course, other considerations, unrelated to volume, may point in the opposite di- 
rection. Suppose that some B issuers that find the benefits of meeting A's standards exceed 
the costs are correct in terms of social benefits exceeding social costs. Because all the entre- 
preneurs, investors, and suppliers of other factors of production associated with these issuers 
are B residents, it is B's residents who gain if the issuers can find a mechanism to assure 
investors that they in fact will meet these higher standards. If B's government is unable to 
provide such a mechanism and views these gains to its residents as outweighing the negative 
effect on share transaction volume in B, it would on balance favor application by A. 
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benefits by such an amount that they would decide not to come to 
A. The second group is likely to be larger than the first because the 
managers of most B issuers would probably prefer not to disclose at 
B's required level, let alone A's.123 
When these additional considerations are added in, A's more 
rigorous standard may lead it to want the place of the transaction 
not to matter in how much a B issuer discloses. A would not have a 
stake in transplant-transaction B issuers disclosing more than do- 
mestic-transaction B issuers unless the number of transactions 
drawn in by reputation exceeds the number deterred by the costs of 
disclosure. B would have exactly the opposite volume-related 
stakes. B would want location to matter unless the market- 
reputation effect outweighed the cost-deterrence effect. 
3. Country B's Regime Is the More Rigorous: The Regulatory- 
Evasion Effect 
Suppose instead that A's domestic disclosure regime is less rig- 
orous than B's. Thus, A might be the United Kingdom, and B 
might be Canada. If A applies its regime to transplant transactions 
in B issuer shares and this results in B's regime not being applied to 
these issuers, B issuers will not have to disclose as much in trans- 
plant transactions as they would have to disclose in domestic trans- 
actions. This difference too will attract certain transactions to A. 
For some entrepreneurs and managers in B, the costs of meeting 
B's disclosure standards exceed the benefits to them. They will 
123. B issuer managers decide where their shares are traded and offered. For most of 
them, the costs of complying even with B's regime likely exceed the reputational benefit of 
doing so. Absent regulation, an issuer voluntarily chooses to disclose at the level where the 
reputational benefits in the market from disclosing at that level just equal the costs as per- 
ceived by management. As we saw in Part II, supra, strong theoretical reasons exist for 
believing that the level so chosen is lower than the level that is socially optimal. The cost of 
disclosure in the manager's eyes includes harm to the issuer resulting from information given 
to competitors, major suppliers, and customers. This harm, however, is not a social cost of 
disclosure, because these recipients of the information enjoy commensurate benefits. 
Assuming that B's required disclosure level is not set below B's social optimum level from 
a risk reduction and resource allocation efficiency point of view, most B issuers thus would 
prefer to disclose less than that and would certainly not be attracted to A's even stricter 
regime. This is an appropriate assumption. Admittedly, political structures within some 
countries, particularly developing ones, may result in disclosure standards below the social 
optimum. However, where, as here, the issue under study is regulation with respect to be- havior with cross-border effects, it is conventional to assume, as a reasonable first approxima- 
tion of reality, that the countries involved act in their own best interests when regulating 
entirely domestic versions of the same behaviors. This, for example, is a fundamental as- 
sumption behind the governmental-interest method for identifying "true conflicts" of law. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); 
Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990). 
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have an incentive to promote transplant transactions in place of do- 
mestic ones. 
This time, however, the existence of other reasons for B issuers 
to be attracted to A, such as execution efficiency, will not cut signif- 
icantly against A's preference for the difference. Some of the issu- 
ers attracted by such other reasons might well be concerned with 
B's lesser-market reputation, but this concern is unlikely to deter 
them from promoting transplant transactions in A. As B issuers, 
they presumably can choose not to opt out of B's regime, even if all 
selling and trading of their shares occur in A. This would communi- 
cate to investors that the issuer, despite being sold and traded in A, 
will comply with B's higher disclosure standards.124 The regulatory 
evasion effect will dominate the reputation effect. When A's re- 
gime is the less rigorous, therefore, A has a clear volume-related 
stake in transplant-transaction B issuers not disclosing as much as 
they would need to if the transactions were effected at home. B has 
the same clear countervailing volume related stake in the issuer dis- 
closing the larger amount of information required by its regime 
even though the place of the transaction is abroad. A wants the 
level of disclosure to depend on location; B does not. 
4. Increased Investor Willingness to Trade on a Country's Market 
Is Not a Sound Basis for Imposing Its Regime on 
Transplant Transactions 
This analysis focuses on the decisions of B issuers as to where to 
promote the sale or trading of their shares and not on the decisions 
of investors. This is because the financial economics models em- 
ployed in this analysis suggest that a country's reputation concern- 
ing the disclosure practices of issuers whose shares are sold or 
traded within its borders will not affect investor willingness to trade 
124. Two objections might be raised here. First, unlike the fact that A is the place where 
a particular B issuer's shares are being sold or traded, the fact that the issuer nevertheless 
chooses to register its securities in B when it does not need to will not be known to all 
investors. Not all investors will know that the issuer is in effect voluntarily binding itself to 
conform to B's higher standard. But not all investors need to know of the issuer's registra- 
tion in B for the price to reflect that fact. It is the price effect of the disclosure choice that 
attracts the issuer to register its securities in the first place. 
Second, and somewhat more serious, if B's regime is not automatically applied to trans- 
plant issuers from B, the issuer that originally announces it will nevertheless comply with B's 
regime could presumably deregister at some later point. Registration in B is not needed for 
continued trading of the issuer's shares the way it would be if the issuer had gone public at 
home, and thus the issuer cannot provide investors with the same degree of assurance of 
continued high disclosure. To that extent, B issuers with market-reputation concerns might 
stay home and avoid A if A's regime applies to transplant transactions in substitution for B's 
regime. 
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in that market one way or the other. If investors expect an issuer to 
provide less disclosure, they will expect that the cash returns from 
the issuer's projects will be lower because of poorer project choice 
and weaker managerial discipline. This results in a sufficiently 
lower share price to provide investors with an expected return 
equal to the competitive rate, but not in any reduced investor will- 
ingness to trade in the issuer's shares. 
An important regulatory implication flows from this conclusion: 
When a country has the more rigorous disclosure regime, imposi- 
tion of its regime on the basis that the transaction was effected 
within its territory can only be justified to the extent that such im- 
position attracts issuers of other countries voluntarily to promote 
such trading, not that it will make investors generally more willing 
to trade on the regulating country's markets.125 
C. Issuer-Country Transactions: Buyer From A; Issuer From B; 
Transaction Occurs in B 
1. The Nature of Issuer-Country Transactions 
"Issuer-country" transnational transactions, like standard trans- 
actions, involve situations in which the buyer or seller of a security 
is of a different country than the issuer. Unlike the standard trans- 
action, the transaction is effected in a securities market of the is- 
125. An alternative story can be told that suggests that the reputations for disclosure of 
the issuers traded in a market could affect the general level of investor participation in that 
market. Under this story, investors perceive that securities about which little is known are 
likely to be unfairly priced. Many investors, for example, believe that insider trading results 
in unfairness and less extensive issuer disclosure increases the opportunities for insider trad- 
ing. Investors may also believe that primary offerings by issuers about which little is known 
are likely to be at unfair prices. Even if, as most financial economists would argue, investors 
are wrong in these beliefs, the perception could lead some investors to be unwilling to buy 
and sell such shares at any price. Suppose that some investors do behave this way and that 
A's regime is the more rigorous but is not imposed on transplant transactions in shares of B 
issuers. Then A would have a stake in the disclosure level of these issuers. A lower level of 
investor participation in the market for these securities would reduce the volume of secon- 
dary trading occurring in A, and hence the demand for the services of A's securities industry. 
Even if correct, however, this story does not make a compelling case for the imposition of 
country A's regime, rather than country B's regime, on B issuers promoting transplant trans- 
actions in A. Country B also has an additional stake, not previously considered, in the disclo- 
sure practices of its transplant-transaction issuers. Lower participation in the trading of the 
shares of such issuers will also hurt B's residents. B's investors would trade less, and the 
shares of B's issuers are involved. Reduced participation increases the aggregate amount of 
undiversifiable market risk in B's economy and reduces liquidity. Both effects result in a 
combination of higher capital costs and lower investor welfare, both of which are, in the case 
of transplant transactions, experienced exclusively by residents of country B. The effect of 
any reduced investor participation from lower disclosure by transplant transaction B issuers, 
furthermore, should be limited to B investors buying shares of B issuers. It is unlikely that investors would be so unsophisticated as not to know that A's issuers must disclose more, 
particularly if securities industry participants were legally required to highlight the fact. 
For an elaboration of these points, see Fox, supra note 68, at 274-77. 
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suer's country. Like transplant transactions, issuer-country 
transnational transactions have historically been relatively unim- 
portant. Effecting a securities transaction abroad has been signifi- 
cantly more costly and inconvenient to an investor than effecting a 
domestic securities transaction. This factor has generally kept the 
level of issuer-country transactions to a de minimis level - in terms 
of triggering disclosure regulations - for securities of most issuers, 
whether or not investors in any one or more other countries have a 
substantial interest in those securities. Where there is such substan- 
tial interest, the issuer will find worthwhile the set-up costs of pro- 
moting a market for its securities in the investors' home market. 
Any issuer-country transactions that would otherwise have oc- 
curred will then be displaced by cheaper standard transnational 
transactions. In the more typical situation in which no substantial 
interest among investors of another country existed, the issuer has 
not found the set-up costs worthwhile. The absence of a market in 
the investors' home country combined with the expense of effecting 
transactions abroad has meant that, although all transnational 
transactions in such an issuer's shares have been issuer-country 
transactions, there have been very few of them. With the cost dif- 
ferential between effecting a transaction on a foreign market and 
effecting one on a domestic market declining, and interest in invest- 
ing in issuers abroad increasing issuer-country transactions, like 
transplant transactions, are likely, however, to become more impor- 
tant in the future. 
In our examples of issuer-country transactions, the issuers are 
again nationals of country B. The sales and trades of their shares 
are to and among residents of A. All that differentiates these is- 
suer-country transactions from standard transactions is that they 
are effected in country B rather than in country A. Again, in order 
to focus our inquiry on the special issues raised by issuer-country 
transactions, we will assume an extreme set of facts: these sales to 
and trades among A residents in shares of these issuers are not ac- 
companied by any public sales to or trades among residents of B 
(domestic transactions) or public transactions effected in A (stan- 
dard transactions). 
2. The Stakes of Countries A and B: A Comparison Between 
Issuer-Country and Standard Transactions 
It is critical at the outset to observe that the distribution of the 
benefits and costs of the disclosure practices of X and Y discussed 
in Part II - risk reduction and allocation of resources - is identi- 
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cal whether the issuer's shares involve issuer-country or standard 
transactions. Differences in the stakes of countries A and B be- 
tween issuer-country issuers and standard issuers must result from 
the factors just considered in the discussion of transplant transac- 
tion issuers, ones relating to the general volume of securities trans- 
actions effected within their borders. To get a picture of the total 
stakes of each country in the disclosure practices of the two kinds of 
issuers, we simply superimpose their respective volume-related in- 
terests, analyzed for transplant transactions, on their respective risk 
reduction, resource allocation, and cost interests, analyzed for stan- 
dard transactions. 
The volume issue with transplant transactions, as we have seen, 
comes from the fact that transplant and purely domestic transac- 
tions are potential substitutes for each other. Similarly, the volume 
issue with standard transactions comes from the fact that standard 
and issuer country transactions are substitutes for each other. We 
must identify the volume-related stakes for each country in the 
existence of a difference in the disclosure practices of issuers in- 
volved in one kind of transaction versus the other. 
a. A's Regime Is the More Rigorous. First, consider the situa- 
tion in which A's disclosure regime is the more rigorous. Thus, A 
again might be the United States and B again might be Germany. 
Some B issuers would, through the market reputation effect, be at- 
tracted to make A the place of share sales to and trading among A 
investors if, as a result, they had to disclose more than if their 
shares were sold and traded in B. In other words, some B issuers 
would be attracted to A if A's more rigorous standards applied to 
standard transactions and B's less rigorous standards applied to is- 
suer-country transactions. 
There would also be B issuers that would be attracted to make 
A the place to buy and trade their shares for other reasons. One 
powerful new reason, not present with transplant transactions, is 
that investors from A would be able to buy and trade their B issuer 
shares more cheaply in A than in B.126 Some members of this 
group of issuers attracted by reasons other than market reputation 
would be deterred from coming to A if they had to meet A's more 
rigorous disclosure standards. These are the issuers that would find 
126. This local-trading attraction exists in addition to any superiority in execution effi- 
ciency in A, the example of an alternative attraction given in the discussion of transplant 
transactions. In the real world, the local trading attraction is likely to be the more powerful 
one. 
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their costs of compliance to exceed their benefits, even after count- 
ing the worth to them of their investors in A being able to buy and 
trade more cheaply. 
A, therefore, will not have a volume-related stake in standard- 
transaction B issuers disclosing more than issuer-country B issuers, 
unless the transactions attracted by the reputation effect exceed 
those deterred by the compliance-cost effect, something that is even 
less likely than with transplant transactions.127 Thus, with A's re- 
gime the more rigorous, absent domination by the reputation effect, 
A will not want, and B will want, location to matter in determining 
which country's regime is applied. 
b. B's Regime Is the More Rigorous. Now consider the situa- 
tion in which B's disclosure regime is the more rigorous. Thus, A 
again might be the United Kingdom, and B again might be Canada. 
Some B issuers will find their costs of compliance with B's regime 
to exceed their benefits. These B issuers will make A the place 
where their share sales to and trades among A residents occur to 
avoid B's heightened disclosure requirements. In other words, 
some B issuers will be attracted to A if A's less rigorous standards 
are applied to standard transactions and B's more rigorous stan- 
dards to issuer-country transactions. 
Some B issuers also will want to make A the place for their A 
investors to buy and trade their shares for other reasons, most im- 
portant, the savings it will confer on those investors. Some of these 
issuers will be concerned with A's lower market reputation. But, as 
with issuers attracted in the transplant-transaction example by A's 
greater execution efficiency, the issuers concerned with market rep- 
utation can presumably choose not to opt out of B's regime, while 
still making A the place to buy and trade their shares. 
A therefore will have a relatively unambiguous volume-related 
stake in reducing the level of disclosure required of standard- 
transaction B issuers below that required of issuer-country B issu- 
ers. Thus, with B's regime the more rigorous, A will want, and B 
will not want, location to matter in determining which regime is 
applied. 
3. Reflections on the Role of Place 
The discussion concerning transplant and issuer-country trans- 
actions suggests a basic rule: The country with the less rigorous 
127. See supra note 123. 
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regime wants location to matter in deciding which regime should 
apply and the country with the more rigorous regime does not. The 
only exception is where the country with the more rigorous regime 
believes that the reputation effect will outweigh the cost-of- 
compliance effect and even then only if the issuer is not its own 
national. At this point in the article, two things are worth noting 
about the role of location, each of which will be important in the 
next discussion concerning the appropriate apportionment of regu- 
latory authority between countries A and B, and later, when we 
seek to identify the best U.S. policy. 
First, there is only one reason a country associated with a trans- 
national transaction has any interest, based on where the transac- 
tion has occurred, in how much the issuer discloses. The reason for 
this is that differences in disclosure levels based on transaction loca- 
tion can affect the aggregate volume of transactions effected within 
the country's borders. These national stakes are essentially a zero- 
sum game: The volume of transactions that one country gains from 
location-based disclosure rules is counterbalanced by the volume 
lost by the other country. 
Second, as we have just seen, it is generally the country whose 
regime is less rigorous that wants location to matter. This means 
that if there are no international constraints on the behavior of 
states in the application of their disclosure regimes, and each state 
comes genuinely to understand and act on its own interests, in the 
future, location is unlikely to play a role in how much an issuer 
discloses. Where the issuer's country has the more rigorous regime, 
it will be the state that will not want place to matter. It has the 
power to enforce this preference by requiring its issuers to meet its 
higher standards wherever their shares are sold or traded. Where 
the issuer's country has the less rigorous regime, it will be the state 
that will want place to matter. As a practical matter, however, it is 
powerless to force those of its issuers whose shares are sold or 
traded abroad to meet the higher standards of the other country if 
the other country does not so require. Thus, when it is the other 
country that wants location to matter, the issuer's country has the 
power to prevent location from mattering; when the issuer's coun- 
try is the one wanting location to matter, it is powerless to make 
that happen. 
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Aand B Aand B A and B A and B 
* Any change in the level of ongoing disclosure from what was expected at the time of initial 
sale by the issuer would instead be felt by A residents. 
IV. THE OPTIMAL APPORTIONMENT OF REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY 
Each country associated with a transnational securities transac- 
tion has particular interests in the issuer's disclosure practices that 
are related to resource allocation, risk reduction, and trading- 
volume effects. Having examined these interests, we are now in a 
position to demonstrate the apportionment of regulatory authority 
among these countries that would maximize global economic 
welfare. 
At the outset, assume a few fundamental features of issuer dis- 
closure that are true today and are likely to continue to characterize 
the world in the short- and medium-term future. First, regulation of 
issuer disclosure will continue to be made at the national, rather 
than global, level and that most of the world's economic activity will 
continue to be undertaken by issuers having a distinct national 
identity.128 As the real economies of nations within certain regions 
such as the European Community become increasingly integrated, 
issuers may take on more of a regional identity and regional regula- 
tory regimes may develop. But a world of regional regimes poses 
the same problems as a world of national ones, and any movement 
in that direction can be easily accommodated within the analysis of 
128. See supra note 9. 
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this article simply by substituting, where appropriate, regional is- 
suer identities and regimes for national ones.129 
Second, the level of disclosure that will maximize global eco- 
nomic welfare is likely to differ among issuers. These differences 
are related both to the nationality of an issuer itself and the nation- 
ality or nationalities of its shareholders. The differences related to 
the issuer's nationality arise from differences among countries in 
their institutional structures of corporate governance. In particular, 
the effectiveness of disclosure in aligning managerial interests with 
those of shareholders depends on both the structure of share own- 
ership and applicable corporate law. For example, more disclosure 
might be called for in Britain and the United States, where hostile 
tender offers are an important factor, than in Germany, where they 
have not been. The influence of share price on the quality of pro- 
ject choice will also vary from one country to another, depending 
on how managers make capital-spending decisions. The differences 
related to shareholder nationality arise because of differences 
among countries in terms of the risk aversion of their typical inves- 
tors and the extent to which they diversify their portfolios. These 
investor-related differences among countries, while in their com- 
bined effect are probably not as important as corporate governance 
structure differences, could also influence the optimal amount of 
disclosure for an issuer. 
Finally, even if issuers around the world did not differ in their 
optimal level of disclosure, what that optimal level is would still be 
unclear. Some commentators find even the most rudimentary 
mandatory disclosure to be on balance harmful, and probably 
would hold this view whatever the nationality of an issuer or its 
investors.130 Others consider mandatory disclosure a necessary cor- 
rective to a clear case of market failure.131 Even those who find 
mandatory disclosure helpful disagree as to how helpful and how 
129. Trends toward transnational economic integration will not extend to the global level 
with sufficient intensity to require a change in the analysis for at least the medium-term 
future. Transnational economic integration will require much greater transnational flow of 
goods, entrepreneurial talent, and noncapital factors of production than is the case today. 
For reasons discussed briefly in Part V, until a high level of global integration is obtained, an 
agreement on a global disclosure regime is also unlikely. 
130. See GEORGE J. BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE 
USA 189 (1976); Benston, supra note 80; Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obso- 
lescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 909, 922 (1994). 
131. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1490-91 (1992); John C. Cof- 
fee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 717 (1984). 
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costly it is, and hence what the optimal level is.132 We simply do not 
know the answers to these questions for certain. 
These fundamental features - the continuation of nationally 
based disclosure regulation and issuers with distinct national identi- 
ties, the likely differences among issuers in optimal levels of disclo- 
sure, and the difficulty in knowing exactly what that optimal level is 
- suggest two prime criteria for assigning regulatory authority. 
The first is the criterion of expertise. Everything else being equal, 
for each of the world's issuers, the country whose officials are likely 
to be best informed on the relationship between the issuer's level of 
disclosure and the interests affected thereby should be apportioned 
regulatory authority. The second criterion is proper political incen- 
tive and feedback, which I shall refer to in shorthand simply as feed- 
back. Everything else being equal, for each of the world's issuers, 
the country whose residents will be most positively affected if the 
level of disclosure required of the issuer is close to what is globally 
optimal and will be most negatively affected if it deviates substan- 
tially from that goal should exercise regulatory authority. When 
this is the case, the officials making the decision have the greatest 
incentive to get the required level right. If, despite this incentive, 
they fail because they do not fully understand the phenomena in- 
volved, they receive the most accurate negative feedback. 
A. The Recommended Approach 
My recommendation is easy to state: When a transnational 
transaction occurs, the issuer's country should be the exclusive de- 
terminant of what, if anything, the issuer should be required to dis- 
close. Assuming that the issuer's country imposes at least as 
stringent requirements on the issuer as it would have if the transac- 
tion had been entirely domestic, all other countries associated with 
the transaction should refrain from imposing their regimes on the 
issuer. 
Two examples in terms of U.S. practice help show how this ap- 
proach, if adopted, would differ from today's.133 The United States, 
unlike today, would apply the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities 
132. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (assessing mandatory disclosure as a 
method to ameliorate the underproduction of issuer disclosure because of its positive exter- 
nalities) with Coffee, supra note 131 (identifying additional reasons for mandatory disclosure 
that are discounted by Easterbrook and Fischel). 
133. See infra Part V for a more general discussion of current U.S. practices. 
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Act")134 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange 
Act")135 mandatory disclosure requirements, even to a U.S. corpo- 
ration that decides to go public abroad through an offering in the 
Euroequity market and even when the issuer imposes restrictions 
on the offering designed to deter its flowback into the United 
States. The United States, unlike today, would not apply these 
mandatory disclosure requirements to an offering in the United 
States to U.S. residents by a French issuer as long as the issuer pro- 
vides, pursuant to the French regime, the same disclosure as it 
would have had it made a purely domestic public offering in France. 
Applying the proposed approach to purely domestic transac- 
tions and to each of the three general categories of transnational 
transactions considered in Part III - transplant transactions, stan- 
dard transactions, and issuer-country transactions - demonstrates 
that the approach represents the optimal assignment of regulatory 
authority. In each case we will continue the frequently artificial as- 
sumption that the issuer's shares are not offered or traded in any of 
the other categories of transactions. In the examples the issuer will 
continue to be from country B and, where the transaction is trans- 
national, the residence of the buyer or the place of the transaction 
- and sometimes both - will continue to be country A. If, for 
each of the categories, the recommended approach is the optimal 
assignment under this artificial assumption, it also will be the opti- 
mal allocation in the real world, in which many issuers' shares are 
offered and traded in some combination of purely domestic transac- 
tions and one or more types of transnational transactions. 
This discussion models issuer disclosure as a linear phenome- 
non: if one country's regime requires a higher level than the other, 
the stricter country requires an issuer to disclose everything that the 
more lenient country requires and more. Concurrent regulation is 
thus equivalent to giving exclusive regulatory authority to the coun- 
try with the stricter regime, and so, within the model, is a meaning- 
less concept. In the real world, of course, the country that most 
observers would consider more lenient may still require disclosure 
of certain information of which the stricter country does not require 
disclosure. Concurrent regulation is therefore not meaningless, and 
is in fact a common occurrence. But, as I briefly will argue in the 
last section of this Part, if the stricter regime is generally superior to 
the lenient regime, the information lost by not applying the more 
134. 15 U.S.C.A. ?? 77a-77aa (West 1981 & Supp. 1997); see infra Part V for a more 
general discussion of current U.S. practices. 
135. 15 U.S.C.A ?? 78a-78mm (West 1981 & Supp. 1997). 
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lenient regime as well is not likely to be important enough to justify 
the many problems that accompany forcing the issuer to comply 
with the goals of two regulators instead of one. 
WHICH COUNTRY'S REGIME WOULD REGULATE B ISSUERS 
Approach to Regulatory Reach 
Investor Market Issuer 
Protection Protection Nationality 
Standard 
Buyer from A 
Occurs in A 
Type of Transplant 
Transaction Buyer from B 
Occurs in A 
Issuer Country 
Buyer from A 
Occurs in B 
Domestic 
Buyer from B 
Occurs in B 
A A B 
B A B 
A B B 
B B B 
B. Purely Domestic and Transplant Transactions 
The superiority of allocating regulatory responsibility exclu- 
sively to the issuer's home country is most easily demonstrated in 
the cases of issuers whose shares are offered and traded either en- 
tirely in purely domestic transactions or entirely in transplant 
transactions. 
1. Risk-Reduction and Resource-Allocation Effects 
In purely domestic transactions and transplant transactions, the 
investors and the issuers are from the same country - in our exam- 
ple, B. The risk reduction and resource allocation effects of such 
issuers' disclosure behavior thus are felt exclusively by B's resi- 
dents. B's officials are obviously more likely than the officials of 
any other country to know the benefits and costs of disclosure that 
affect only its residents. They are also the officials with the political 
incentives to choose the disclosure level that maximizes global wel- 
fare, because, where there are no effects abroad, maximizing the 
welfare of B's residents maximizes global welfare. B's officials also 
will feel the negative feedback if, despite these incentives, they fail 
at first to find the welfare-maximizing level. If we look only at risk 
reduction and resource allocation effects of disclosure regulation, 
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the expertise-feedback criteria unambiguously argue for assigning 
to B's government exclusive regulatory responsibility for the disclo- 
sure behavior of B's issuers. 
This conclusion is hardly surprising when it comes to B's purely 
domestic issuers, whose shares are offered and traded exclusively at 
home. It is equally compelling, however, for its transplant issuers, 
whose shares are offered and traded exclusively in A. 
2. Adding in Trading-Volume Effects - First Analysis 
What will happen when we add the trading-volume effects of 
disclosure regulation into the analysis? Will we still want to treat 
transplant issuers the same way as purely domestic issuers? As- 
sume preliminarily that the choice of which country - A or B - 
has regulatory authority over transplant issuers from B has no ef- 
fect on the levels of disclosure required by their respective regimes 
on purely domestic issuers. As discussed in Part III, the volume- 
related stakes of countries A and B in the choice of which country 
governs B's transplant issuers are a zero-sum game: any gain in the 
volume of transactions for one country will be exactly counterbal- 
anced by the loss in volume by the other country. There will be no 
net effect on global welfare. Adding trading-volume effects into the 
calculations thus does not affect the conclusion that B should regu- 
late both its purely domestic and transplant issuers. 
3. Adding in Trading-Volume Effects - Accounting for 
Intercountry Competition's Impact on Regulatory 
Content136 
This preliminary assumption may, however, be incorrect. Ap- 
portioning regulatory authority over B's transplant issuers to the 
country where the transactions occur - in our example, A - gen- 
erates regulatory competition. With apportionment to A, B issuers 
will be choosing the disclosure regime by which they will be gov- 
erned when they choose where their shares are going to be offered 
and traded. Each country wishes to maximize the volume of B is- 
suer transactions effected in its own market, because that would in- 
crease rents earned by its residents. Each would thus endeavor, 
everything else being equal, to set its level of required disclosure to 
136. A more extended version of this discussion appears in Merritt B. Fox, The Political 
Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities 
45-52, app. II (Apr. 5, 1997) (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on the 
Regulation of Interactional Economic Activity, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., on file with 
author). 
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attract as many B issuers as possible. Apportioning authority to the 
issuers' home country, B, does not generate such regulatory 
competition. 
We initially concluded that regulatory authority over transplant 
issuers from B should be apportioned to B, a choice which we have 
seen forecloses any regulatory competition. This initial conclusion 
was based on the fact that B's officials have greater expertise and 
are politically responsible to the people affected by the issuers' dis- 
closure practices. This conclusion should only be changed if the 
competition that would arise by apportionment instead to A would, 
despite the advantages of home-country regulation, move A's and 
B's required levels of disclosure closer to what is optimal in global 
welfare terms for the respective sets of issuers that each, in the end, 
regulates. 
a. Preliminary Considerations. Note two considerations at 
the outset. First, regulatory competition is desirable only if, in the 
absence of regulatory disclosure, A and B would each require too 
much disclosure rather than too little. Remember that for competi- 
tion to arise, A must exert regulatory authority over transplant issu- 
ers from B. Part III showed that with authority apportioned in this 
way, if A has the lower disclosure requirements, more B issuers are 
likely to abandon their home country's market and promote the 
sale and trading of their shares in A than would do so if A had the 
higher ones.137 In other words, the regulatory-evasion effect of 
lower standards dominates the reputation effect of higher stan- 
dards. Regulatory competition thus creates pressure to lower each 
country's required level of disclosure. B, in order to retain its own 
issuers, will want a lower level than it would otherwise. The same 
will be true for A in order to attract these B issuers. 
Second, including the effects of regulatory competition in the 
analysis should not change the conclusion that purely domestic and 
transplant-transaction issuers should be treated alike. If one be- 
lieves that such regulatory competition on balance would improve 
global welfare through its pressures on each country to lower its 
required level of disclosure, there is no reason to require an issuer 
to go to the inconvenience of having its shares offered and traded 
only abroad in order to be governed by a different regime. The 
location of the transaction still should not matter. For a B issuer 
whose shares are sold and traded entirely domestically but whose 
137. See supra section III.B.3. 
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entrepreneurs or managers prefer that it be governed by A's regime 
rather than B's regime, that option should be available as long as 
investors are fully aware of the choice that is made. The fact that 
no country's domestic regime currently permits its purely domestic 
issuers this option, however, suggests that the claim that competi- 
tion in securities regulation would be beneficial is highly 
controversial.138 
b. The Starting Presumption: For Regulating Each State's En- 
tirely Domestic Activities, Its Rules Are Superior to Those of Any 
Other State. Where, as here, the issue under study is how to regu- 
late a given kind of behavior with transborder effects, it is conven- 
tional to presume, as a reasonable first approximation of reality, 
that the countries involved act in their own best interests when reg- 
ulating entirely domestic versions of the same behaviors.139 This 
conclusion seems a reasonable starting presumption in the construc- 
tion of a positive theory of such behavior and its regulation. Under 
this assumption, it would be undesirable to apportion to A regula- 
tory authority over transplant issuers from B. The resulting regula- 
tory competition would cause the disclosure required by each 
country's regime to be lowered from a presumptively optimal level 
to a suboptimal one. 
What would be the implications, though, of incorporating a 
more complicated theory of governmental behavior - public 
choice theory - into the analysis?140 Public choice theory suggests 
that concentrated interest group action will cause a country to regu- 
138. The absence of this option in the securities law context is in stark contrast with the 
corporate law context. A corporation is free to choose its jurisdiction of incorporation. It is 
free to do business not only there, but in all other jurisdictions as well. Under choice-of-law's 
internal affairs doctrine, each of these other jurisdictions will respect the law of the corpora- 
tion's jurisdiction of incorporation as the corporation's governing law for matters pertinent to 
a corporation's "internal affairs." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
?? 301-302 (1971); see also P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 15-18 (discussing moder trend of how internal affairs doctrine dominates, despite 
ensuing choice of law "revolution"). These factors, in combination, allow a firm, wherever it 
operates, to be governed by the corporate law of its choice. 
Professor Roberta Romano, who favors such competition, has recently suggested giving 
even purely domestic issuers such an option. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation (Apr. 28, 1997) (unpublished paper, presented 
at the Symposium on Comparative Corporate Governance, Max-Planck-Institut, Hamburg, 
Germany, on file with author). 
139. See sources cited supra note 123. 
140. For examples of public choice theory see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TUL- 
LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOC- 
RACY (1965); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
335 (1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, supra note 80. 
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late more than is in its national interest. Some commentators have 
used public choice theory applied within a purely domestic context 
to suggest that mandated disclosure represents overregulation at 
the behest of the securities industry,141 so that the required level of 
disclosure is suboptimally high. If so, regulatory competition might 
be a useful counteracting force. This may suggest that regulatory 
authority over transplant issuers from B should, contrary to my ini- 
tial conclusions, be apportioned to A, the country where the trans- 
actions take place. 
The advocate of such an approach, however, must establish two 
things to overcome the conventional and reasonable starting pre- 
sumption that states act in their own best interests. First, she needs 
to show that within a purely domestic context, concentrated interest 
group action results in an excessive level of mandated disclosure. 
Second, she needs to show that regulatory competition at the inter- 
national level would be a helpful antidote to the problem. Neither 
will be easy to show. 
c. The Public Choice Critique in the Purely Domestic Context. 
Several factors cast doubt on the claim that within a purely domes- 
tic context concentrated interest group actions result in an excessive 
level of mandated disclosure. To start, the effectiveness of public 
choice theory in explaining regulation generally is the subject of 
much debate; there is hardly consensus that most political action 
consists of self-interested rent seeking.142 Moreover, even if one 
believes that public choice theory has considerable explanatory 
value generally, the story may err when applied to securities disclo- 
sure. Those who use public choice theory to argue that the domes- 
tically mandated level of disclosure is excessively high may not 
correctly identify all of the interests of the securities industry. They 
may be correct that some members desire a high level of mandatory 
disclosure in order to reduce their costs of collecting information. 
Other securities-industry members, however, might prefer a low 
level, so that, for example, more firms would be willing to be public 
companies, thereby resulting in more fee-generating initial public 
offerings and secondary trades. They also omit consideration of 
141. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTER- 
EST 22-23 (1981); Macey, supra note 130. 
142. For reactions to public choice theory, see Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: 
The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179 (1996); 
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice 
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
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concentrated interest groups outside of the securities industry, such 
as the managements of established public corporations, whose in- 
terests are likely to favor low levels of required disclosure. Finally, 
they do not account for the possibility that the interests favoring 
more disclosure attributed to persons in the securities industry may 
serendipitously coincide with correction of important market fail- 
ures in issuer disclosure due to the public goods nature of informa- 
tion and agency problems between the managements of established 
issuers and their stockholders.143 
d. Even If the Public Choice Critique Is Valid in the Purely 
Domestic Context, Regulatory Competition Is Not Necessarily a 
Helpful Antidote. Assume now that the public choice story is cor- 
rect and that within a purely domestic context the forces it identi- 
fies result in an excessively high required level of disclosure. This 
does not necessarily imply that promoting regulatory competition 
- assigning regulatory responsibility for B's transplant issuers to A 
- is a helpful antidote to the problem. Issuer entrepreneurs and 
managers are the ones who will determine where their shares will 
be offered and traded. Full-fledged regulatory competition thus is 
likely to result in some small country, with little in the way of do- 
mestic issuers, offering a disclosure regime that requires no more 
disclosure than these entrepreneurs and managers find to be in 
their individual best interests. In other words, some country is 
likely to become in its disclosure laws the equivalent of Luxem- 
bourg in its banking laws.'44 In essence, as a result of regulatory 
competition, issuer entrepreneurs and managers are likely to have 
the option of disclosing no more than if there were no regulation at 
all.145 
Whether it is desirable to provide these individuals with this op- 
tion depends on a comparison of two ways of coming to a decision 
on the proper level of issuer disclosure. Our goal is that the level 
chosen is the one where, at the margin, social costs of issuer disclo- 
sure just equal social benefits. One way is to rely on the decisions 
of issuer entrepreneurs and managers, which are based on their cal- 
143. See Coffee, supra note 131; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 132, at 684-85. 
144. In fact, Luxembourg itself is already reputed to provide only a "nods and winks" 
review of offers and sales of new issues of securities listed on the Luxembourg Stock Ex- 
change. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Regulatory Harmony in the European Communi- 
ties: The Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOK. J. INTL. L. 19, 41 (1990). 
145. Even if a securities law equivalent to Luxembourg does not develop, regulatory 
competition is likely to create larger pressures for all countries with major stock exchanges to 
lower their regulations significantly. See Fox, supra note 136. 
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culations of the benefits and costs privately experienced by them. 
The other is to rely on the decisions of the government of the coun- 
try whose residents exclusively experience the actual benefits and 
costs of their issuers' disclosures. 
As Part II demonstrates, the entrepreneurs' and managers' cal- 
culations of private benefit and cost are unlikely to correspond 
closely to the social benefits and costs. Private benefits are prone 
to be less than social benefits and private costs are prone to be 
larger than social costs.146 The calculations of entrepreneurs and 
managers thus will be biased: they will want to disclose less than is 
socially optimal. 
Public choice asserts that the government has biases running in 
the opposite direction. One would not want to promote regulatory 
competition by apportioning authority to A, however, unless one 
believes that the level chosen by the government is even more bi- 
ased than the level chosen by legally unconstrained private entre- 
preneurs and managers. Few legal commentators, including those 
with a law and economics orientation, appear implicitly to hold that 
belief; few find the domestic regime of even the most rigorous 
country, the United States, sufficiently flawed such that a total 
abandonment of regulation - and hence reliance on issuers' calcu- 
lations of private cost and benefit - would be preferable to main- 
tenance of the current system.147 
Some of these commentators, while favoring some disclosure 
regulation to none, still might prefer the less rigorous regimes of the 
other major capitalist countries to that of the United States. Ap- 
portioning the regulation of transplant issuer disclosure to the 
country where the transaction takes place, however, might well, 
over time, result in a race-to-the-bottom among the countries with 
major stock exchanges rather than toward a state in which issuers 
146. See supra section II.B. 
147. See supra note 143. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel conclude, after explicitly 
considering public choice theory, that the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime ought to be re- 
tained. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 132, at 714-15. Addressing a somewhat analo- 
gous problem within our domestic federal system of corporate and securities lawmaking, 
Lucian Bebchuk has argued that placing the regulation of corporate disclosure under the 
authority of state corporate law rather than federal securities law would, because of regula- 
tory competition, result in a suboptimally low level of disclosure. See Bebchuk, supra note 
131, at 1490-91. Jonathan Macey, on the other hand, finds that "[a]s markets have become 
more efficient, society's need to devote resources to support a statutory regime of mandatory 
disclosure designed and enforced by the SEC has disappeared. Any information that was 
supplied by the force of law now is supplied by the marketplace." Macey, supra note 130, at 
928. The issue of the efficiency with which markets impound the information that issuers 
choose to release, however, differs from the question of whether issuers will choose to release 
as much information as is socially optimal. See Fox, supra note 69, at 1015-25. 
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disclose at the level currently required by the other major capitalist 
countries. 
e. Public Choice Arguments for Not Promoting Regulatory 
Competition. Adding a public choice component to the analysis of 
what country should exercise regulatory authority over transplant 
transactions may actually add to the overall strength of my conclu- 
sion that regulatory authority should be apportioned to the issuer's 
home country. With regulatory competition, persons who receive 
rents dependent on the volume of transactions effected in a given 
country would enjoy gains from a relaxation of their country's dis- 
closure standards. Public choice theory would suggest that the re- 
laxation may occur even if these gains are less than the welfare 
losses to the country's residents from its issuers disclosing at a 
lower-than-optimal level in resource allocation and risk reduction 
terms. The gainers are more concentrated and more capable of 
political action than the losers, who are many but diffuse. No in- 
consistency thus necessarily exists between a belief in public choice 
theory and the conclusion that, in the context of a globalizing secur- 
ities market, regulatory competition will result in each country hav- 
ing a too-low level of mandated disclosure. 
f Conclusion. Assigning regulatory authority over the disclo- 
sure practices of transplant issuers to their home country has clear 
advantages. Compared to the country where the sales or trades oc- 
cur, the home country's governmental authorities have greater ex- 
pertise concerning the resource allocation and risk reduction effects 
of such disclosure. They have greater political incentives to choose 
the right level and they receive more direct negative feedback if 
they get it wrong. 
The argument that regulatory competition is sufficiently desira- 
ble that the country where the trades occur nevertheless should ex- 
ercise regulatory authority is not persuasive. This argument is 
based on the claim that domestic disclosure regimes tend to require 
excessive disclosure and that regulatory competition will counteract 
this tendency. Such a claim runs contrary to the conventional and 
reasonable starting presumption utilized in studies concerning the 
regulation of behavior with transnational effects that countries' do- 
mestic regulations represent their own best interests. Moreover, a 
number of factors cast doubt on the proposition that in the particu- 
lar area of disclosure, countries tend to overregulate. 
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The conclusion that the issuer's home country is the better regu- 
lator would not change even if, for the sake of argument, we were 
to accept the claim that domestic disclosure regimes require too 
much disclosure. To be successful, the argument for regulatory 
competition requires a political theory akin to second best theory in 
welfare economics.148 As just noted, regulatory competition creates 
its own imperfection resulting from the increasing political pressure 
from members of the securities industry concerned with the volume 
of transactions effected in their home market. The political theory 
would need to show that this imperfection is optimal given the 
assumed imperfection that domestic disclosure standards are 
currently too high. Unless a proponent of regulatory competition 
can provide such a theory, there is no reason to believe these 
competition-induced political pressures will represent an appropri- 
ate antidote to the assumed problem of excessive disclosure 
regulation. 
C. Standard and Issuer-Country Transactions 
Now consider standard transnational transactions and issuer- 
country transnational transactions. In each case the buyer is from 
one country - in our example, A - and the issuer from another - 
in our example, B. Standard transactions are effected in the buyer's 
home country, and issuer-country transactions are effected in the 
issuer's home country. 
Should this difference in where the transaction is effected affect 
which country is apportioned regulatory authority over the issuers 
involved? The answer is no, unless one so distrusts domestic disclo- 
sure regulation and is so persuaded of the corrective benefits of reg- 
ulatory competition that one favors giving country A regulatory 
responsibility over the disclosure practices of both transplant B is- 
suers and B issuers whose shares are sold and traded only domesti- 
cally but would prefer A's regime.149 The discussion above suggests 
148. The theory of second best in welfare economics concerns the circumstance where, 
because of institutional restrictions, one condition necessary for Pareto optimality - the 
situation where there are no possible reallocations that can make any person better off that 
would not make some other person worse off - cannot be met. The theory says that if such 
a constraint exists, economic welfare will not generally be maximized by still trying to satisfy 
all the other conditions for Pareto optimality. Rather, welfare will be maximized when some 
other counteracting imperfection, specified by the theory, is present. See HENDERSON & 
QUANDT, supra note 99, at 286-88. 
149. If one does so distrust domestic disclosure regulation that one wishes to give country 
A regulatory responsibility over the disclosure practices of those B issuers whose shares are 
sold and traded only domestically but who would prefer to be regulated by A's regime, then, 
a fortiori, one would also want to give that option as well to B issuers whose shares are 
involved in any kind of transnational transaction. 
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the unsoundness of such beliefs. Assuming that one does not hold 
such beliefs, one then also should view the argument for assigning 
regulatory responsibility to country A in the case of standard trans- 
actions issuers as no stronger than the argument for assigning it to 
A in the case of issuer-country transactions issuers. 
The fact that standard transactions are effected in A and issuer- 
country transactions are effected in B should not matter, because 
the only difference between standard and issuer-country issuers 
that their shares are sold and traded in A rather than B - is irrele- 
vant to the determination of what apportionment of regulatory au- 
thority would maximize global welfare. This reasoning follows 
closely from the prior discussion of transplant transactions. The 
only way that this difference between the two kinds of issuers could 
matter to A and B, in terms of their stakes in how regulatory au- 
thority is apportioned, concerns the volume effects of disclosure 
regulation. If A were assigned standard-transaction issuers because 
of the additional contact to A, and B assigned issuer-country issu- 
ers, issuers would have an incentive to have their shares offered and 
traded in the market of the country with the lower level of required 
disclosure. If both kinds of issuers were assigned to the same coun- 
try, whichever that might be, there would be no such incentive. The 
country with the lower required disclosure thus would benefit from 
assigning standard issuers to A and issuer-country issuers to B, and 
the one with the higher level would benefit from assigning both 
kinds of issuers to the same country. This sort of benefit should be 
irrelevant to our choice of which country should exercise regulatory 
authority over each category of issuer because the effects of the 
choice on volume of trading in each country is a zero-sum game 
from a global welfare point. Assigning standard issuers to A and 
issuer-country issuers to B would also, unlike assigning both groups 
to the same country, promote regulatory competition. For the rea- 
sons discussed above, this is not an affirmative reason for treating 
differently two groups of issuers, the effects of whose disclosure is 
otherwise identical.150 
150. However we resolve the tension between A determining that one level of disclosure 
is needed to give its non-fully diversified investors adequate risk reduction and B determin- 
ing that a different level is necessary in terms of resource-allocation efficiency and cost, in- 
cluding the place where the transaction occurs as a factor provides issuers with a method of 
evading that resolution. Consider the two extremes. At one extreme, we always resolve in 
favor of the determination of the issuer's country, B, because it has the resource allocation 
and cost stakes. In our example, if A's regime is less rigorous, taking location into account 
still permits evasion of B's calculations of disclosure's contribution to an efficient allocation 
of resources versus its costs. If B has the less rigorous regime, as with transplant ransactions, 
location will be irrelevant anyway. At the other extreme, we always resolve in favor of the 
determination of the investors' country, A, because it has the risk-reduction stakes. If B's 
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But, determining that the same country should exercise regula- 
tory authority over both issuer-country issuers and standard issuers 
does not identify which country should exercise the regulatory au- 
thority. As we saw in Part III, with standard and issuer-country 
transactions, each country has non-volume-related interests in the 
disclosure practices of the issuers involved. This section applies the 
expertness and feedback criteria in seeking to determine, for B issu- 
ers whose shares are involved in these types of transactions, which 
country, if it were the regulator, would require disclosure at a level 
closer to what would be optimal for global economic welfare. It 
concludes, consistent with my proposed approach, that B, the is- 
suer's home country, would be the better choice. 
1. The Simplified Case: Risk Reduction and Project Choice 
Efficiency Gains With Initially Capitalizing Firms 
Start with the simplified case in which the B issuers whose 
shares are involved in standard or issuer-country transactions are 
new firms seeking capital for their initial project. Assume also that 
only the quality of the idea, and not the quality of management, 
affects future return in this world. Improved project choice is thus 
the only improved resource allocation efficiency gain to be 
considered. 
First, consider expertness. Country A residents exclusively en- 
joy the reduced risk for less than fully diversified investors resulting 
from greater disclosure. A's authorities know their own investors 
- the persons buying and trading these shares - better than B's 
authorities know them. They thus have more expertise concerning 
the extent to which these investors benefit from a reduction in risk. 
B's authorities know better their own real-investment opportuni- 
ties. They therefore have more expertise concerning the extent to 
which more disclosure will lead to better project choice. They also 
have more expertise concerning the costs of requiring their issuers 
to reveal more. 
Next, consider incentives and feedback. If A is the country reg- 
ulating transnational B issuers, its officials will feel - through ordi- 
nary political processes - all of the risk reduction benefits from the 
level of disclosure that they choose. They thus will have the polit- 
ical incentives to take these benefits into account. If at any point 
they misestimate the extent of these benefits, they will receive cor- 
regime is less rigorous, taking location into account permits evasion of A's calculation of the 
optimal amount of risk reduction. If A's regime is the less rigorous, place is again irrelevant. 
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rective negative feedback. On the other hand, these processes will 
not give these officials any feeling for the benefits from improved 
resource allocation efficiency due to the disclosure level they 
choose. Nor will they receive any feeling of the costs of the chosen 
level. They have no direct incentives to take these factors into ac- 
count. To the extent that they nevertheless try to do so but incor- 
rectly estimate their magnitudes, they will receive no direct 
feedback.151 
If instead B is the country regulating B issuers, its officials feel 
both the costs of the level they choose and its resource-allocation 
efficiency benefits, but do not feel its risk-reduction benefits. 
Country B residents - the entrepreneurs who propose real invest- 
ment projects and the suppliers of labor - exclusively enjoy the 
benefits of greater disclosure's improvements in project choice. 
The pattern of incentives and feedback with B is thus just the mir- 
ror image of what it is if A is the regulating country. But what do 
these respective patterns of expertise, incentives, and feedback im- 
ply about which country would be the better regulator? 
a. A Count of Categories of Superiority Points to B. The ex- 
pertise factor is divided on the benefits of disclosure and clearly 
favors B for the costs. Incentives and feedback are distorted for 
both countries. Therefore, absent the difficult, if not impossible, 
quantification of these various factors, application of the expertise 
and feedback criteria cannot unambiguously point to one country 
over the other as the more appropriate regulator. A crude counting 
of each country's categories of superiority, however, points toward 
B as the better regulator. Several more refined considerations rein- 
force this conclusion. 
b. B's Domestic Regime's Required Level of Disclosure Is 
Likely to Be Closer Than A's to What Is Globally Optimal for Stan- 
dard and Issuer-country Transnational Issuers From B. The country 
that regulates the disclosure of standard and issuer-country issuers 
from B is likely to apply to these B issuers either its own domestic 
regime or some modified regime that uses its own domestic regime 
as a starting point.152 This observation suggests assigning regula- 
tory authority over standard and issuer-country issuers to the coun- 
151. Country B may, of course, put diplomatic pressures on A concerning these matters. 
Such pressures, however, are institutionally crude and unrefined substitutes for the incentives 
and feedback that arise within a domestic political system. 
152. See, e.g., infra notes 170-71 (concerning the rules that the United States has chosen 
to apply to transnational issuers). 
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try whose domestic regime's required level of disclosure is closer to 
what would be optimal for these transnational issuers. As we will 
see, the issuer's home country - in our example, B - rather than 
the investor's home country - in our example, A - more likely fits 
this profile. 
B's required level of disclosure is assumed to be optimal for 
purely domestic B issuers.153 This means that for such an issuer, the 
social marginal costs of disclosing at its required level just equal the 
social marginal benefits. A's required level of disclosure similarly is 
assumed to be optimal for purely domestic A issuers. In deciding 
which country's domestic regime is closer to what would be optimal 
for standard and issuer-country issuers from B ("transnational B 
issuers") we thus need to look at the costs and benefits of requiring 
different levels of disclosure from these issuers and see whether 
their situation more closely resembles purely domestic B issuers or 
purely domestic A issuers. 
Suppose that whichever country is assigned regulatory authority 
over transnational B issuers, it will require of them the same level 
of disclosure that it requires of its own purely domestic issuers. The 
costs and benefits of requiring this level of disclosure from transna- 
tional B issuers are identical to those of requiring it of entirely do- 
mestic B issuers, except to the extent, if any, that investors in A 
differ from those in B in the amount by which disclosure reduces 
their disutility from the riskiness of their portfolios. Similarly, the 
costs and benefits of requiring A's domestic level of disclosure from 
transnational B issuers are identical to those of requiring it of 
purely domestic A issuers, except to the extent, if any, that issuers 
from B differ from those in A in the costs of, and improved re- 
source-allocation efficiency benefits from, greater disclosure. The 
country whose purely domestic issuers' disclosure costs and benefits 
most closely match those of transnational B issuers will be the 
country for which the factor or factors constituting the exception 
differ less between the two countries. That appears to be country 
B, as detailed below. 
Issuers from different countries likely differ more in the costs of, 
and resource-allocation improvements from, greater disclosure than 
would investors from different countries differ in terms of the risk- 
reduction benefits of greater disclosure. The costs of, and resource- 
allocation benefits from, greater disclosure depend on a complex of 
institutional factors that will have a uniquely national flavor. These 
153. See supra section IV.B.3. 
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include the role of banks versus public equity issues in funding new 
companies and the ratio of institutional to individual share purchas- 
ers. In contrast, the amount by which an individual investor's risk is 
reduced by a given increase in disclosure depends on the extent of 
her nondiversification, regardless of nationality. The benefit to her 
from risk reduction depends on her level of risk aversion. It is quite 
possible that investors in one country are, on average, more risk 
averse than in another. At first blush, this would suggest differ- 
ences among countries in the typical risk-reduction gain from 
greater disclosure. Reflection, however, suggests a counterbalanc- 
ing factor. If one country's investors are more risk averse than 
those of another, they will be more diversified and less leveraged, 
and so they would experience less risk reduction for an increase in 
disclosure. 
c. B Has Greater Expertise, Incentives, and Feedback With Re- 
spect to Disclosure's Costs and Allocational Benefits - the Factors 
That Differ More Between the Countries. Suppose instead that it is 
anticipated that the regulating country, rather than simply using its 
domestic rules, tailors special disclosure rules to apply to issuers 
from B involved in transnational transactions. The regulating coun- 
try would make such special rules to account for differences be- 
tween the interests of residents of the other country associated with 
these transnational transactions and the interests of the equivalent 
persons in purely domestic transactions.154 In an interactive world, 
countries will often make such accommodations because, with reci- 
procity, they both can benefit. 
This likely pattern of differences between countries still points 
to B as the better regulator. The argument varies only slightly from 
that set out just above. As we have seen, the interests of each coun- 
try's residents in the disclosure behavior of B issuers relate to par- 
ticular factors. The interests of B residents relate to costs and 
allocational benefits; the interests of A residents relate to risk re- 
duction. Everything else being equal, it is better to assign regula- 
tory authority to the country whose residents' interests relate to the 
factors that differ more between A and B. This country's officials 
are in a better position to take account of the interests of the resi- 
dents of the other country. They are relatively more familiar with 
154. If B was the regulating country, the nonresidents with an interest in the disclosure 
behavior of B issuers whose shares are involved in standard and issuer-country transnational 
transactions would be the investors in A who buy or trade these shares. If A was the regulat- 
ing country, it would be the entrepreneurs and suppliers of other factors of production in B. 
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such interests because they vary less from the interests of their own 
residents. Applying the analysis to the problem at hand, the cost 
and resource allocation effects of disclosure differ more between 
country A and country B. Because B residents have an interest in 
these factors, B's officials will be better at tailoring special rules. 
That is, they are in a better position to understand disclosure's risk- 
reduction effects on residents of A, whose situation is more similar 
to that of some B residents, than are A's officials to understand 
disclosure's cost and resource allocation effects on residents of B. 
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the factor that differs 
more - the cost to the issuer of disclosure and the allocational ben- 
efits - is probably inherently more difficult to understand, and 
hence more difficult to get right from afar, than the risk-reduction 
benefits from disclosure. 
d. Risk Reduction Through Greater Disclosure Is a Subsidiary 
National Interest. Finally, one additional consideration significantly 
reinforces the choice of B as the better regulator: the nature of risk 
reduction as an interest. Only when A's regime is more rigorous 
than B's regime does country A have a risk-reduction interest in 
applying its regime - rather than that of B - to transnational issu- 
ers from B.155 In such a situation, A's government has available an 
alternative policy instrument to reduce the risk associated with in- 
vesting in B issuers that does not conflict with B's determination of 
the proper level of disclosure: a program of education and institu- 
tional reform to encourage its investors who invest in B issuers to 
diversify more. The only reason B's disclosure level determination 
might not be optimal is if the typical A investor is, relative to his 
risk aversion, less diversified than the typical B investor. For pas- 
sive investors, at least, being anything less than fully diversified is 
clearly undesirable in any event.156 
155. If A's regime is less rigorous than B's, an inability to apply its regime means that A's 
investors get more risk reduction than would otherwise be the case. That in itself cannot be a 
cause for complaint. The larger amount of disclosure costs the issuer more, but those costs 
are borne by entrepreneurs in B. 
156. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. A speculative investor, who trades on the 
basis of information that suggests to her the possibility of profit, faces a trade-off when she 
diversifies more. On the one hand, because fewer shares will be bought or sold on its basis, a 
given piece of information creates less expected profit. On the other, the investor enjoys 
reduced risk. If global economic welfare is the goal, however, declining to encourage diversi- 
fication to enhance the opportunities of A investors to make speculative profits trading in B 
shares is not a justification for applying A's regime. Such trading is a zero-sum game among 
the players; the only potential gains to society come from more accurate prices. Entrepre- 
neurs and laborers in B, who enjoy the efficiency benefits, gain the only benefits from more 
accurate prices. The expertise and feedback criteria therefore suggest that making the mar- 
ket safer for speculation in B issuer shares is better handled by B's authorities. 
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The advantage of a program of education and institutional re- 
form is that it addresses the purely domestic problem of inadequate 
diversification directly, rather than trying to compensate for it with 
a disclosure policy that negatively affects the interests of residents 
of another country.157 Because of this, the allocational benefits and 
cost interests - which B has the political incentives to pursue, as 
well as superior expertise and feedback - deserve more recogni- 
tion in the apportionment of regulatory authority than the risk-re- 
duction interests with respect to which A is the better-positioned 
country. 
2. Ongoing Corporations With Ongoing Disclosure 
Now enlarge the world we are considering to include issuers that 
have an ongoing existence. The managers of these issuers from 
time to time decide to implement new projects. Once a project is 
implemented, they make decisions on how it is run. Two kinds of 
disclosure affect the efficient allocation of resources in this world. 
First, a firm may make new public issue disclosure. Where firms 
finance their projects by such share sales, less accurate prices lead 
to an inferior choice of projects to be implemented, just as in the 
simplified world. Second, a firm may make ongoing disclosure after 
it has received its initial injections of publicly held equity. As we 
saw in Part II, increasing the amount of ongoing disclosure in- 
creases the effectiveness of the market for corporate control and 
share-price-based compensation in limiting managers from making 
both project choice and operating decisions that deviate from what 
is optimal. 
In this more complex world, we need to determine which coun- 
try would be the better regulator with respect to each kind of dis- 
closure. As to new public issue disclosure, the analysis is identical 
to that of the simplified world. Country B, the issuer's country, is 
the better choice. Ongoing disclosure is more complicated. It is 
most easily understood by first thinking of an artificial world in 
which there is just one B issuer that makes a single offering to A 
investors and then enlarging the inquiry to account for multiple B 
issuers, resulting in a stream of such offerings over time. 
157. The substitution of A's regime for B's in regulating transnational B issuers will hurt 
the interests of entrepreneurs and labor in B to the extent that the costs and allocational 
benefits of disclosure differ between the countries. A's regime will reflect calculations of 
these factors with respect to issuers in A, but not with respect to the B issuers that are being 
regulated. 
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a. The Regulation of Ongoing Disclosure in the Case of a 
Single B Issuer Making a Single Offering to A Investors. 
i. The Rules Governing Ongoing Disclosure in Force at the 
Time of the Offering. One way of looking at the question of which 
country would be the better regulator of an issuer's ongoing disclo- 
sure is to ask which country, if it were chosen to regulate, would at 
the time of the offering have the rules requiring ongoing disclosure 
at a level closer to what would be globally optimal. 
Investors in A will know at the time of the offering which coun- 
try will be the regulator of the issuer's ongoing disclosure and what 
the country's current rules are. Since the current rules are generally 
the best available predictor of what the rules in the future will be, 
the investors will use the current rules to form expectations con- 
cerning the firm's disclosure practices in the future. As we saw in 
Part III, this in turn will lead to expectations concerning both the 
extent to which management will deviate from optimal project 
choice and operating decisions over the rest of the issuer's life and 
the issuer's future disclosure costs. The share price will reflect 
these combined expectations. Entrepreneurs in B will thus bear the 
entire expected allocational and cost consequences of the regulating 
country's ongoing disclosure rules, whether good or bad. Less than 
fully diversified country A residents, in future sales and purchases 
of shares on the secondary market, will exclusively enjoy the ex- 
pected level of disclosure's reduction in risk. This distribution of 
stakes in disclosure means that for each country, the patterns of 
expertise and feedback are identical to those present with disclo- 
sure for new public issues in the simplified case, already considered, 
where there are only initially capitalizing firms. Consequently, the 
analysis of which country would, at the time of the offering, better 
regulate the issuer's ongoing disclosure is, as a formal matter, iden- 
tical to the analysis of which country would come up with better 
new public issue disclosure rules. Again, the analysis points to 
country B. 
When one looks at the magnitudes of the important factors 
identified in the formal analysis, one can see that the case here for 
B is even stronger than the case for B with respect to new issue 
disclosure rules. It was suggested in the discussion of the simplified 
world that issuers from different countries differ more from one an- 
other in the costs of, and allocational improvements from, greater 
disclosure than investors from different countries differ from one 
another in the risk reduction benefits they enjoy from greater dis- 
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closure. In the case of ongoing disclosure, the divergence between 
countries in terms of costs and allocational benefits is likely to be 
even more pronounced. This is because disclosure's effects on the 
ongoing project choice and operational decisions of management 
and on the firm's costs are more likely to be determined by institu- 
tional features that are uniquely national - the way that a particu- 
lar country's issuers operate as organizations, for example - than 
would be disclosure's effects on the way the market in each country 
would choose among potential initially capitalizing firms. The same 
is likely to be true in terms of the costs of disclosure for ongoing 
firms compared to the costs of ones just starting up. Since differ- 
ences between the countries in terms of the risk-reduction benefits 
of greater disclosure are the same whether we are talking about 
trading in the primary or the secondary market, this more pro- 
nounced divergence in terms of costs and allocational benefits 
means that the factors that are more different between the coun- 
tries are even more different than in the former cases. 
ii. Accounting for Regulatory Change: Which Country Would 
Make Better Modifications? The country that is the regulator has 
not written its rules for ongoing disclosure in force at the time of 
the offering in stone; they can change. It is the level of disclosure 
actually prevailing at the time that the issuer's managers consider 
any particular decision, not the level that was expected at the time 
the shares were publicly offered, that determines how much man- 
agement is constrained in deviating from the shareholders' best in- 
terest. The same is true of costs. A determination of which country 
would be the better regulator depends not only on which one would 
come up with the better rules at the time of offering - according to 
my analysis, country B - but also on which country would be bet- 
ter at making modifications over time. 
The case for B as the better modifier of disclosure rules is 
weaker than the case for B as the initial rulemaker. Compared to 
A, B still has superior expertise with respect to the factors that dif- 
fer more between the countries. The argument that risk reduction 
is a subsidiary national interest is just as applicable as before. Feed- 
back concerning the resource-allocation effects of disclosure, how- 
ever, carries more ambiguous implications. 
All of the public shareholders of the B issuer are residents of A 
and will be among the persons bearing ongoing disclosure's costs 
and enjoying its disciplining effects on management. Suppose A 
were the regulator instead of B. At the time of the offering, A's 
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officials would be totally indifferent to what kind of ongoing- 
transnational B issuer disclosure rules they promulgate. Any defi- 
ciencies would be fully discounted in the price A's residents pay for 
the shares. Thereafter, however, these officials begin to face incen- 
tives to make modifications to their rules that would move disclo- 
sure toward the level that is in the shareholders' best interests. If in 
doing so they erred in their assessment, they would receive correc- 
tive negative feedback. 
Now suppose instead B were the regulator. The issuer's entre- 
preneurs, who provided the incentives for B's officials to account 
properly for disclosure's costs and allocational benefits at the time 
of offering, would now regard the sale of their shares simply as his- 
tory. At least as to those shares, these entrepreneurs would be in- 
different as to any modifications in the ongoing disclosure rules. In 
fact, to the extent that they continue in their role as managers, these 
entrepreneurs might even lobby B's officials to lower disclosure be- 
low what is optimal in order to make it easier to benefit themselves 
at the expense of shareholders. 
iii. Combining the Inquiries. Despite the weaker case for B in 
the modifications inquiry than in the rules at the time of offering 
inquiry, a variety of considerations suggest that overall B is still the 
better choice as the regulator of the ongoing disclosure of the B 
issuer. 
To start, the fact that at the time of the offering B would pre- 
scribe the better set of rules for ongoing disclosure is important. 
Regulation has its own inertia, and small changes are generally 
more likely than large ones. Any modifications that B would make 
subsequent to the offering would likely just fine tune a set of rules 
that regulatory authorities had incentives to get right initially. In 
contrast, if country A were the regulator, its modifications might be 
starting on a base that is far from optimal. Also, B is the better 
regulator of new public issue disclosure and, everything else being 
equal, it is better to have the same authorities regulate both new- 
issue and ongoing disclosure. It is less costly for the issuer to an- 
swer questions in ongoing disclosure that resemble the questions 
asked in connection with the public offering than to have to transi- 
tion to a different set of questions. 
Second, the other major group with a stake in the level of the 
issuer's disclosure - owners of the other factors of production, par- 
ticularly labor - still are B residents. They would continue to pro- 
vide B officials with incentives and feedback in support of a 
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disclosure policy that encourages efficient managerial 
decisionmaking. 
Third, at least initially, residents of B will continue to hold all of 
the issuer's shares representing the entrepreneurial surplus at the 
time of the public offering. To the extent that the holders continue 
to be managers, their holdings will buffer their tendency to lobby 
for changes in disclosure that would lower the value of their shares. 
To the extent that the holders of these shares are not current man- 
agers, they could provide incentives and feedback for B officials 
that are as balanced as what A shareholders would provide for its 
officials. In fact, the existence of a public market in A into which 
these shares held by B residents can be sold means that there are B 
residents who will provide B officials with incentives and feedback 
concerning the risk-reduction features of disclosure. 
Even more important, B's officials will also continue to receive 
strong feedback from investors in B concerning the effects of its 
choice of disclosure level for entirely domestic B issuers. Because 
entirely domestic B issuers should have institutionally similar struc- 
tures, the costs and allocational benefits resulting from their greater 
disclosure should be the same as from greater disclosure by issuer- 
country and standard-transaction B issuers. Feedback concerning 
the choice of disclosure level for entirely domestic issuers therefore 
should provide information about the standard and issuer-country 
levels, whether or not the level of disclosure chosen for the transna- 
tional issuers is the same. 
Also, the importance of the incentives and feedback that offi- 
cials in A would receive from their investors if A were the regulator 
should not be exaggerated. If A were the regulator of ongoing dis- 
closure, its initial rules would likely be identical to the rules it ap- 
plies to its own issuers involved in entirely domestic transactions. A 
might make modifications for the transnational B issuers, but if it 
did, it is unlikely that they would be great enough to cover com- 
pletely the gap between what is best for A's domestic issuers and 
what would be globally optimal for transnational B issuers. Modifi- 
cations this extensive are even more unlikely if, as in the real world, 
there are issuers from several foreign countries, not just B, whose 
shares are publicly traded among residents of A. It would be an 
administrative nightmare for A to have a specially tailored set of 
ongoing disclosure rules for each such foreign country. 
b. The Regulation of Ongoing Disclosure in the Case of a 
Stream of Offerings by B Issuers. In fact there is not, of course, 
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going to be just a single offering in A by a single B issuer. Over 
time a stream of B issuers will engage in offerings of their securities 
in A. The country that regulates the ongoing disclosure of transna- 
tional B issuers, whichever it is, will presumably apply its current 
rules to all issuers, new and old. In the single-issue model, with B 
as the regulating country, B's officials, when considering any modi- 
fications to the rules governing the transnational B issuer that had 
previously offered its shares in A, would receive no pressure from 
the issuer's entrepreneurs to account for the modification's alloca- 
tional benefits or costs. In fact, the issuer's entrepreneurs, if they 
were still managers, might lobby these officials for a reduction in 
disclosure to a suboptimal level so that they could profit at the ex- 
pense of the shareholders. The existence of a stream of issuers and 
the need to treat new and old alike will have a disciplining effect 
that reduces this concern. Where there is a pool of entrepreneurs 
in B contemplating offerings in A in the future, they will pressure 
the authorities to continue to strive for a rule mandating the opti- 
mal level of ongoing disclosure. Anything else would reduce the 
entrepreneurial surplus they will receive at the time of their 
offerings.158 
D. Additional Considerations Favoring Country B as the 
Exclusive Regulator of the Disclosure of Its Issuers 
Beyond preventing a regulatory "race to the bottom" and con- 
cerns for expertise and proper incentives and feedback, additional 
considerations favor country B as the exclusive regulator of the dis- 
closure practices of all B issuers. 
1. Special Costs of Different Disclosure Levels for Different 
Issuers From the Same Country 
If B issuers whose shares are offered to and traded among inves- 
tors residing in A must disclose more than B issuers whose shares 
158. The existence of a stream of offerings would also reduce the concerns expressed 
above with giving A regulatory authority. In the single-issue model with A as the regulating 
country, we saw that the officials producing the regulations that would be in effect at the time 
of the B issuer's offering have no incentive to account for either the costs or the allocational 
benefits of disclosure and therefore may act irresponsibly. In contrast, where there is a 
stream of B issuer offerings over time, the A officials who are responsible for the rules in 
force at the time of any given new issue would be subject to pressures by the A shareholders 
of all the B issuers who had previously offered their shares in A. These residents of A enjoy 
the rules' allocational benefits and suffer their costs. 
This observation should not, however, change the overall conclusion that B is the better 
regulator. With the possibility of irresponsible behavior reduced on both sides of the ledger, 
the single-issue model's overall conclusion that B would be the better choice remains valid 
when we take account of the fact that there will be a stream of offerings. 
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are offered and traded entirely domestically, two special kinds of 
costs arise. To understand the first of these costs, suppose for a 
moment that B had a financially closed economy. No issuers have 
shares offered or traded in transnational transactions. All issuers 
are subject to the same purely domestic disclosure regime. As we 
saw in Part II, for the average issuer, the commercial and competi- 
tive benefits from legally mandated disclosure - the benefits that 
arise from acquiring information disclosed by suppliers, customers, 
and competitors - will cancel out the costs from the issuer's suppli- 
ers, customers, and competitors acquiring the information disclosed 
by the issuer. Thus, the only harm to the average issuer from re- 
quiring all issuers to reveal more is the increase in its operating 
costs of disclosure. The increase in commercial and competitive 
costs will be counterbalanced by a corresponding increase in 
benefits. 
This discussion has assumed throughout, however, that in fact 
there is a subgroup of all B issuers whose shares are offered and 
traded in transnational transactions. Problems arise if members of 
this subgroup are subject instead to A's regime. If A's regime re- 
quires a higher level of disclosure than B's, then transnational B 
issuers would be providing more information to, than they would be 
receiving from, suppliers, purchasers, and competitors that are not 
in the transnationally traded subgroup. The fact that not all B issu- 
ers are covered by a more rigorous disclosure regime means that 
the imposition of the regime on those who are covered increases 
their costs disproportionately. The distribution of the costs of dis- 
closure, whether operating costs or these extra commercial and 
competitive costs, was analyzed earlier in discussing the stakes of 
country A. Those who do bear the disclosure costs of B issuers 
whose shares are transnationally traded - on an expected basis, 
residents of country B - will bear these extra costs. Suppose in- 
stead that A's regime requires less disclosure than does B's. Similar 
problems arise, this time with B's purely domestic issuers facing 
higher costs. Either way, these differences in costs create inefficient 
distortions in the issuers' decisions as to which markets they will sell 
and promote trading of their securities in. 
The second cost of requiring a different level of disclosure from 
transnational B issuers exists even if all B issuers join the group. As 
Part II discussed, country B determined the appropriate level of 
disclosure for B issuers in a way that may well have reflected, 
among other things, B's calculation for its economy of the balance 
between disclosure's beneficial effects on static efficiency and its 
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harmful effects on dynamic efficiency. Imposition of a different re- 
gime overrides this determination. 
2. The Reality That Most Transnational Issuers Will Also Have 
Public Shareholders at Home 
We have assumed throughout Part III and Part IV that for any 
given B issuer, all public transactions in its shares fall exclusively 
into one of four categories: standard, transplant, issuer country, or 
purely domestic. This assumption sets up the most extreme set of 
facts against which to test the propositions that I have made. In the 
real world, however, almost all issuers whose shares are involved in 
one of the three transnational types of transactions are publicly 
traded at home as well. Indeed, in most cases, the majority of their 
shares are held by residents of the issuer's nationality. 
This reality only further strengthens the case for apportioning 
regulatory authority over transnational B issuers to B. With B resi- 
dents holding a significant portion of the shares of most transna- 
tional B issuers, officials in B will continue to receive feedback from 
B residents concerning ongoing disclosure rules. Also, as to the 
shares of these issuers held domestically, officials in B will have su- 
perior expertise and feedback with respect to disclosure's risk- 
reduction features. 
E. The Case Against Concurrent Regulation 
The argument thus far has focused on demonstrating that if just 
one country is to regulate the disclosure of all B issuers, B should be 
that country. But with B issuers whose shares are involved in trans- 
national transactions, why designate just one regulating country? 
Why not allow concurrent regulation, as often happens today? 
If B's regime is more lenient than A's regime, answering this 
question is easy. Concurrent regulation effectively overrides the 
policy determination of country B that less rather more disclosure is 
optimal. This outcome is undesirable because B has a stronger case 
for being the regulator than does A. 
If B's regime is stricter, the answer to the question is more com- 
plex but the conclusion is the same. As noted earlier, in the real 
world, A's regime, though it might generally be regarded as more 
lenient, may still require disclosure of certain information not re- 
quired by B's regime. While there is probably a great deal of over- 
lap, A's regime may well try to reach somewhat different types of 
information. Even where A's regime tries to reach the same type of 
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information, it will ask questions in a somewhat different way and 
so the resulting answers will contain somewhat different facts. 
But if B has already demonstrated its preference for more 
rather than less information, one might ask why not permit concur- 
rent jurisdiction and get even more information? The benefits from 
concurrent regulation where A's regime is more lenient are at best 
unclear. The fact that B prefers more disclosure to less disclosure 
does not mean that it prefers even more disclosure than its regime 
requires. If B had wanted even more disclosure, it would have re- 
quired it. B presumably concluded that the extra costs of more dis- 
closure were not worth the additional benefits. Also, A is unlikely 
to have a special stake in the particular additional information that 
concurrent application of its regime would reveal, because A's pri- 
mary stake is risk reduction. No particular kind of information is 
necessary for risk reduction as long as it assists in predicting future 
income streams with greater certainty. B's regime already requires 
more information to be disclosed by its issuers - and hence per- 
mits more certain predictions - than A's regime requires to be dis- 
closed by A's own domestic issuers. As for project choice and 
constraining managerial deviations from shareholders' best inter- 
ests, the differences between what A asks and what B asks are likely 
to be the result of differences in their domestic institutional struc- 
tures. For issuers from B, the additional information revealed by 
getting answers to A's questions is unlikely to yield particularly sub- 
stantial allocational and managerial discretion reduction benefits in 
B. 
The costs of permitting concurrent regulation are substantial. B 
issuers whose shares are involved in both domestic and transna- 
tional transactions must incur significant administrative costs in 
providing similar information asked for in somewhat different ways 
by multiple authorities. B issuers whose shares are currently only 
involved in domestic transactions but who perceive that investors 
residing in A would be interested in their shares would be deterred 
by the additional administrative costs of concurrent regulation from 
developing that market. This distortion results in a loss of eco- 
nomic welfare to residents of both countries. Finally, permitting 
the possibility of concurrent regulation raises the question of when 
it should be permitted: What mix of domestic and different kinds of 
transnational transactions would imply sufficient involvement by 
A? Creation and application of rules concerning this question in- 
volve an increase in legal complexity that both consumes considera- 
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ble legal and administrative resources and creates uncertainty 
among economic actors. 
The argument for exclusive regulation by B is strong. Concur- 
rent regulation is clearly unjustified when B's regime is more leni- 
ent than A's. Where A's is more lenient than B's, the benefits of 
adding A's regime are at best uncertain, while the costs are 
substantial. 
V. APPLICATION TO U.S. POLICY 
What are the implications of the foregoing analysis for setting 
the appropriate reach of U.S. mandatory securities disclosure rules? 
There are 36,000 issuers of publicly traded securities in the world.159 
As we have seen, the barriers to a truly global market for the shares 
of these issuers continue to decline: financial information is becom- 
ing increasingly globalized and effecting share transactions abroad 
is becoming less expensive and more easy. With this trend toward 
globalization, an ever-larger portion of issuers will face securities 
transactions in their shares that have a least one U.S. dimension 
whether it be the nationality of the buyer, the nationality of the 
issuer, or the place of transaction. On which of these issuers is it in 
the enlightened best interest of the United States to impose its dis- 
closure regime? In this final Part, I briefly survey the existing U.S. 
approach to deciding whether to impose its regime on an issuer and 
sketch out the need for change.160 
Imposition of the U.S. disclosure regime is triggered by the pub- 
lic offering of, or indices of public trading in, an issuer's shares.161 
As we will see, the U.S. approach to statutory reach has in practice 
put some weight on each of the three national dimensions of such 
transactions - buyer, issuer, and place of transaction. The articu- 
lated goal, however, has traditionally focused on the first of these 
factors: the need to protect United States investors from making 
damaging securities choices as a result of being poorly informed.162 
This "investor protection" approach suggests that the only transac- 
tions associated with an issuer that should trigger imposition of U.S. 
disclosure regulation are those involving U.S. investors. Given this 
159. According to the International Finance Corporation's annual survey of world stock 
exchanges, the total number of listed domestic companies worldwide in 1994 was 36,176. See 
INTERNATIONAL FIN. CORP., EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK 1995, at 21 (1995). 
160. I deal with these issues much more extensively in a companion piece. See Fox, supra 
note 136. 
161. See infra section V.A. 
162. See infra section V.A.1.a. 
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goal, the rationale for including the nationality of the issuer and the 
place of the transaction in the determination of whether to apply 
the U.S. regime is presumably that they act as proxies for the prob- 
able nationality of the buyers. Information about the nationality of 
buyers is difficult to acquire. The fact that transactions in an is- 
suer's shares occur in the United States or that the issuer is from 
the United States makes it more likely that buyers are from the 
United States than if this were not the fact. 
In 1988, the SEC, in proposing its subsequently adopted Regula- 
tion S,163 articulated a different, "capital market protection" goal 
for the U.S. approach to statutory reach. The new goal still looks to 
protect certain investors from being poorly informed but reformu- 
lates the class of persons protected to be all investors, wherever 
resident, but only if they purchase in the U.S. market.l64 While this 
change in the articulated goal suggests that the place of transaction 
should weigh more heavily in the calculations of whether to apply 
the U.S. regime, U.S. practice has not, at least to date, changed 
dramatically.165 
The traditional SEC goal of investor protection and its more re- 
cently articulated goal of market protection are both misguided. 
The goal of U.S. securities regulation should be to maximize, to the 
extent that it is cost effective, the benefits enjoyed by U.S. residents 
from disclosure's capital allocation and managerial-agency-cost- 
reduction effects. Accordingly, U.S. practice should change so that 
the United States imposes its regime only on issuers of U.S. nation- 
ality166 but does so regardless of where transactions in the issuer's 
shares occur or the nationality of the buyers. It is therefore in the 
enlightened self-interest of the United States to conform to the ap- 
proach to statutory reach that I showed earlier will maximize global 
economic welfare. This is the case even if other countries do not 
follow suit. 
There are two reasons for this recommended change in the U.S. 
approach. First, this approach discriminates among the world's is- 
163. 17 C.F.R. ?? 230.901-.904 (1996). 
164. See infra section V.A.1.b. 
165. See Securities Act Release No. 6779, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 84,242 at 89,123 (June 10, 1988) [hereinafter Reg. S Proposing Release]; infra sec- 
tion V.A.1.b. 
166. Under this approach, the nationality of an issuer, it will be remembered, is deter- 
mined by where the issuer has its center of gravity as a firm. Important factors include the 
locations of the entrepreneurs who formed the enterprise, the current headquarters, and 
where the bulk of its operations are conducted. Nationality is not determined by jurisdiction 
of incorporation or where the issuer's shareholders reside. 
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suers more precisely than the other approaches in selecting which 
issuers' disclosure practices most affect the welfare of U.S. resi- 
dents. Second, it prevents political pressures from developing that 
might otherwise lower the U.S. requirements to a suboptimal level. 
A. The Current U.S. Approach 
Two basic components of U.S. securities law link transactions in 
securities with regulations requiring issuers to disclose information 
about themselves. First, certain sections of the Securities Act of 
1933 ("Securities Act") regulate the primary market for securi- 
ties,167 imposing a set of disclosure obligations upon the offering 
and sale by the issuer of a new block of securities. Second, certain 
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") 
regulate the secondary market for securities. Exchange Act disclo- 
sure obligations are triggered by indices - a listing of the issuer's 
shares on a securities exchange or the existence of more than a 
given number of shareholders - that suggest that already-issued 
shares of an issuer will be traded frequently.168 
1. Issuer Disclosure Triggered by Primary Market Transactions 
a. The SEC's Traditional Approach. Section 5 of the Securi- 
ties Act prohibits the offer or sale of any security by any person 
unless the security is registered under the Act or the security or 
transaction is subject to an exemption.169 By its terms, section 5 
makes no distinctions between foreign offerees or purchasers and 
domestic ones, or between transactions occurring abroad and trans- 
actions occurring at home.170 The SEC has always made clear that 
it interprets section 5 to cover public offerings in the United States 
by foreign issuers.171 This interpretation appears to be based on the 
SEC's traditional position that the registration requirements of sec- 
167. See infra section V.A.1. 
168. See infra section V.A.2. 
169. See 1933 Securities Act ? 5, 15 U.S.C. ? 77e (1994). 
170. Application of ? 5 requires only that an instrument of "interstate commerce," which 
is defined under ? 2(7) to include "trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or 
communications relating thereto .. . between any foreign country and any State," 15 U.S.C. 
? 77b(7) (1994), at some point be used in connection with the transaction, see 15 U.S.C. ? 77e 
(1994). 
171. Traditionally, foreign issuers wishing to offer publicly securities in the United States 
were required to register them on the same Form S-1 required of all domestic issuers not 
qualifying for one of the SEC's abridged forms. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, 1980 Securities 
Law Handbook 231 (1980). In 1982, the SEC, in an extension of the integrated disclosure 
system, adopted three registration forms exclusively for foreign issuers: the F-1, F-2 and F-3. 
See 17 C.F.R. ?? 239.31-.33 (1996). 
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tion 5 are primarily intended to protect U.S. investors.172 A large 
portion of the purchasers of any public offering made in the United 
States would obviously be U.S. investors. The SEC's only special 
concern in the case of foreign issuers has been, given the public 
interest in attracting them to make public offerings in the U.S. mar- 
ket, how much it should relax the ordinary disclosure standards ap- 
plicable to domestic issuers because of the special hardships the 
ordinary standards create for foreign issuers.173 
According to the traditional rationale, the U.S. disclosure re- 
gime should not be applied to the public offering to persons abroad 
of shares newly issued by a U.S issuer even if some activities in 
connection with the offering occur in the United States. In fact, the 
position of the SEC for over 30 years has been not to take action 
against U.S. issuers for failure to register securities that have been 
distributed abroad to foreign nationals if the distribution is effected 
in a manner that will result in the securities coming to rest 
abroad.174 
b. Regulation S. In 1988, the SEC issued a release first pro- 
posing its subsequently adopted Regulation S rules concerning Se- 
curities Act registration exemptions for offers and sales abroad.175 
In this release, the SEC articulated a shift in rationale concerning 
the appropriate reach of the entire U.S. disclosure regime: 
[T]he registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital 
markets and all investors purchasing in the U.S. market, whether U.S. 
or foreign nationals. Principles of comity and reasonable expectations 
of participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws applicable 
in jurisdictions outside the United States to define disclosure require- 
ments for transactions effected offshore. ... As investors choose their 
markets, they would choose the disclosure requirements applicable to 
such markets.176 
Concern with where the transaction is effected, which in the past 
had been simply a proxy for the likely residency of the person buy- 
ing the security, thus becomes an end in itself. 
This articulated change in goal has not, so far, resulted in a ma- 
jor change in practice. The rules actually adopted do not provide a 
wholesale exemption for every transaction effected abroad. 
172. See Securities Act Release No. 4708, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 1361, at 2124 (July 
9, 1964) [hereinafter Release No. 4708]. 
173. See Securities Act Release No. 6437, SEC Docket (CCH), at 964 (Nov. 19, 1982); 
Fanto, supra note 5. 
174. See Release No. 4708, supra note 172, at 2124. 
175. See Reg. S Proposing Release, supra note 165. 
176. Id. at 89,128 (emphasis added) (footnotes deleted). 
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Rather, the focus is on two concerns. The first is preventing 
directed-selling efforts in the United States of unregistered shares 
nominally offered only abroad. The second is preventing the 
"flowback" into the United States of unregistered shares initially 
sold abroad, particularly where the issuer is also not providing peri- 
odic disclosure under the U.S. regime.177 Regulation S applies to 
both U.S. and foreign issuers, but with somewhat different results. 
i. U.S. Issuers. A U.S. issuer that scrupulously offers its 
shares only to persons residing abroad and lists them only abroad is, 
even with Regulation S, still ultimately likely to have to comply 
with U.S. disclosure requirements. This is true even though pur- 
chasers of the shares would have chosen to acquire their shares in a 
market outside the United States and hence, according to the SEC's 
newly articulated goal of market protection, have chosen foreign 
disclosure requirements as well. It would be difficult or impossible 
for such an issuer to construct a practical scheme to market its 
shares that would qualify for the Regulation S exemption from Se- 
curities Act disclosure. Even if it succeeds in doing so, its victory is 
likely to be pyrrhic: soon after, it would be likely to have to provide 
177. Regulation S was proposed by the SEC in June 1988. See id. at 89,123. It was repro- 
posed in 1989. See Securities Act Release No. 6838, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ? 84,426, at 80,209 (July 11, 1989) [hereinafter Reg. S Reproposing Release]. The 
Commission adopted Regulation S on April 19, 1990. See Securities Act Release No. 6863, 
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ? 84, 524, at 80,661 (Apr. 24, 1990) 
[hereinafter Reg. S Adopting Release]; 17 C.F.R. ?? 230.901-.904 (1996). 
Regulation S, which consists of rules governing offers and sales of securities made outside 
the United States, covers both U.S. issuers and foreign issuers. See 17 C.F.R. ? 230.903 
(1996). Rule 901 provides that ? 5 of the Securities Act does not cover "offers and sales that 
occur outside the United States." 17 C.F.R. ? 230.901 (1996). Regulation S also contains, in 
rule 903, a safe harbor from registration for offers and sales by issuers, underwriters, and 
dealers involved in the distribution of securities. See 17 C.F.R. ? 230.903 (1996). To qualify 
under this safe harbor, the offer must be made only to persons outside the United States, it 
must be reasonably believed that the purchasers are outside the United States when they 
place their orders, and there must be no directed selling efforts in the United States. Under 
rule 903(c), qualification may also require meeting additional conditions designed to discour- 
age flowback to the United States of securities offered and sold in this fashion. See 17 C.F.R. 
? 230.903(c). The need to meet these additional considerations, and their severity, depends 
on factors suggesting the likelihood of such flowback and the extent of damage if it does 
occur. Such factors include the nationality of the issuer, the nature of the security, the loca- 
tion where the issuer's currently outstanding securities trade, and whether the issuer provides 
periodic disclosure under the 1934 Act. 
For an overall description and analysis of Regulation S, see RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET 
AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 519-21, 1594-612 (7th ed. 1992); Loss 
& SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 792; Don Berger, Offshore Distribution of Securities: The Im- 
pact of Regulation S, 3 TRANSNATL. LAW. 575 (1990); John Regis Coogan & Thomas C. Kim- 
brough, Regulation S Safe Harbors for Offshore Offers, Sales and Resales, INSIGHTS, Aug. 
1990, at 3; Samuel Wolff, Offshore Distributions Under the Securities Act of 1993: An Analy- 
sis of Regulation S, 23 LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 101 (1991-92). 
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the same information under the Exchange Act periodic disclosure 
requirements.178 
ii. Foreign Issuers. A foreign issuer that offers its securities 
only to persons residing abroad is likely to avoid the need to com- 
ply with U.S. disclosure requirements. Foreign issuers will find it 
easier to qualify under Regulation S. The apparent intention of 
Regulation S is to exempt public offerings by foreign issuers where 
the sale is effected abroad, there are no efforts directed at United 
States residents to sell shares of the new issue, and the likelihood ex 
ante is that the securities will come to rest abroad - even if some, 
ex post, do ultimately come to rest in the United States.179 A for- 
178. Consider a privately held issuer whose operations and management are predomi- 
nantly in the United States and whose initial shareholders are primarily U.S. residents. It 
decides to go public only abroad. Even if the issuer is incorporated (or reincorporated) 
abroad, such an issuer would not qualify as a "foreign issuer" under rule 902(f). At the time 
of the offering, more than 50% of its shares would be U.S.-held and it would have an eco- 
nomic center of gravity in the United States. Thus, the only safe harbor for which the offer- 
ing could qualify would be rule 903(c)(3), which imposes the most severe conditions to 
prevent flowback to the United States. See supra note 177. Under rule 903(c)(3), the offer- 
ing must be constructed in such a way that the purchasers are non-U.S. residents who agree, 
for a year, only to resell to non-U.S. residents who themselves agree to similar restrictions. 
These restrictions prevent the shares for a year from being listed to trade in an ordinary 
fashion on even a foreign stock exchange and, because of the consequent reduction in liquid- 
ity, greatly reduces their marketability. 
A previously privately held issuer able and willing to market its securities to the non-U.S. 
public under these difficult circumstances would still not, because of the Exchange Act's 
periodic disclosure requirements, escape the U.S. disclosure regime for long unless the offer- 
ing resulted in a majority of its shares being held abroad. See infra section V.A.2. 
Now consider a public offer abroad by an issuer with the same U.S. connections but 
whose shares are already publicly traded in the United States. It would be providing Ex- 
change Act periodic disclosure at the time of the offering abroad. Because of this, it could 
qualify for rule 902(c)(2)'s safe harbor. The conditions designed to discourage flowback 
under rule 902(c)(2) would not create the same roadblocks to the shares being traded on a 
foreign exchange immediately after the offering. But ultimately the already publicly traded U.S. issuer will find it no easier than the previously privately held issuer to avoid continued 
imposition of the Exchange Act periodic disclosure requirements, even if the foreign offering is so large that it leads to a majority of the issuer's shares being held by non-U.S. residents. 
There are only two exemptions from Exchange Act periodic disclosure based on an issuer's 
foreign aspects: rule 12g3-2(a) and rule 12g3-2(b). See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying 
text. Neither is likely to be available to the issuer being considered here. A rule 12g3-2(a) 
exemption would be unavailable because the issuer would still presumably have more than 300 U.S. resident shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.12g3-2(a) (1997). A rule 12g3-2(b) ex- 
emption would be unavailable because of rule 12g3-2(d)(1), which denies the exemption to 
issuers whose shares are already Exchange Act registered. See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.12g3-2(d)(1) (1997). 
179. The only tricky question here is whether publicity abroad that ends up reaching both investors abroad and investors in the United States - something happening with greater 
frequency as the financial media become increasingly international - could constitute a 
directed-selling effort in the United States. Under rule 901, offers and sales "that occur 
outside the United States" are deemed not covered by ? 5 of the Securities Act and hence do 
not require registration. See 17 C.F.R. ? 230.901 (1996). For offers and sales to be within the 
"safe harbor" provisions of rule 903 that deem them as "occur[ring] outside the United 
States," however, there must be "no directed selling efforts ... made in the United States." 
17 C.F.R. ? 230.903(b) (1996). "Directed selling efforts" are in turn defined in rule 902(b)(1) 
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eign issuer that does not have any securities publicly traded in the 
United States can engage in a public offering abroad and qualify for 
an exemption under Regulation S from Securities Act disclosure 
without having to meet any additional conditions designed to pre- 
vent their subsequent flow to the United States.180 As we will see 
below, as long as the offering does not ultimately result in U.S. in- 
vestors owning more than fifty percent of the issuer's shares and the 
issuer does not subsequently list the securities on a U.S. stock ex- 
change or NASDAQ, the issuer will not subsequently be required 
to provide Exchange Act periodic disclosure either. 
2. Issuer Disclosure Triggered by Secondary Market Transactions 
Issuers, whether foreign or U.S., that have never engaged in a 
public offering registered under section 5 of the Securities Act can 
nevertheless become subject to U.S. disclosure requirements 
through the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure regime.181 Issuers 
of both types wishing their shares to be listed on a U.S. stock ex- 
change, must, pursuant to section 12(a), register these securities 
with the SEC and thereby become subject to the Exchange Act's 
periodic disclosure regime.182 
For publicly traded issuers not wishing securities to be listed on 
a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ, the situation is more complicated. 
as "any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could reasonably be expected to have 
the effect of, conditioning the market in the United States" for the securities being offered. 17 
C.F.R. ? 903(b)(1) (1996) (emphasis added). 
In the domestic context, the SEC has interpreted the term "conditioning" very broadly to 
include almost any publicity effort that reaches significant numbers of potential investors. 
See Securities Act Release No. 3844, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 3,253, at 3,148 (Oct. 8, 
1957); Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959). The SEC, in its statements con- 
cerning the impact of news conferences on the availability of a Regulation S exemption, has 
indicated, however, that it may not be as strict in its interpretation of the term "conditioning" 
in the international context. See 17 C.F.R. ? 230.703(T) preliminary note 7 (1996). The SEC 
has recently issued for comment proposed rules that, if translated into a final rule, will clarify 
its definition of directed-selling efforts. See Securities Act Release No. 7392, [Current 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 85,909, at 89,279 (Feb. 20, 1997). 
180. 17 C.F.R. ? 903(c)(1) (1996). 
181. Sections 12(b) and 12(g) of the Exchange Act set forth requirements for the registra- 
tion of the securities of certain issuers. Exchange Act ? 13(a) requires issuers registered 
under ? 12 to file, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the SEC, annual 
reports and current information that follow up on the original ? 12 registration application or 
statement. See Exchange Act ? 13(a), 15 U.S.C. ?? 781, 78m (1994). An issuer that has en- 
gaged in an offering registered under ? 5 of the Securities Act must, pursuant to Exchange 
Act ? 15(d), provide on a continuing basis the same annual reports and current information. 
See Exchange Act ?15(d), 15 U.S.C. ? 77e (1994). 
182. Section 12(a) prohibits any member, broker, or dealer from effecting on a national 
securities exchange any transaction in "any security" not registered in accordance with the 
provisions of the Exchange Act. See Exchange Act ? 12(a), 15 U.S.C. ? 781 (1994). No dis- 
tinction is made in the statute between a security of a foreign issuer and one of a U.S. issuer. 
The SEC has not interpreted the statute's reach more narrowly than its terms. 
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Issuer nationality can have an important effect. First consider for- 
eign issuers. Exchange Act section 12(g)(1) requires any issuer 
having assets of more than ten million dollars and a class of equity 
securities held of record by 500 or more persons to register such 
securities under the Act.183 The section makes no distinction be- 
tween domestic and foreign in terms of the nationality of the issuer 
or its shareholders or the location of the issuer's assets.184 The 
SEC, however, has exempted from these requirements any issuer 
that has sufficiently foreign characteristics to be considered a "for- 
eign issuer"'85 and that: (i) has no class of equity with more than 
300 holders resident in the United States,186 or (ii) furnishes the 
SEC with the disclosure information required by its home country's 
regime (this second basis not being available for issuers first listed 
on NASDAQ after October 1983).187 In effect, the SEC is imposing 
its own disclosure system on foreign issuers wishing to commence 
listing of securities on a national securities exchange or NASDAQ 
and, for all others, is accepting as adequate the disclosure system of 
their home countries.188 
183. Section 12(g)(1) requires every issuer who is engaged in interstate commerce or 
whose securities are traded by use of any means of interstate commerce and who has total 
assets exceeding $1 million and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more 
shareholders to register such securities with the SEC and provide information comparable to 
that required by a ? 12(b) registration. See Exchange Act ? 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. ? 781(g)(1) 
(1994). Rule 12g-1 exempts from this requirement issuers with total assets not exceeding 
$10,000,000. See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.12g-1 (1997). 
184. The text of subsection 12(g) as a whole, which was added by amendment to ? 12 in 
1964, see Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, ?3, 78 Stat. 565, 565-68, 
clearly suggests that ? 12(g)(1) is to apply to foreign issuers as well as domestic. See Ex- 
change Act ? 12(g), 15 U.S.C. ? 781(a) (1994). There is explicit provision in ? 12(g)(3) for the 
SEC - by rule or regulation - to exempt any security of a foreign issuer. See Exchange 
Act, ? 12(g)(3), 15 U.S.C. ? 781(g)(3) (1994). This interpretation is confirmed by the legisla- 
tive history of the amendment. See H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 11 (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3023-24. 
185. To qualify, the issuer must be a "foreign private issuer," as defined under rule 3b-4. 
See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.3b-4(c) (1997). This requires the issuer to be organized under the laws of 
a foreign country and, if its operations are sufficiently connected with the United States, have 
no more than 50% of its voting securities held by U.S. residents. See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.3b-4 
(1997). 
186. See Rule 12g3-2(a), 17 C.F.R. ? 240.12g3-2(a) (1997). 
187. The SEC in 1983 amended rule 12g3-2 to eliminate the availability of the 12g3-2(b) 
exemption for all foreign issuers quoted on the automated quotation system of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ), unless the issuer was already quoted on NAS- 
DAQ prior to the date of the amendment, and was and continues to be in compliance with 
the requirements of the exemption. The reasoning for eliminating the exemption was that 
"trading on NASDAQ is substantially the same as trading on an exchange and therefore the 
information available ... should be essentially the same." Exchange Act Release No. 20,624 
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Q 83,435, at 86,293 (Oct. 6, 1983). 
188. This acceptance of the disclosure system of the issuer's domicile has been strongly 
criticized by Professor Buxbaum. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the 
Foreign Issuer Exemption, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 358 (1969). More recently, some commenta- 
tors have pointed out that many such securities are traded within the United States via "pink 
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For the typical publicly held U.S. issuer not listed on a U.S. ex- 
change, domestic trading or holdings in the United States are by 
themselves sufficient to trigger imposition of the Exchange Act pe- 
riodic disclosure regime. Consider, however, a U.S. issuer with a 
majority of its assets and management in this country that, perhaps 
in an attempt to avoid U.S. disclosure rules, chooses to become a 
public company but decides to do so only abroad. In other words, it 
engages in no domestic public offerings, and it facilitates the trading 
of its securities only abroad.189 Section 12(a) is not a problem for 
such an issuer because 12(a)'s registration requirements would only 
be triggered by a listing of the issuer's shares on a U.S. stock ex- 
change.190 Section 12(g) may well still be a problem, however. The 
simple fact that the issuer has gone public, regardless of where most 
of its shareholders reside, is enough to trigger imposition of the 
U.S. regime if the issuer remains incorporated in the United 
States.191 If the issuer reincorporates abroad, it might escape the 
sheets." See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSAC- 
TIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 50 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing COCHRANE T AL., supra note 
12, at 11-13). Pink sheets are stock quotations published twice daily by the National Quota- 
tion Bureau that include the names and telephone numbers of market makers. See id. In 
1994, over 7600 foreign securities, and 440 American Depository Receipts (ADRs), traded 
through pink sheets. See id. These trades averaged $136.2 million in daily dollar value. See 
id. 
189. Research reveals at least one previously nonpublic U.S. company, International Sig- 
nal and Control Group, that listed and offered its shares on the London Stock Exchange in 
order to avoid U.S. disclosure requirements. See John H. Ehrlich, Comment, International- 
ization of Stock Markets: Potential Problems for United States Shareholders, 7 Nw. J. INTL. L. 
& Bus. 532, 550 (1986). 
190. A listing on a foreign stock exchange would not, under ? 12(a), trigger a need for 
such an issuer to register securities: section 12(a) applies only to transactions on a "national 
securities exchange." See Exchange Act ? 12(a), 15 U.S.C. ? 781(a) (1994). No foreign ex- 
change is currently registered as a "national securities exchange." See 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 1 21,310.10, at 15,705 (Feb. 2, 1994). 
191. This assumes that the issuer is not so insignificant that it has less than $10 million in 
total assets. It also assumes that by going public, the issuer has a class of equity securities 
with more than 500 holders located somewhere in the world. If these assumptions are cor- 
rect, as long as the issuer remains incorporated in the United States, it would appear to be 
required by ? 12(g)(1) to register its securities. Section 12(g)(1), as we have seen, makes no 
distinction between foreign and domestic security holders. Because foreign issuers are cov- 
ered unless exempted pursuant to a rule or regulation, see supra note 184, this issuer, being 
from the United States, surely would, absent such an exemption, be covered as well, even if 
most of its shareholders are abroad. No exemption is available for this issuer. Rule 12g3-2 is 
the only exemption that concerns the foreign characteristics of securities potentially subject 
to Exchange Act registration. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. Assuming that 
the issuer in question is incorporated in the United States, neither branch of the rule would 
provide an exemption, because both require the issuer to be a "foreign private issuer." See 
supra note 185. A corporation, to be a "foreign private issuer," must, under rule 3b-4, be 
incorporated under the laws of a foreign country. See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.3b-4(b)-(c) (1997). 
At least four issuers incorporated in the United States, but with fewer than 300 U.S. 
resident shareholders, have applied, however, pursuant to the Exchange Act's catch-all ex- 
emption, ? 12(h), for an order of the Commission exempting them from registration under 
? 12(g). In each case, the Commission appears not to have issued the requested order. The 
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U.S. disclosure regime. The requirements for doing so, however, 
are strict: public offerings of its securities must be made exclusively 
abroad, and, from the moment it becomes a public company - 
whether through a public offering or by share ownership growing in 
some other fashion to at least 500 holders - a majority of shares 
must be held by persons residing abroad.192 Such an issuer would 
be entitled to an exemption on the same basis as a foreign issuer.193 
3. Conclusion 
In summary, U.S. practice currently works as follows. Issuers 
that I categorize as U.S. nationals - those with their economic 
center of gravity in the United States - are generally subject to the 
U.S. regime. Potential escape is available through a combination of 
going public only abroad and incorporating abroad, but only for 
those issuers that meet strict requirements limiting the extent of 
their U.S. ownership. For those that meet these strict requirements, 
actual escape depends on the same factors as apply to foreign issu- 
ers. Foreign issuers are subject to the U.S. disclosure regime if they 
offer their shares in the United States or list them on a U.S. stock 
exchange or NASDAQ, but otherwise can probably escape the U.S. 
regime. 
staff of the Division of Corporate Finance stated that it would not raise any objection if the 
issuers did not register their securities under ? 12(g). See Equitable American Property Co., 
SEC No Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ? 79,403 (Dec. 19, 
1989); Paribas Properties, Inc., SEC No Action Letter (Feb. 29, 1988), available at 1988 SEC 
No-Act LEXIS 222; States Properties, Inc., SEC No Action Letter (Nov. 30,1987), available 
at 1987 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2785; Petrogen Petroleum, Inc., SEC No Action Letter (Oct. 12, 
1987), available at 1987 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2549. 
As of January 1987, there were 14 U.S. companies traded on the London Unlisted Securi- 
ties Market (USM). For most of these companies, however, the reported attraction of 
London was the lower cost of an initial public offering rather than avoidance of U.S. disclo- 
sure rules. See Philip Coggan, Low Costs Attract, FiN. TIMES (London), Jan. 20, 1987, at 6. Since that time, the London Stock Exchange has closed the USM to make way for its new 
creation, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). See Christopher Price, Opportunities 
for Investors: Managers' Ability Is the Key, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 14, 1997, at 3. Most 
of the companies previously listed on the USM have found their way to AIM, which now has 
259 listed issuers. See id. At least one company, however, moved to NASDAQ. See LBMS 
to Opt for American Listing, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 29, 1995, at 28. 
192. Should the issuer in question, despite having a majority of its assets and manage- 
ment in the United States, choose to incorporate abroad, it would be, under Exchange Act 
rule 3b-4(b), a "foreign issuer." See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.3b-4(b) (1997). It can be exempt from 
registration under rule 12g3-2 if it has no more than 300 holders resident in the United States 
or furnishes the SEC with the disclosure information required by authorities abroad, see 
supra notes 186-87, but only if it qualifies under rule 3b-4(c) as a "foreign private issuer." See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.3b-4(c) (1997). That would require not only foreign incorporation but also 
that no more than 50% of outstanding voting securities be held by U.S. residents. This might 
or might not be true of a corporation originally owned by its founders, private-offering inves- 
tors, and employees and that subsequently goes public abroad. 
193. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text. 
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Where an issuer is of U.S. nationality, the issuer is thus very 
likely to need to comply with the U.S. regime. Where a significant 
number of transactions in an issuer's shares are effected in the 
United States, it is fairly likely that the U.S. regime will be applied 
as well, even if the issuer is foreign. Where a significant number of 
purchasers of an issuer's shares are U.S. residents, but the issuer is 
foreign and the shares are neither offered in the United States nor 
listed on a stock exchange or NASDAQ, the U.S. regime will proba- 
bly not be applied. 
B. A Switch to the Issuer-Nationality Approach 
Would Enhance U.S. Welfare 
1. Selection of Issuers 
The United States has a strong interest in the disclosure behav- 
ior of U.S. issuers. Greater disclosure, through its beneficial effects 
on capital allocation and on aligning managerial and shareholder 
interests, leads to greater returns on capital utilizing projects.194 It 
also leads to greater costs.195 The suppliers of capital, entrepre- 
neurs, and the suppliers of the other factors of production - pri- 
marily labor - share the returns on such projects, after subtracting 
these costs. The global return on capital, whatever the issuer's dis- 
closure practices, sets capital's share.196 Thus it is the entrepreneurs 
and labor associated with U.S. issuers, who are concentrated in the 
United States, that primarily feel the cost and benefit effects of the 
disclosure behavior of U.S. issuers.197 U.S. officials are best situ- 
ated to decide if the disclosure of these issuers needs regulation 
and, if so, at what level. This is equally true whether the issuer's 
shares are traded only at home and held primarily by U.S. investors 
or traded only abroad and held primarily by foreign investors. 
The United States has only a weak interest in the disclosure be- 
havior of foreign issuers, even those whose shares are predomi- 
nantly owned by U.S. investors. Because the U.S. investors will 
receive the global expected rate of return on capital, whatever a 
foreign issuer's disclosure practices, concerns about improving the 
expected rate of return for U.S. investors do not justify U.S. regula- 
194. See supra section II.A.3. 
195. See supra section II.B. 
196. See supra section III.A.1. 
197. See supra section III.A.2. 
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tion of such issuers.198 More disclosure by these foreign issuers 
would benefit less than fully diversified U.S. investors through re- 
duction in the risk of their portfolios.199 Regulation on this basis, 
however, is less vital, because these investors can also reduce risk 
simply by diversifying more. Not only are the benefits to the 
United States from regulation of foreign issuers less, but the costs 
to the United States are greater. Such regulation can reduce the 
availability of foreign issuer shares to U.S. investors. This is welfare 
decreasing for U.S. investors, even if the excluded foreign issuers 
would have disclosed only at a very low level.200 It also can lead to 
foreign-relations problems. 
The place where an issuer's shares are traded does not affect 
these conclusions. The only U.S. interests at stake are persons 
whose rents depend on the volume of share transactions effected in 
the United States. Because the United States has the strictest re- 
gime, these interests will be hurt, not helped, by having application 
of the U.S. regime depend, in part or in whole, on whether transac- 
tions in an issuer's shares are effected in the United States. Such a 
policy's negative effect - issuer managers deciding to have their 
shares traded outside the United States in order to evade the strict 
U.S. rules - will dominate its positive effect - issuer managers 
deciding to have their shares traded in the United States in order to 
enhance their reputations.201 
2. The Prevention of Political Pressures to Lower U.S. Disclosure 
Requirements to a Suboptimal Level 
The market for securities, as we saw in Part I, will become in- 
creasingly global in the future. Globalization has two components: 
investors everywhere will be at a diminishing information disadvan- 
tage concerning issuers from other countries, and effecting share 
transactions abroad will become increasingly inexpensive and easy. 
Globalization has important implications for the U.S. mandatory 
disclosure regime, which is currently the strictest in the world.202 
198. See supra section III.A.l.b, which also includes a discussion of why the United 
States has only a weak interest even if there is not a single risk-adjusted global expected rate 
of return on capital. 
199. See supra sections II.A.2 & III.A. 
200. See supra sections II.A.2 & III.A. 
201. See supra sections III.B.2-.3 & III.C.3. 
202. The United Kingdom is a critical country for comparison with the United States. 
The United Kingdom is the home of the International Stock Exchange (formerly the London Stock Exchange), which, along with the New York Stock Exchange and the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, is one of the world's three major stock exchanges. The United Kingdom is consid- 
ered by the SEC to have disclosure requirements that are closer to those of the United States 
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The current U.S. approach to statutory reach includes as relevant 
factors the nationality of the buyers and the place where the trans- 
actions occur. If we maintain this approach, increasing globaliza- 
tion is likely to cause a significant reduction in the U.S. level of 
required disclosure. This relaxation of the U.S. regime will result 
from increasing political pressure by persons seeking to maximize 
the number of transactions effected in the U.S., most prominently 
from members of the U.S. securities industry, and will occur even if, 
as seems likely, it diminishes U.S. welfare. A switch to a pure 
issuer-nationality approach would avoid these pressures and hence 
the welfare-diminishing reduction in required disclosure. 
a. Globalization-Induced Pressures to Lower 
U.S. Disclosure Standards. 
i. The Issuer-Nationality Approach. This statutory-reach-ap- 
proach-based disparity in the impact of globalization on the strict- 
ness of the U.S. regime relates to a particular kind of issuer 
than those of other countries (except Canada). See Securities Act Release No. 6568, [1984- 
1985 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,743, at 87,319 (Feb. 28, 1985). Neverthe- 
less, a detailed comparison between the disclosure requirements of the United States and the 
United Kingdom for companies that issue equity securities reveals that the United States 
requires significantly more information. Differences between U.S. and U.K. requirements 
include differences in the amount of detail that must be provided describing the nature of the 
issuer's business and the results of the various lines of business in which the issuer partici- 
pates; the need to discuss management-identified trends that may affect its future liquidity, 
capital needs, or operating results; and the need to provide information concerning manage- 
ment compensation and share ownership. See David H. Landau, Note, SEC Proposals to 
Facilitate Multinational Securities Offerings: Disclosure Requirements in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, 19 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POL. 457, 459-68 (1987); see also BENSTON, 
supra note 130, at 20-21, 37; 1987 SEC INTERNATIONALIZATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 
III-91. European countries in general put much less emphasis on full disclosure. See Peter 
Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws - Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to Messrs. Loomis 
and Grant), 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 39-40 (1978). Japan, the home of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, has a securities statute that closely parallels the Securities Act and the Ex- 
change Act of the United States. However, the staff responsible for promulgating regulations 
and enforcement is very small compared to that of the SEC. Many provisions of the statute 
are treated as inoperative. The emphasis is on de facto screening of issuers by regulatory 
authorities rather than full disclosure. See 1987 SEC INTERNATIONALIZATION REPORT, supra 
note 33, at III-127; Kunio Hamada & Keiji Matsumoto, Securities Transaction Law in Gen- 
eral, in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN ? 1.02[1], [4] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1996). 
The United States, in addition to having a set of regulations and an administrative appara- 
tus that solicits more information from issuers than those of other countries, has a liability 
system that prods more information out of issuers. Under ? 11 of the 1933 Securities Act, the 
issuer is absolutely liable for materially false or misleading statements in the registration 
statement. See 1933 Securities Act ? 11, 15 U.S.C. ? 77k (1994). The underwriter is liable as 
well, unless, under ? 11(b), he sustains the burden of proof that after conducting a reasonable 
investigation ("due diligence") he believed the statements at issue to be true. See 1933 Se- 
curities Act ? 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. ? 77k(b)(3) (1994). The liability system in the United King- 
dom, for example, is not as far reaching. See 1987 SEC INTERNATIONALIZATION REPORT, 
supra note 33, at III-116. 
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sensitivity. This is the sensitivity of issuers to the level of disclosure 
required by the U.S. regime when they make their choices as to 
whether or not to have their shares offered or traded in the United 
States. The greater this sensitivity, the larger the portion of issuers 
currently unwilling to have their shares offered or traded in the 
United States that would change their minds in response to a lower- 
ing of the U.S.-required disclosure level by any given amount. 
Greater issuer sensitivity leads to a greater desire by interests 
whose well-being depends on the volume of transactions effected in 
the United States to have the U.S. disclosure level lowered. 
Under a pure issuer-nationality approach, an issuer's choice of 
whether or not to have its shares offered or traded in the United 
States would have no impact on whether the U.S. regime is applied 
to it. Issuers thus are completely insensitive to the required disclo- 
sure level of the U.S. regime, and there is no reason globalization 
would change this.203 Consequently, globalization would not in- 
crease the pressure on U.S. officials to lower the U.S. disclosure 
requirements. 
ii. The Current Approach. Under the current U.S. approach 
to statutory reach, factors relating to the nationality of the buyers of 
an issuer's stock and the country where transactions in shares occur 
are taken into account in determining whether to apply the U.S. 
regime. As a result, issuers are sensitive to the level of U.S. disclo- 
sure standards. The issuer can often avoid being subject to the U.S. 
regime by a strategy of not offering shares in the United States and 
of discouraging or preventing secondary trading there.204 We have 
seen that issuers, left unregulated, are likely to disclose at a level 
lower than is socially optimal, in part because they bear all the costs 
of their disclosures but do not enjoy all the benefits.205 Issuers, U.S. 
and foreign alike, would therefore prefer to be regulated by a less 
203. The desensitizing effect of a switch to the issuer-nationality approach will also en- 
hance welfare in terms of an issuer's choices as to where to have its shares offered and 
traded. The choice of each issuer, rather than being guided by an effort to come under the 
regulatory regime it prefers, will instead depend on the economic fundamentals of the situa- 
tion: the efficiency with which different markets effect trades, the country or countries of 
residence of their most likely investors, and the extent to which such investors find markets 
in their own country or countries the cheapest and most convenient places to transact. 
204. Location is an explicit factor not only under the market-protection approach - in 
which it represents the whole concern, see supra section V.A.1.b - but under the investor- 
protection approach as well, see supra sections V.A.1.a and V.B. The strategy also helps issuers avoid the U.S. regime because, without offerings or secondary trading in the United 
States, two other indicators used by the United States in determining whether or not to apply its regime - the percentage of their shares held by U.S. residents and the absolute number 
of such U.S. holders - are likely to be lower as well. See supra section V.B. 
205. See supra section II.B. 
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strict regime than the U.S. regime, even if being subject to the U.S. 
regime confers some reputational benefit.206 This means that under 
the current approach, issuers will have an incentive not to offer 
their shares in the United States and to discourage or prevent sec- 
ondary trading there as well. 
Avoiding the U.S. market, however, also involves a sacrifice. It 
reduces the pool of potential investors in the issuer's shares and 
thus leads to a lower share price. Each publicly traded issuer in the 
world, in deciding whether to have its shares offered and traded in 
the United States, must compare this sacrifice to the burden of 
complying with the U.S. disclosure regime.207 Those that find the 
sacrifice less than the burden of compliance will avoid the U.S. mar- 
ket. Their absence represents foregone rents for U.S. persons 
whose welfare depends on the volume of transactions effected in 
the United States. In order to minimize the number of issuers 
avoiding the U.S. market, these persons can be expected to exert 
ongoing pressure on U.S. officials to lower U.S. disclosure 
requirements. 
Avoiding the U.S. market traditionally has constituted a particu- 
larly big sacrifice for U.S. issuers because the United States is the 
residence of a large portion of their most likely potential investors. 
Hardly any U.S. issuers have chosen to do so.208 The converse of 
this proposition is that for many foreign issuers, avoiding the U.S. 
market has been much less of a sacrifice. In fact, most foreign issu- 
ers - all but about 700 out of total of about 28,400 - have avoided 
206. See supra section II.C.2. Consistent with the rest of this discussion, this statement 
assumes that, absent international regulatory competition, each country's required disclosure 
level will be at least as high as the socially optimal one for issuers of its nationality. Even if 
this assumption is not correct, the United States would still attract more issuers by lowering 
its required level of disclosure as long as that level starts out at least as high as is socially 
optimal for U.S. issuers and the level of what is socially optimal for issuers of each other 
country is no higher than that for U.S. issuers. 
207. Compliance with the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure requirements is necessary 
for any foreign issuer's shares to trade on a U.S. stock exchange. See supra notes 182-88 and 
accompanying text. Through a grandfathering provision, a number of foreign issuers that 
were trading over NASDAQ prior to October 6, 1983, have been permitted to continue to do 
so by meeting a substitute, minimal disclosure requirement. See supra note 187. Any foreign 
issuer wishing to commence NASDAQ trading at this point, however, must undertake full 
compliance. See id. Full compliance is not necessary for a foreign issuer's shares to be traded 
in the United States in a forum other than an organized U.S. exchange or NASDAQ. Such 
an issuer can commence having its shares traded among U.S. brokers on the basis of "pink 
sheets" simply by meeting the same substitute minimal requirements imposed on the 
grandfathered NASDAQ issuers. The spreads associated with this kind of trading are consid- 
erably larger, however. Investors purchasing these shares will experience a lower expected 
return and less liquidity. See, e.g., Iain Jenkins, 'Pink Sheets' Mix Risk with Rewards, INTL. 
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 19-20, 1994, at 19 (asserting that the spread in the OTC market for 
ADRs can be as much as 10%). 
208. See supra note 189. 
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the U.S. market. For them, the sacrifice is small enough to be less 
than the burden of complying with the U.S. regime.209 Globaliza- 
tion, however, will change the extent of sacrifice for both U.S. and 
foreign issuers. 
iii. The Impact of the Global Diffusion of Financial Informa- 
tion. The increasing global diffusion of financial information will 
diminish the information disadvantage that all investors face with 
regard to issuers from countries other than their own. Assume for a 
moment that it is impossible to effect orders abroad: initial share 
purchases and subsequent secondary trades by U.S. residents occur 
only in the United States, whatever the nationality of the issuer. 
This assumption isolates the effect of global diffusion of informa- 
tion on issuer sensitivity from the effect of the further reduction in 
the cost and difficulty of effecting transactions abroad. With this 
assumption, a U.S. or foreign issuer will, under the current ap- 
proach to statutory reach, have to comply with U.S. disclosure rules 
in order to have a significant number of U.S. resident investors. 
The larger the number of the world's issuers that choose to comply, 
the larger the total volume of transactions effected in the United 
States.210 
Today, almost all U.S. issuers comply with the U.S. regime and 
have their shares traded in the United States because the sacrifice 
of relying on foreign investors alone is too great. Thus, U.S. issuers 
currently are insensitive to lowering U.S. standards, because they 
are all traded in the United States anyway. With the global diffu- 
sion of financial information, however, the costs to a U.S. issuer of 
relying solely on foreign investors will decrease. Absent an action 
by the United States to make its disclosure requirements more lax, 
209. According to the International Finance Corporation's annual survey of world stock 
exchanges, the total number of listed domestic companies worldwide in 1994 was 36,176. See 
INTERNATIONAL FIN. CORP., supra note 159, at 21. Of these companies, 11,291 were in the 
world's developed markets outside of the United States and 7770 were U.S. companies. See 
id. As of September 1995, there were 602 SEC-registered and reporting foreign companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. See 
COCHRANE ET AL., supra note 12, at 10. One hundred registered and reporting foreign com- 
panies were trading over-the-counter. See id. at 10 n.8. Another 1173 unregistered foreign 
companies were trading over-the-counter, exempt from the SEC's reporting requirements 
under ? 12g3-2(b). See id. at 10. The 242 foreign companies currently being traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange represent only about one-tenth of the overseas companies that 
meet the Exchange's listing qualifications. See id. at 2. 
210. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that if U.S. residents have made available 
to them the shares of a greater array of the world's issuers, they will both save more and 
invest a larger portion of their savings in equities. This seems plausible given the significant 
improvement in the trade-off between risk and return that can be attained through interna- 
tional diversification of equity investment. See supra Part I. 
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a significant number of U.S. issuers may in the future opt to offer 
their shares and have their shares traded only abroad. These issu- 
ers would be induced to stay at home, however, if U.S. standards 
were lowered sufficiently. In the future, the volume of trading of 
U.S. issuer stocks thus will be sensitive to a relaxation of the U.S. 
regime. 
In contrast, there is no reason to believe that the sensitivity of 
foreign issuers will significantly increase or decrease. Foreign issu- 
ers will be sensitive to a lowering of the U.S. required level of dis- 
closure both now and in the future. Aggregating the effects of 
further globalization on U.S.- and foreign-issuer sensitivity, a given 
drop in the level of disclosure required by the U.S. regime would, 
under the assumption of this subsection, increase U.S. trading vol- 
ume more in the future than now. Globalization will thus increase 
the political pressure to relax the U.S. regime. 
iv. Reductions in the Cost and Difficulty of Effecting Transac- 
tions Abroad. Now consider the impact from the reduction in the 
cost and difficulty of effecting transactions abroad - the other 
component to globalization - on the sensitivity of U.S. and foreign 
issuers. This requires a very specific description of the U.S. ap- 
proach to statutory reach and how it is implemented. If the United 
States adopted an exclusive investor-protection approach to statu- 
tory reach and implemented it perfectly - that is, did not rely on 
evidence concerning where transactions in an issuer's shares occur, 
whether as proxy for the residency of the shares' buyers or other- 
wise - a reduction in the cost and difficulty of effecting transac- 
tions abroad would not affect the pressures for a lower U.S. 
standard. In that situation, only the increasingly global diffusion of 
information would influence such pressures, and the analysis above 
would describe the whole story.211 
In reality, however, the U.S. government is not perfectly imple- 
menting the investor-protection rationale. This article's review of 
current practice shows that it is more likely that the U.S. regime will 
211. Any issuer seeking a significant number of U.S. buyers or holders would, in that 
situation, have to comply with the U.S. regime, regardless of whether or not it was selling its 
shares or promoting secondary trading of its shares in the United States. Such issuers there- 
fore face no disincentive to selling and promoting their shares in the United States. Even if 
the cost and difficulty for U.S. residents of purchasing securities abroad substantially de- 
clined, some loss of potential U.S. investors would remain whenever an issuer's shares were 
not offered or traded in the United States. As in the analysis above, an issuer's decision that 
the benefits of access to the pool of U.S. investors outweigh the costs of compliance is there- 
fore tantamount to a decision to offer its shares and have its shares traded in the United 
States. 
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be imposed on an issuer if transactions in the issuer's shares occur 
in the United States than abroad. An issuer thus has an incentive to 
avoid the transacting of its shares in the United States. As it be- 
comes cheaper and easier for U.S. investors to effect transactions 
abroad, this incentive increases. Issuers are no longer forgoing as 
many U.S. investors when their shares are only offered or traded 
abroad, and so the sacrifice is less. In a certain portion of cases, the 
fact that an issuer's shares are sold or traded only abroad will tip 
the balance, and the U.S. regime will not be applied. The lowering 
of the sacrifice associated with having shares sold or offered only 
abroad will induce more issuers, both U.S. and foreign, to choose 
that route. This will reduce the volume of transactions effected in 
U.S. markets relative to what it would be absent the use of location 
as a factor by the United States in determining whether to apply its 
regime. 
Remember that almost all U.S. issuers today comply with the 
U.S. regime. Relaxing U.S. disclosure requirements therefore can- 
not attract additional U.S. issuers. Remember also that this will 
change in the future as a result of further global diffusion of finan- 
cial information. Foreign demand for U.S. issuer shares will in- 
crease sufficiently that, even if it were impossible for U.S. investors 
to effect transactions abroad, some U.S. issuers, to avoid the cur- 
rent U.S. level of required disclosure, would have their shares sold 
and traded only abroad. Adding the second component of global- 
ization into the analysis, this phenomenon will in fact be all the 
greater because it will be increasingly easy and inexpensive for U.S. 
investors to effect transactions abroad. 
A somewhat different analysis applies to foreign issuers. A time 
will come when, for a U.S. investor, effecting a transaction abroad 
becomes almost as easy and inexpensive as effecting one at home. 
At that point, no reason exists for foreign issuers to tolerate current 
U.S. disclosure requirements - at least to the extent that the 
United States does not use a perfectly implemented investor-pro- 
tection approach. This will be true no matter how much global dif- 
fusion of information has added to U.S. investor demand for their 
shares. Notwithstanding increases in U.S. investor demand for for- 
eign issuer shares, the second component of the globalization trend 
will, with current requirements, in the long run decimate at least the 
secondary trading in the United States of shares of foreign issuers 
that have not previously engaged in primary offerings in the United 
States or listed their shares on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ. Mar- 
ginal reductions in the level of disclosure required by the U.S. 
2625 August 1997] 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 15 Oct 2015 14:20:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Michigan Law Review 
would not help much, but a total elimination of the difference be- 
tween the U.S. level and levels abroad would help a great deal.212 
What then, is the overall effect of globalization's two compo- 
nents on the sensitivity of U.S. and foreign issuers to a reduction in 
the U.S.-required level of disclosure? The effect on U.S. issuers is 
clearly to increase their sensitivity. Many foreign issuers, on the 
other hand, might be almost entirely insensitive to minor reductions 
in the U.S. standard but very sensitive to a major reduction - one 
that takes the U.S. level down to the level of foreign countries. This 
situation will give rise to a mix of political pressures demanding, on 
the one hand, a major reduction in the U.S. level, and on the other, 
a move away from location-based tests for determining statutory 
reach. As discussed above, to the extent that the second element of 
the mix succeeds, the analysis of the effects of globalization returns 
to the immediately preceding section, which was devoted to the 
pure effects of global diffusion of information. Globalization will 
then be seen as increasing the sensitivity of issuers to the level of 
the U.S. disclosure requirements, but the reduction in cost and diffi- 
culty component to the trend would not be a contributing factor. 
b. How Increased Political Pressure Under the Current Ap- 
proach Can Lead to a Suboptimally Low Level of U.S. Required 
Disclosure. If the United States fails to switch to the issuer-nation- 
ality approach to statutory reach, there are good reasons to believe 
that the resulting increasing political pressures from globalization 
will succeed in lowering the disclosure required by the U.S. regime 
to a suboptimally low level. 
One reason for concern is the possibility of a disclosure "race to 
the bottom," as the United States and other countries each compete 
to grab as much of the world's securities trading activity as possi- 
ble.213 We have seen that it is reasonable to assume that in the 
prior era of relatively little transnational trading, the United States 
developed a.regime requiring a level of disclosure that maximizes 
U.S. welfare in terms of its capital allocation and agency cost of 
212. The dynamic nature of the situation may make this statement a slight oversimplifica- 
tion. It will probably be some time before it is almost as easy and inexpensive for a U.S. 
investor to effect a transaction abroad as at home. Until then, some foreign issuers will be 
sensitive to more minor reductions in the U.S. level of required disclosure. This, combined 
with the fact that under the current U.S. approach to statutory reach a foreign issuer's deci- 
sion to offer or list its securities in the United States and comply with to U.S. regime is 
essentially irreversible, might induce particularly strong political pressures for even a moder- 
ate relaxation of the U.S. regime. 
213. This simple "prisoner's dilemma" game theory model is set out with more detail and 
rigor in Fox, supra note 136, at 45-46, app. 2. 
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management reducing effects (the "substantively optimal" level of 
disclosure).214 
Imagine the following scenario. Transnational securities trans- 
actions become more prevalent, and U.S. authorities, in a desire not 
to lose U.S. issuers and to attract foreign issuers, lower the U.S.- 
required disclosure level. Assume for a moment that this would 
appear to be a welfare-enhancing move because, compared with 
maintaining the old stricter regime, the increased rents from the 
larger volume of transactions effected in the United States exceed 
the efficiency losses from requiring less than the substantively opti- 
mal level of disclosure. Other countries, however, now face a wel- 
fare loss as a result of the loss to the United States of transactions 
that would have occurred on their territories but for the reduction 
of the U.S. required disclosure level. In response, they lower their 
disclosure levels, seeing that the rents from the recaptured transac- 
tions exceed the welfare decline from now also having substantively 
suboptimal disclosure levels. Each country, including the United 
States, ultimately suffers a welfare loss: it has a substantively 
suboptimally low disclosure level and does not receive any compen- 
sating rents. 
The result would be the same if another country had moved first 
instead. Adopting a substantively suboptimal disclosure level of re- 
quired disclosure is, in game-theory terms, a dominant strategy. 
Each country is better off choosing this lower level of required dis- 
closure, no matter what the other countries do. Thus, choice of this 
lower level by all of them is an equilibrium. Absent some difficult- 
to-reach agreement among them, they are certain to make it. 
The race-to-the-bottom story describes how, under the current 
approach to statutory reach, a government that acts to maximize 
national welfare can end up with a substantively suboptimal disclo- 
sure level. The gain in rents from increased volume, which initially 
exceeds the welfare loss from reduced efficiency, withers away as a 
result of the competitive regulatory reactions of other countries. 
But this race-to-the-bottom story does not need to be right to con- 
clude that, under the current approach to statutory reach, globaliza- 
tion may well result in government policies representing a welfare 
loss to the United States. Public choice theory suggests how a gov- 
ernment could choose a substantively suboptimal level of required 
disclosure when the gain in rents is insufficient, even initially, to 
make up for the welfare loss from reduced resource allocation effi- 
214. See supra section IV.B.3. 
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ciency. This is because the persons enjoying the higher rents - 
members of the securities industry - are concentrated, whereas the 
losses from reduced efficiency are spread over a large portion of the 
public in the form of labor and suppliers of entrepreneurial talent. 
Politically, the actions of the concentrated gainers outweigh those 
of the diffuse losers. 
CONCLUSION 
Since their inception, mandatory disclosure rules have had at 
least three rationales. One is to protect investors from making poor 
investment decisions due to lack of knowledge. A second is to pro- 
tect the reputations of the markets in which investors buy securities. 
A third is to promote efficiency through better capital allocation 
and reduced agency costs of management. These rationales coex- 
isted peacefully for many decades because they differed little in 
their implications for legal choice. Their peaceful coexistence is 
coming to an end. Technological and political forces are moving us 
toward a situation where the share market for a large number of the 
world's issuers is becoming global. This trend raises the issue of 
statutory reach: Which country's disclosure regime should apply to 
which issuers? The different rationales give very different answers 
to this question. 
The need to decide on the best approach to statutory reach is 
thus an occasion to reexamine the three rationales for mandatory 
disclosure. The reexamination is revealing. Investor protection, 
while a worthy goal for many aspects of securities regulation, is a 
surprisingly weak justification for mandatory disclosure rules. As 
for market protection, it is hard to argue that in a world of compet- 
ing markets, any one market will enjoy a net gain in trading volume 
by having strict disclosure rules that give it a better reputation. The 
only rationale for mandatory disclosure that really holds up is 
efficiency. 
Identification of efficiency as the paramount rationale for 
mandatory disclosure suggests a clear principle of statutory reach. 
Each country should regulate the disclosure behavior of issuers of 
its nationality and no others. It should not be concerned with 
where an issuer's shares are traded or what the nationality of the 
buyers is. This approach assigns to each country regulatory author- 
ity over the issuers whose disclosure behavior most affects its wel- 
fare. Global welfare will be maximized, because each issuer will be 
regulated by the country that will benefit most by getting the level 
of required disclosure right. A switch to the issuer-nationality ap- 
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proach will also prevent a kind of regulatory competition that could 
lead to suboptimally low disclosure levels required by all countries. 
For similar reasons, the issuer-nationality approach is also the 
best approach for the United States in terms of promoting its own 
welfare. This is so even if other countries do not follow suit. 
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APPENDIX 
THE EFFECT OF LABOR SAVING BETTER ALLOCATION 
ON THE MARGINAL PRODUCT OF LABOR 
Economists commonly assume when examining economy-wide 
phenomema that firms have constant elasticity of substitution 
("CES") production functions. This requires that the production 
function (i) is linear homogenous (see supra note [capital saving in- 
novation analogy]) and (ii) has elasticity of substitution (the per- 
centage change in the ratio of marginal products-the marginal 
rate of substitution-for a given percentage change in inputs) that 
is constant over the full range of possible input combinations.215 
An example is the Cobb-Douglas production function, where the 
elasticity of substitution is 1. 
A CES production function for X may be expressed in the form 
Qx = X(L,K) = b[a LP+(1-a)KP]1P 
Y's production function, which differs from X's only in that the ac- 
tual number of units of labor act as though they were a greater 
number than that of "effective" units, can thus be stated as Qy = 
Y(L,K) = b[a (ELL)P + (1-a) KP]/p, where EL > 1. 
The elasticity of substitution for a CES production function can 
be shown to be a=l/1-p. It is usually assumed to be somewhere 
between 0 (no substitutability) and 1 (unitary substitutability) and 
thus it is assumed p < 0. 
The question of whether a reallocation analogous to a labor- 
saving innovation increases mppL is the question of whether d2Qy/ 
dLdEL > 0. If it is, dY/dL = dX/dL when EL=1 (that is, when 
Y(L,K) =X(L,K)) and dY/dL > dX/dL for and given L when EL>1 
(as assumed here). 
dQ 1-p 
(1) -=b[a (ELL)P+ (1-a)KP] P aELLP-1 
dL 
>0 >0 >0 >0 
d2 Q ' '-2p p -1 p 
(2) =baLPi [[(1 
-)[a(EL L)P + (1-ac)KP]P (cLPE EL )+ dLdEL > 
[>oL <+<0 >0L 
[a(EL L)P + (1-a)KPj 1pET 
215. See HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 99, at 62, 85-89. 
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For notational convenience, set 
1-2p 
U = (1-p)[c(ELL)P+(1-a)KP] P (aLPELP1)ELP 
and 
1-p 
V = [a(ELL)P+(1-a)KP] P pELP-l 




if and only if < 1. 
U 
-V -P [a(ELL)p + (1-a)KP] 
(3) 
U (l-p) a(ELL)P 
(4) =( -P + (1-a)KP 
I 1-p A ax(ELL)P j 
(l-c)KP/a (ELL)P, the second part of the expression in brackets, 
is the ratio of capital's share of national income to that of labor. 





(5) (dQ/dL)L a(ELL)P 
Thus, with empirical estimates of the marginal rate of 
a-1 
substitution a and hence of p = 
and of the ratio of capital's to labor's shares of national income, we 
can tell, assuming CES production functions, whether labor saving 
reallocation will raise or lower the marginal product of labor. 
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Labor's share in the United States has been estimated at 
approximately 0.65 and capital's share at approximately 0.35.216 
Thus, equation (5), which equals the second part of the bracketed 
expression in equation (4), equals 0.54. The entire bracketed 
expression would therefore equal 1.54. Given this, we can see from 
equation (4) that -V/U will be less than 1 (and hence mppl will 
increase with labor saving better allocation) if (-p/l-p) is less than 
0.65. This would be true for any value of p > -1.86 and hence for 
any elasticity of substitution greater than 0.37 - because the 
elasticity of the production function equals 1/1-p. 
Kravis, using a time series analysis, has estimated the "historic" 
elasticity of substitution of the U.S. economy as 0.64.217 Arrow, 
Chenery, Minhas, and Solow explored various ways of measuring 
the elasticity of substitution in various sectors of the economy, in 
the U.S. economy as a whole and transnationally. Using two 
different time series tests, they developed respective estimates for 
the nonfarm sector of the U.S. economy of 0.569 and 1.10.218 They 
also performed a cross-section analysis involving 24 industries and 
19 countries.219 The elasticity of substitution in all but one was less 
than 1.00, but none were lower than 0.721. A review of the 
significance tests of these estimates suggests that most of them 
would be greater than 0.37 at a ninety-percent confidence level.220 
Overall, the available evidence suggests that it is very unlikely 
that the elasticity of substitution in the United States or in other 
developed economies is less than 0.37 and thus very unlikely that 
even labor-saving allocational improvements would lower labor's 
marginal product. 
216. See Kravis, supra note 113, at 925. 
217. See id. at 940. 
218. See Arrow et al., supra note 113, at 244-46. 
219. Arrow et al. suggest that their industry data in their 19 countries are best explained, 
not by the assumption that the production function for each industry is the same in every 
country, but that the industry's elasticity of substitution is the same for every country with 
the production functions differing only by a factor neutral efficiency factor - in the 
statement of X's and Y's production functions, b. See id. at 234-38, 246. 
220. See id. at 227-28. 
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